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James Perry Esq^r
From the Author

THE

BALANCE OF POWER

IN

EUROPE.

T. Miller, Printer, Noble Street, Cheapside.

AN

HISTORICAL RESEARCH

INTO THE NATURE OF THE

BALANCE OF POWER

IN

EUROPE:

WITH AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS ON THAT SUBJECT, AND TO REDUCE IT TO A SYSTEM SUSCEPTIBLE OF IMPROVEMENT.

BY

GOULD FRANCIS LECKIE.

Je me doute bien d'abord que ce projet sera regardé comme une de ces magnifiques chimères, de ces oisives speculations politiques, auxquelles se livre un esprit ami des idées singulieres. Ceux qui en jugeront ainsi, ne peuvent etre que cette sorte de gens, a qui la premiere impression d'une imagination prevenue tient lieu de regle; on ceux a qui l'eloignement des tems et l'ignorance des circonstances feront confondre le plus sage et le plus noble des entreprises, avec ces capricieux projets, dout on a vu de tous tems se repaitre les princes entêtés de leur pouvoir. *Memoire de Sully, Livre* 30.

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1817.

DEC 18 1968
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ADVERTISEMENT.

At length this work appears, which ought to have been presented to the Public during the last spring; and which would have been then published if it had not been suspended in consequence of a disagreement between the Author and the Publisher who was first employed: the sentence of a court of law has replaced the manuscript in the possession of the Author, and has enabled him to confide the printing of the remaining part, and the publication of the whole, to more trust-worthy hands.

The Public is only so far interested in this information as it tends to exculpate the present Printer, who has executed his part of the performance with the most satisfactory evidence of his skill and precision, from the reproach of so long a page of Errata. It is feared that even now many errors have escaped the vigilance of the corrector, though he has been obliged to recommend the reprinting of nearly one hundred pages in that part of the work which had been finished before the present Printer was employed.

ERRATA.

Page 15, line 21, for ' which' *read* ' who.'
21, 5, omit the comma between ' Emperor' and ' Galienus.'
22, 11, after ' Alaric' a comma instead of a semicolon.
23, note, line 2, for ' μουον' *read* ' μονον.'
24, last line, omit the comma after ' was.'
25, line 13, for ' Merovigniun' *read* ' Merovingian.'
26, 10, omit the comma after ' disorder.'
28, 2, for ' Recimer' *read* ' Ricimer.'
39, 4, for ' that' *read* ' the.'
47, 8, for ' have' *read* ' has.'
50, 4, omit the comma after ' Leo.'
53, 2, for ' dutchy' *read* ' duchy,' *passim.*
54, 11, for ' in the favor' *read* ' in favor.'
64, 25, for ' ceeded' *read* ' ceded.'
78, 8, for ' preceded' *read* ' proceeded.'
79, last line, for ' physic' *read* ' physics.'
81, line 2, for ' Carlovignian' *read* ' Carlovingian.'
Ib. 5, for ' overspead' *read* ' overspread.'
84, 3, for ' Neutria' *read* ' Neustria.'
85, 4, for ' Pepins' *read* ' Pepin.'
Ib. 26, for ' fouth' *read* ' fourth.'
88, 17, for ' Mayance' *read* ' Mayence.'
98, 1, for ' Tamelane' *read* ' Tamerlane.'
Ib. 3, for ' . The' *read* ' , the.'
106, 9, omit the comma after ' Henry.'
Ib. 22, for ' chiefs' *read* ' chief.'
107, 9, for ' were' *read* ' was.'
110, 5, for ' Vladinir' *read* ' Vladimir.'
112, 21, for ' imperial' *read* ' spiritual power.'
115, 1, for ' apellation' *read* ' appellation.'
117, 19, for ' for' *read* ' against.'
120, 18, for ' popes' *read* ' pope.'
121, 2, for ' to' *read* ' against.'
Ib. 21, for ' monastaries' *read* ' monasteries.'
125, 18, for the first ' the' *read* ' this.'
127, 14, for ' expend' *read* ' expand.'
138, 13, for ' was' *read* ' were.'
145, 16, for ' rivalty' *read* ' rivality.'
146, 11, for ' expeditions' *read* ' expedition.'
175, 20, for ' collissions' *read* ' collisions.'
178, 9, omit the comma after ' cabinets.'
Ib. 18, for ' or' *read* ' our.'
180, 21, for ' alliances' *read* ' alliance.'
185, 6, for ' right' *read* ' rights.'
186, 9 and 10, omit ' and' before ' placed,' and insert ' and' before ' declared.'

ERRATA.

Page 187, line 21, omit the 'colon.'
191, 13, for 'guaranteing' *read* 'guaranteeing.'
195, 23, for 'states' *read* 'state.'
198, 1, insert 'of' after 'crown.'
200, 17, for 'litteral' *read* 'literal.'
Ib. 22, for 'conferrences' *read* 'conferences.'
216, 14, for 'cateau' *read* 'chateau.'
235, last line, insert 'to' before 'France.'
254, line 15, for 'alliances' *read* 'alliance.'
255, 23, for 'morcels' *read* 'morsels.'
Ib. 25, for 'vassals' *read* 'vassal.'
256, note, for 'traties' *read* 'traités.'
289, note, line 13, for 'example' *read* 'exemple.'
Ib. line 15, for 'inconnue' *read* 'inconnus.'
Ib. last line, for 'out' *read* 'ou.'
290, note, line 1, for 'specific' *read* 'pacific.'
292, line 9, for 'relalised' *read* 'realised.'
302, note, line 2, for 'traties' *read* 'traités.'
307, line 10, for 'palatineate' *read* 'palatinate.'
310, 6, omit the stop after 'Austria.'
311, 20, for 'he' *read* 'be.'
354, 20, for 'I' *read* 'we.'
356, 25, 26, for 'laid claims to the right of becoming' *read* 'asserted claims and become Mahomedans.'
366, 11, for 'five' *read* 'four.'

PREFACE.

I WISH the reader to consider this work in the same light in which I view it myself, that is as speculative: I have, however, grounded myself in the known history of Europe, and to those readers whose fastidious delicacy may be shocked by some of my proposals, I flatter myself that I shall present a little book of historico-political reference, which will facilitate the studies of some, and recal agreeably the forgotten learning of others. I certainly have no wish or design to offend any one; and even in those places in which I have had occasion to speak of the negociations of my own times, I have not forgotten that the minis-

gloriously continued with this view, should be terminated with such securities as would dissipate the apprehension of its revival.

The geographical position of the British isles points out clearly that no accession of territory on the continent can be desirable; but their political relation with the continent points out clearly that it is their best policy to establish and preserve a steady balance of its various powers; and as the former of these considerations affords the most reasonable pledge of the impartiality of Great Britain, the latter presents the most solid security that can be found of her good faith; and together, they qualify her for the office of umpire above any other power in Europe. If we consider the monstrous weight of Russia, and the rising greatness of North America, with the various disputes in which we are every day liable to be implicated on both sides of the Atlantic, and more than all, the exhausted

condition of our finances, we may, when it is too late, find that we shall have more objects to attend to than we shall be well able to embrace, and if we let slip the opportunity of settling Europe on a firm basis, we must sacrifice our present prosperity, and shorten the duration of Great Britain as a great and powerful empire.

In the course of this work many points are only touched on, and left unfinished; the intelligent reader will be able, if he pleases, to supply many deductions which are evident from the reasonings of the writer: the reader without intelligence, would only be fatigued had the subject been more extended; and it is not clear that he would have comprehended the views of the writer a jot better.

Bulstrode Street,
December 16, 1816.

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AN

HISTORICAL RESEARCH,

&c.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

NATIONS would probably degenerate without occasional war; but the frequency or long protraction of wars must be reckoned among the greatest of human evils: and when we consider them in this light, we are surprised to find that no statesmen have ever seriously turned their thoughts to discover from what latent seeds of mischief in the principles or policy of states, one quarrel is constantly observed to arise out of another; the recurrence of hostilities becomes so frequent; their duration so long; and the condition of peace so precarious.

The notion of some recluse and speculative

philosophers, who have supposed that an epoch would some day arrive, when men would attain to such perfection in virtue and wisdom as to produce eternal peace in the civilized world, is one of those chimæras which may indeed amuse, but not instruct: with such reasonings, it is not the intention of the present work to engage the reader; and were we to suppose such a state of things possible, that very tranquillity would in the course of time generate so much disorder, and such a relaxation of principles, both public and private, as would inevitably bring us back to the point from whence we had departed; for the state of war would be revived by the eruptions of distant barbarians, against whom established order would cease to afford security. The history of nations in the period subsequent to such an event, would exhibit the same chaos of invasions, treaties, conquests, &c. with which that of the past is replete. The intent and scope of the present work is much more limited; it is merely an inquiry, whether the great system of independent states could not be so improved, as to insure, for longer periods, the duration of peace; by giving them such a relative position as should at once make wars less general, and the incentives to them fewer and weaker.

The writings of the greatest historians and

philosophers are full of reproaches to sovereigns and states, for their blindness and misplaced ambition, in plunging mankind on the most frivolous occasions into the most destructive contests: yet no one has ever seriously endeavoured to point out by what plan of policy steadily pursued they are at least to be moderated, if not totally avoided. The subjecting independent states to the decrees of an Amphyctionic council, or to a general diet as in Germany, has already evinced its own insufficiency.

It is taken for granted, that the enlightened reader will not expect, in this place, to find such visionary plans offered to him: he is invited to take a survey of past events; and from them, together with a proper knowledge of human nature, to suggest if possible a system of politics which may render the different nations of Europe more tranquil and secure. To this end, it is necessary to begin by affixing clear and distinct ideas to an expression familiar to every one, and to which perhaps few attach strictly the same signification, namely, the Balance of Power.

The first motive to undertake this work was suggested by the speeches of noblemen in the upper House in 1814, who looked forward (they

said) with a lively hope, to see the Balance of Power in Europe restored on the ruin of Napoleon's throne. They did not, however, explain what they meant by the restoration of the Balance of Power; whether they looked forward to the replacing every thing as it had formerly stood, or whether they meant a new order of things, either general or partial. From this suggestion it occurred, that an inquiry into the nature, history, vicissitudes, and oscillations of the Balance of Power might tend, if clearly made, to improve the diplomacy of modern times. But as the history of mankind consists principally in a struggle on one side to overthrow the balance, and to preserve it on the other; an historical discourse of the different phases it has exhibited for the last ten centuries, that is, from the conquest of France, Germany, and Italy, by the Francs, cannot but be an interesting subject, as it must necessarily throw considerable light on the present state of politics. Although the writer feels that the importance of the subject requires the exercise of superior abilities, he hopes, nevertheless, to demonstrate pretty clearly, that the disorders and revolutions which during that period have disturbed mankind have arisen from the imperfection of that balance; from the inexperience of nations; the ignorance and superstition

which overspread the world; and more than all, from pretensions left by princes to their successors, incompatible with each other, and with any peaceable accommodation. Time alone can shew whether the adoption or rejection of the inferences he would draw from the picture he is about to trace will improve the state of nations, or plunge them into more misery and difficulties. If future experience should establish the credit of his reasonings, and a favourable combination of events promote his views for the improvement of the public right of Europe; the hints here suggested will eventually prove serviceable to mankind. To the maturity of this hope he cannot pretend to look forward; the shortness of life precludes it: still, future negociators may be, perhaps, actuated by some of his reflections, which alone is sufficient encouragement to pursue his task.

The following is the plan of this work: First, to trace the partial system of balances in ancient times, and the destruction of them in the universal dominion of Rome: Secondly, The irruption of the barbarous nations, the confusion previous to the age of Charlemagne, and the rise of Ecclesiastical Power, down to the commencement of the ninth century: Afterwards it is designed to trace, in four periods, the relative weight and influence

of the different bodies in the great community of states: and to conclude with an endeavour to point out that possible distribution of territory, which would best preserve the steadiest balance, and be most conducive to the peace and prosperity of all.

The perpetual state of warfare among the Grecian republics, did indeed urge some distinguished men of those times to consider this subject; but having few historical records to reason from, they seem not to have done more than touch it superficially. One work has come down to us, the famous oration, or rather pamphlet, of Isocrates, addressed to Philip of Macedon; it consists in shewing how advantageous it would be to the Grecians, were they to unite with that prince, in an offensive league against the Persians. But this scheme is imperfect; for it makes no provision for the internal political arrangement of the different states:—It proposes no plan of federative union, reserving to each town its own municipal laws; and vesting in the crown of Macedon the power of arbitrating between those who had any differences to settle. The want of such a necessary convention was fatal to Greece, as well as to Macedon; for the war against the Persians being realized by Alexander, the contest among his generals for the succession threw the whole

mass into disorder; and Greece and Macedon divided from the conquests in Asia, and from each other, became, at a subsequent time, too weak to resist the Romans.

Plutarch, in his life of Pyrrhus confesses himself at a loss on this very interesting subject. "It is not," he says, "to be imagined, how it be possible for those whose lust of conquest neither the sea, nor the mountains, nor deserts can contain, and whose views are not bounded by the natural limits of Europe and Asia, to remain long quiet, when they are continually touching and clashing together.

We have in an oration of Demosthenes in favour of the Megalopolitans, a testimony that the leading men of Greece had formed some notion of erecting a balance of power: in that oration, the reasons adduced to persuade the Athenians to support the Arcadians against their present allies, the Spartans, present in miniature a picture of the received principles of balances, as understood at this day. Two causes rendered it impossible to reduce them to practice; the one, the nature of their government, republican, turbulent, and unsteady; the other was the smallness of the territories of these states; for in one day the capital was taken and universal ruin produced.

From this historical view, and from these

reflections, the writer is induced to examine how far the European system of modern times is exempt from these inconveniences; and further, what obstacles still present themselves to a nearer approximation towards a more durable and steady order of things?

The present generation is in possession of the records, more or less perfect, of various nations, which, without encroaching too much on the fabulous legends of antiquity, comprehend a space little short of twenty-four centuries.

The philosophic reader of history cannot but reflect with pain, that these records contain for the most part a register of wars, crimes, and calamities of every kind.

Contiguous nations or states have never been at a loss for pretexts to go to war. The talents of the greatest statesmen have been exerted in making such arrangements as appeared most likely to insure and to prolong the blessings of peace. The treaties so often ratified and so often violated, remain testimonies of these insufficient attempts to preserve them. The doctrine of a counterpoise among nations, in order to make the declaration of war, by any one, less alluring to the general rapacity and ambition is, as we have seen, not new among men. Unfortunately such have hitherto been the effects, that every balance

which has been tried has proved insufficient for its end: a defect somewhere has always been found to originate fresh discords and miseries.

If we go back to the most remote periods of antiquity, we find the general peace reposing on a vast extent of territory reduced under the domination of a single chief; but this system necessarily draws after it a delegation of sovereign power to lieutenants of extensive provinces; which, added to the degeneracy consequent on a long state of repose, is a sure source of corruption in every department; and enterprising neighbours are soon invited by these advantages to attempt the subversion of such powers. The empire of the Medes was overturned by the Persians, who followed through every step the same career; every trace of civil liberty was by degrees effaced all over Asia, and so it has remained to this day.

Such was the condition of Asia when the small states of Greece having established in every part warlike republics, break forth to our notice. The internal defects of their government, together with the jarring interests of so many independencies, produced an unceasing series of wars. In this posture of affairs Lacedemon and Athens surrounded themselves with confederates from motives of self-defence and ambition. On a sudden

Thebes rose to a leading influence; and the balance between the two former states might have been expected to become more stable from the intervention of a third; but the facility, even in that event, of crushing all three, with their confederacies, was felt by Jason of Pheræ, as may be seen in the speech of Polydamus the Thessalian to the Spartans.* The violent death of Jason, with the subsequent disorders in Thessaly, prolonged for a short time the independence of Greece; leaving its people to make violent efforts to give consistence to a system too susceptible of violent changes.

Shortly after this arose the Macedonian power; and the Grecians, unable either to profit of their independence, or submit to the Macedonians, present the picture of a cluster of states, without any balance whatever.

The conquests of Alexander the Great, and his premature death, again deranged every thing; his expedition into Asia, while it drained Greece of its soldiers, was ultimately the cause of the invasion of the Gauls;† and the fall of the Persian empire produced a long and memorable contention among his successors. From that time the consequence

* See Xenoph. lib. 6. cap. 1.

† See Diod. Sic. Fragment, lib. 22.

of the Grecian republics began to decline; and we find, after a few feeble attempts to recover it, that the influence of the princes who reigned in Macedon bore down the independence of Greece. The Spartans, differing in their laws and manners from the rest of Greece, could not coalesce into one body with their countrymen, and thus they prevented the union of all into one form of government, which was one of the great obstacles to the perfection of the Achæan league. The fate of Cleomenes was decided by the arms of Antigonus; fresh disturbances were excited by the infamous injustice and rapacity of the Etolians; Macedon would have reduced the whole if these had not invited the Romans into Greece.

Thus, in early times, the maturity of every system was prevented by the intrusion of a new power on the scene of action, which totally altered the existing relations of each. If we trace the rise of the Roman power from its origin to the period now before us, we shall find that similar accidents influenced the relations of the independent states in its neighbourhood, but produced different results. The Romans, confined in their origin to a very narrow territory, by degrees conquered, and coalesced into one mass with those whom they had subdued; a policy which the Greeks never pursued, as they reduced their allies to the rank of

subjects to the sovereign state. By this enlightened policy of the Romans, Rome became the head of a large portion of Italy, was at length able to cope with the confederation of Hetruria, and finally to extend her dominion to the southern extremity of that Peninsula. In this space of time she was often attacked by the Gauls, but she as often repulsed them by her superior courage and discipline.

At the epoch now before us, the nations bordering on the Mediterranean were further advanced in the arts of civil society than any other on the face of the earth; yet it cannot be said there existed any system of balance of power among them. Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, formed an heterogeneous mass of relations without order or stability; fit only to excite and nourish the ambition of each, according as opportunities occurred; and though we see a continued series of unsuccessful attempts to rectify and consolidate them, they were in general either misunderstood, imperfectly developed, or ineffectual. In Greece itself a secondary class of them prevailed, arising naturally from the respective position of its various states. About that time, Rome was acquiring the dominion of Italy. Spain, ruled in its interior by barbarous and warlike chiefs, was only partially subdued by Carthage: the

half of Sicily was a province of that republic, which, by war and commerce, had placed itself at the head of the African nations. Thus in three different parts arose systems of external relations, bearing on three distinct centers: the first, in Italy; the second, in Greece and Asia; the third, in Carthage, Spain, and Sicily.

Rome and Carthage met in Sicily; the power of each was balanced only during the time required to decide the contest between them: Carthage being at length reduced to a dependance on Rome, the scene opened still wider; by degrees the affairs of Greece were implicated with those of Italy; but the disunion of the former and the inferiority of the Macedonian power decided the struggle in favor of Rome. Antiochus who had, in Asia, the preponderance among the successors to the spoils of Alexander the Great, perceived, when it was too late, his error in quietly beholding the encroachments of the Romans in Greece and Macedon; nor did this mistake give warning to the king of Egypt, nor to the princes of Asia, who, in their turns, were all reduced by these universal conquerors.

If we reflect on these vicissitudes, we shall see that one of the principal causes of them was, that in Asia Minor, in Greece, in Africa, in Italy, while the science of political government was

unfolding itself, the component members of each were struggling to establish their respective balances, without being aware of the approaching contact of the others; the theatre of foreign politics opened upon them unexpectedly, and a confusion took place which changed the relative position of all. In this progress, the Romans, who were the best statesmen and soldiers, knew how to turn events to their own advantage, and finished by establishing a dominion over all. The supremacy of Rome being thus established, and the civil wars terminated, which abolished the republican and introduced the monarchic form of government; the spirit of aggrandizement was laid aside. Here all balances were at an end, except only that which remained in respect of Persia. The northern barbarians were not yet on the scene of action, and the civilized world formed one empire.

The imperfect balances of the ancient world, and their continual fluctuations before the union of civilized Europe into one body by the conquests of the Romans, can have but little connexion with the political system of modern times. The period therefore from which we must begin our enquiry, is the dissolution of the Roman empire, and the establishment of the various nations who sat down upon its ruins. It is, in fact, to this origin and to the consequent events,

that the present state of the European world owes its form. Without tracing the various combinations of circumstances which concurred to produce these results, it is impossible to judge properly of the political state of this quarter of the globe. This enquiry will, therefore, be both useful and necessary to the statesman who, not only in the present but in succeeding times, may be employed in the management and conclusion of negociations for treaties of peace; for how is it possible to propose arrangements for the future, without knowing, not only what the state of Europe was at the beginning of the revolutionary war, but what train of events brought about that state of affairs? In order then to go to the source, we must take a cursory view of those nations whose establishment, in remote ages, laid the foundation of the present kingdoms of Europe.

It will be obvious to every reader, that an unbounded desire of conquest actuated the various swarms of barbarians, which, in rapid succession, invaded every part of this continent. Each advanced on the theatre of action with indefinite views; and the re-action of these various impulses finally produced the outline of the complicated picture before us. It is evident, that no notion of a Balance of Power could, for a very long period, have occurred to our unpo-

lished ancestors; it must have resulted, at length, from mutual fear and the sentiment of self-preservation. Although it is here not intended to write a general history of events, but to trace the origin and progress of the Balance of Power, it will perhaps not be improper to take a view of these nations, from their first military enterprises to their final settlement, and amalgamation with the people whom they subdued. In this the dates will occasionally be inserted, and the progress of each will be separately but briefly stated, for the better understanding of the political situation of affairs through the periods proposed. Let us then pass in review the Goths, Vandals, Sarmatians, Huns, Franks, Allemanni, Longobards, Saracens, Saxons and Normans. These, with the rise and progress of the temporal power of the Popes, will bring us to the state of Europe in the time of Charlemagne: for the very form and pressure of modern Europe are evidently derived from that great and leading epoch. A previous knowledge of the events which led to or at least preceded it, must be deserving of some consideration; and indeed without it, it may be doubted whether modern statesmen can be considered as having clear and distinct conceptions of the present state of affairs.

The barbarians who overturned the Roman

empire are known to the reader of history, by various uncouth names; and yet it does not appear, that all these nations varied entirely in language and manners; they will therefore be classed here in a different manner from that which has been usual with former writers, in order to prevent the confusion, which must naturally arise from considering each distinctly, under the titles they assumed. We shall here divide them into the Gothic or Teutonic, the Sarmatians, and the Huns. The Celtic tribes appear to have overspread Spain, Gaul, and Britain, in the earliest times; and after the conquest of these countries by the Romans, never to have performed any thing worthy of the notice of the historian; their descendants may be traced by their language, which is spoken in the west of Scotland, Ireland, Wales, Britanny, and, as some writers assert, in part of the Pyrennees. In all the reverses which the Roman empire experienced, they do not seem ever to have taken the lead, or to have been more than a declining race. Cesar, in his account of Gaul, shews that they had been invaded by the Belgi and Aquitani, who seem to have been of Teutonic origin. It is therefore unnecessary to say more of this people.

The Gothic or Teutonic race are the most distinguished in the annals of mankind. From this stock the Goths, Franks, Burgundians, Lombards, and Normans spring, for the Gepidi, Heruli, Alani, and others, all spoke the Gothic or Teutonic tongue, from which the modern Saxon or German is derived. The Sarmatians are a distinct tribe from these; and the Poles, and Illyrian nations, are their descendants; the admixture of their language with that of Russia and of Bohemia, shews the connection of these last nations with the Sarmatian horde. The Bulgarians, or Bolgarians, or Volgarians, are traced from the Volga, in the neighbourhood of Astrachan, and shew their Tartar origin. Lastly, the people of Hungary, if our accounts are to be depended upon, are to be traced from the most eastern parts of Siberia, bordering on the deserts of China. These races are only interesting in proportion to the magnitude of those nations which are severally descended from them, and of course will occupy us only according to the weight and importance of their several establishments.

During the period which immediately succeeded to the fall of the republic of Rome, while the Roman armies still preserved the discipline and energy of former times, the

countries of the Gauls or Celtes, were reduced to the state of provinces; and the Germans, governed by petty sovereigns, were unable to resist the power of the emperors. The history of the first ages of the Germans we owe to the Roman historians. The wars of Varus and Germanicus prove with what difficulty they were repressed. They seem to have lived under the command of independent chieftains, who from time to time confederated together, and chose a chief whenever they meditated any enterprise of plunder or conquest. On these occasions they assumed a title; at one time, it was Goths or Guten, that is, good men, brave and staunch to each other; at others, it was an universal coalition, and hence the title of Alemani or all men, of Franks or free men, of Vandals, from vandilen, to wander, because these tribes led a wandering pastoral life on the coast of the Baltic; and the Longobards were so called from the length of their beards.

About the beginning of the fifth century, the Vandals, united with the Alani and Suevi, invaded Spain; and nearly at the same time, Stilicho invited these nations into Gaul. The Vandals settled in the country, anciently called Betica; the Alani fixed in Portugal and in the

territory of Carthagene. These having entered Spain under the command of Genseric king of the Vandals, were afterwards invited by the count Boniface into Africa, where the Vandal empire existed nearly two centuries, till it was finally overthrown by the arms of Justinian under the celebrated Belisarius. This event, of which Procopius has given us the detail, is perhaps one of the most lamentable in history. The declining empire of the east was animated by the personal qualities of Belisarius; but what his talents had achieved, the Byzantines knew not how to preserve. Had not the Vandals been subdued by the eastern emperors, they might in a subsequent time have been able to resist the Mahometans who afterwards invaded the northern coast of Africa. They would have ceased to be barbarous, and the country which they possessed, so near to Europe, might have been a part of the civilized world to this day. But the Vandals have been erased from the annals of mankind long ago, and therefore deserve no farther attention. The irruption of the Goths who first invaded Italy in the fourth century in the reign of Honorius, and the subsequent oppression of that country by Ricimer who made and unmade emperors, are only to be considered as preparatory to the

Gothic kingdom of Italy. The history* of this people, like all the annals of barbarians, is but little interesting to the modern reader. Without relating their ravages in the time of the emperor, Gallienus, it will suffice to our purpose to observe, that they were divided into two principal branches originating in a common stock; the Ostrogoths, who before their establishment in Italy, had settled in Pannonia, and were in alliance with Zeno; and the Visigoths, who had previously conquered the province of Aquitain, and occupied a large tract of country, from the Pyrennees to the city of Toledo.

The Goths, according to Jornandes, followed two principal families: the Visigoths were ruled by the illustrious house of Balti; the Ostrogoths by that of Amala. In the reign of Honorius, the province of Aquitain was assigned to the Visigoths: Toulouse was the capital of that kingdom, which took the name of Gascony,† on that occasion. This new power, like all the invaders of those days, sought, by every means, to extend its empire by encroaching on the neighbouring provinces of Gaul and of Spain.

* See Jornandes, cap. 14.

† See Paulus Emilius de rebus Franc. lib. 1.

This latter kingdom had, as we have seen, been occupied before that time by the Vandals, when Vallia, the third prince in succession from Ataulphus, who had succeeded to Rigerius, beat the Vandals in several battles: that prince died in Toulouse, whither he returned in triumph in the year 428. After a succession of four kings, Theoderic the Fifth was killed at Challons, in a battle against the Huns, whose invasion was thus repressed by the Visigoths of Aquitain. Alaric; the last king of that nation, was killed in 507, in Poictiers, by Clovis, king of the Franks; and thus was the whole extent from the Pyrennees to the Loire, added to the dominions of the latter. The Visigoths, driven in this manner from Toulouse, established themselves at Toledo. It is not necessary to enumerate the successors of Gesalaric, who re-established the monarchy after the disasters which it had suffered from the arms of Clovis, and extended their empire over the greater part of Spain. The pitch of civilization and improvement, at which this nation arrived, may be seen by referring to the works of the learned Giannone. The kingdom of the Visigoths flourished in Spain, from their emigration out of France, till 713, when the invasion of the Saracens altered its face, and rendered that

Peninsula a scene of intestine war, for more than the space of seven centuries.

These circumstances must be called to the recollection of the reader; as the sovereigns of Spain, who, by degrees, recovered the country from the Mahomedan yoke, boasted their lineage from the Gothic kings; and the union of that kingdom under Ferdinand and Isabella, concentrated, in one point, all pretentions to the throne, which were originally derived from the illustrous house of Balti.

We have the testimony of all writers, that the Franks, as above-mentioned, were a branch of the Gothic stock.* It will be necessary to mark the progress of this people from the forests of Germany to their establishment, as one of the principal nations of Europe. As early as the year 260, we find these Teutonic tribes, confederated under the name of Franks, attacking Gaul. They were repulsed by the emperors Gallienus and Aurelian, and finally by Julian;† after whose death, as Zosimus tells

* Constantine Porphyrogenetus, speaking of these nations, says, εν ονομασιν μονον και ουδενι ετερῳ διαλλατοντες; and in the same chapter, he says, και Γερμανες τους νυν καλουμενους φραγγους. Const. Porp. part 2. ch. 25.

† Const. Porp. lib. 4. c. 3.

us, they crossed the Rhine again, in the reign of Valentinian.

It appears, that before the time of Clovis, the Franks had been settled, by treaty with Julian, in that part of Gaul adjacent to Cambray, about the year 486; they beat Siagrius, and placed the seat of their monarchy at Soissons, and between that period and the year 496, that they conquered to the Pyrennees, having, as we have before observed, driven the Visigoths into Spain. Three years before this, Clovis had married Clotilda, daughter of Chilperic, king of Burgundy.

At that time the kingdom of the Franks extended beyond the Wahal and the Rhine, In the year 495, Armorica, or the country between the mouths of the Seine and Loire, voluntarily submitted to his dominion.

Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths, was married to Audeflede, sister of Clovis, and an alliance was formed between them by which Gondebaud, king of Burgundy, and successor to Chilperic, was sacrificed. Thus were his dominions divided between the Franks and the Ostrogoths.* It was, by means of these mea-

* Mr. Gentz, in his Fragments on the Balance of Power, considers the partition system as a new invention. Whatever is physically possible, will one time or other, be attempted, at the

sures, that the Franks extended themselves over Gaul, and formed the present kingdom of France. It is unnecessary to trace the intricate succession of the princes, who succeeded to Clovis; at one time, dividing the empire into four kingdoms, and at another, re-uniting it under the first and second Clothaire and Dagobert. The vicious policy of dividing the states of princes among their sons, was one of those incentives to war, which have been obviated in modern times.

The weakness and degeneracy of the Merovignian princes, Clovis the third, Childebert the third, Dagobert the third, and Chilperic the second, established the authority of Pepin and of Charles Martel. We find Pepin, the son of Charles Martel, and the father of Charlemagne, proclaimed king of France, in 751; he is succeeded by Charlemagne in the year 786.

Having briefly traced the rise of the French monarchy to the eighth century, let us take a general view of the countries beyond the Rhine and Danube, in order to prepare all the neces-

instigation of the passions or interests of mankind; in states balanced by a well-constructed international system, such an event must be calculated on and prevented, not preached against, as preaching is useless in politics.

sary materials for a political review of Europe, up to the same period of its modern history.

The commencement of the fifth century * shews us the origin of the principal nations of Europe, and the infancy of the present political system. Swarms of barbarians, mostly from Germany, poured forth on all sides upon the Roman empire, overwhelmed it, and from its vast ruins formed the kingdoms and states of modern times. This astonishing disorder, among nations, was caused by the emigration of the Huns from the frontiers of China, their native soil. This race of Siberians, driven back by the Chinese, fled westward, and established themselves on the Tanais, and on the coasts of the Euxine sea. Their savage appearance and unknown language, struck such terror into the people bordering on the Roman empire, that we are very gravely told by Jornandes in his history of the Goths, that the Huns were supposed to be the offspring of witches, begotten on them by the evil spirits and demons of the Siberian desert. From this new settlement they drove out the Alani, who threw themselves on the Goths, and who, under the reign of Gallienus, settled between the Danube and the Niester. The Goths thus impelled, threw

* Pfeffel.

themselves into Pannonia, where they remained for some time. These were the Ostrogoths of whom we have already made mention. The Alani, uniting themselves with the Vandals, penetrated through Germany and France into Spain.

The Visigoths first attacked Italy; but being repulsed, followed the steps of the Vandals and Alani into Aquitain and Spain. The Vandals were thus pushed on into that country by the latter, and by the invitation of Boniface they crossed over to Africa: they there established a flourishing kingdom, which was afterwards overthrown by the arms of Justinian.

At the same time the Suevi joined the Alemanni, not only took possession of the right bank of the Rhine as far as the Maine, but also of Helvetic Rhætia, and Vindelicia, as far as the river Lech, which was then the limit of their territory, and still remains the boundary of the circle of Swabia.

The Angles and Saxons, the ancient inhabitants of Sleswic and Holstein, passed under Hengist and Horsa over to Britain, and founded the Saxon power. The Heruli and Rugi, people of Pomerania, under the command of Odoacer, overturned the empire of the west,

* Const. Porphy. Pt. 2. ch. 25.

and established the kingdom of Italy, after the death of Recimer, the Goth.

The period of the Ostrogoths being in Italy, whose history has been already recalled to the readers memory, (notwithstanding the declamations of modern writers, who are too apt to rely on the faith of the Byzantine authors,) was perhaps one of the most happy epochs of the Italian history. The invasion of Belisarius brought a fresh series of disasters, on that unfortunate country. The declining state of the eastern empire disabled the emperors from preserving and governing it. The Italians were oppressed by the corrupt and feeble government of the Greeks; Narses, who succeeded to Belisarius in the command, was master of Beneventum with a territory comprehending the modern kingdom of Naples:* pope Zachary, an Athenian by birth, then presided over the church of Rome: and Narses, having been obliged to continue the war against Teja the last Gothic king, who had succeeded Totila, called to his assistance Alboin king of the Longobards, about the year 553. The Goths were totally defeated at the foot of Mount Vesuvius, and their prince killed. The expences of this campaign had obliged him to

* See Const. Porphy. Pt. 2. ch. 27.

withhold the remittances from the revenues of Italy to the Byzantine court; complaint was made from Constantinople, and Narses in answer alleged the expences of the war, and even made a requisition for a supply of money. Irene,* the empress, sent him a distaff and spindle, telling him that such instruments were better suited to his equivocal sex, than the command of the Roman armies; to which Narses replied, "I will weave such a web, as the Romans while they live will never be able to unravel." This absurd conduct induced Narses to invite the Longobards into Italy; who, joined by about twenty thousand Saxons, as Paul Warnefrid informs us, marched into Italy and established the kingdom which still bears their name.†

The country which the Saxons had abandoned, was occupied by the Franks under Clothaire and Sigisbert, in the year 575. It remains for us to remark, with respect to the Longobards, that they were Teutonic, and originally came from Scandinavia. Their history before the time of Alboin, is nothing more than that of their wars with their neighbours, previous to their occupation of Pannonia a short time before the events just mentioned.

* Const. Por. 2 p. cap. 25. † Paul Warn. l. 2. c. 10.

After having observed that the Franks occupied Belgium in the fifth century; that the Thuringi extended as far as the Scheld; that the Boyarians, who had long dwelt in the country of the Marcomani, peopled anew the province of Noricum and the territory of Augsburg and founded the state of Bavaria by means of their colonies; that the Burgundians, the ancient inhabitants of Pomerania and Brandenburg, established themselves in the country which still keeps their name; while the Slavi and Venedi took possession of the country bordering on the Drave in Carinthia and Carniola: after having I say touched these facts, it is hardly necessary to trouble the reader with further details. No nation in Europe can, after what we have seen, accuse its neighbour of violence and injustice, as every one of them owes its present possessions to the very same means: and if conquest gives the present occupants a right, conquest again repeated, may transfer that right into other hands. The less frequent such events take place, the better it is for human society: but as the immorality of the action is a consideration too feeble to prevent a repetition of it, we must leave the moral part of the subject to abler hands; and occupy ourselves with the means of politically preventing such evils, by

rendering conquest more difficult, and less the interest of the respective nations.

The history of these particulars is not irrelevant to our present object; it is useful as it points out the changes which in the fifth century subverted the Roman empire, and substituted an order of things out of which the present state of Europe has arisen. Having therefore briefly traced these events, it will not be necessary to dwell on the history of France before the time of the Carlovingian dynasty. A feeble race of degenerate princes shut up in their palaces, abandoned the care of public affairs and the command of the army to the mayors of the palace; a pusillanimity which ended in their destruction. Pepin the son of Charles Martel, famous for his victory over the Moslems of Spain, was the first who assumed the title of king. He was succeeded by Charlemagne, from which era it was proposed to take a survey of the political state of Europe, and its progress from that great and leading event, through its various forms and vicissitudes, down to the period of the French revolution; at which time a new set of ideas arose, totally unconnected with ancient pretensions, as well as with the machinery of the church of Rome.

We shall indeed see Bonaparte attempting to revive the plan of Charlemagne; but with this

difference, that while the one laid the foundation of the papal power, and opened the road for the Pontiffs to become the liege lords of all the princes of Europe; the other endeavoured to depress, and did reduce him to the lowest state of degradation. When we shall have traced the ambitious and wicked policy of these cruel priests, much as we ought to feel indignation against a sovereign who endeavoured to crush Europe under his own iron sceptre, posterity will do Napoleon the justice to attribute to him the merit of having given the fatal blow to that power, which has ever aimed at the debasement of the human mind, and the perpetuation of ignorance and vice; and which pursued the policy of exciting cruel wars in every part of the world to maintain its splendour, at the expence of the peace and innocence of mankind: popes will hereafter never do more than keep their own territories in barbarism and ignorance; a policy which, while the rest of Europe improves, will continue to diminish their influence as well as power, and it is to be hoped finally extirpate both.

I have no pretension to treat the subject theologically, nor skill in religious controversy; the truth or error of any particular dogma, or of any sect, is not within the compass of my present view. The effect of various tenets will only

occasionally be touched on as they bear on the transactions of the times. To the opinions of the Catholics I do not pretend to object, nor is it my duty, though a son of the church of England, to maintain the merits of one set of them against another. Whatever predilection I may feel for the religion of my fathers, it would be improper to introduce it here: a cool and dispassionate survey of events, politically considered, is my only aim. The Catholics however will perceive, that it is by no means essential to their church or their religion that their chief should be an independent sovereign, nor true that either cannot subsist without an universal head; that the popes have been subject to the civil power of the emperors of the east and west; that they were the subjects of Charlemagne and his successors, who exercised the right of church patronage, and that religion flourished; that the sovereignty of Rome was an usurpation, and the pretension to nominate to all benefices an incroachment on the temporal power, extorted from the weakness and ignorance of princes and people in ages of superstition; and that the church having already subsisted without detriment to its prosperity in subordination to temporal power, it may do so again.

These truths, if once put in a clear point of view, may obviate a great objection which exists in this country to the emancipation of the Catholics, and to their admission to places of trust in the state. But if the professors of that religion think proper in the nineteenth century to adhere to maxims adopted in the tenth and eleventh, and expect that the forged letters published under the name of Isidorus of Seville, will be received in these days with the same submission as in those; the government of Great Britain would do right to treat them as maniacs, and unworthy of any rational intercourse. The restoration of the empire of the west by Charlemagne will constitute a principal point of observation. That empire had been overturned by Ricimer the Goth, and Odoacer king of the Heruli, about 260 years. The Italians were no longer Romans; and surely the Franks could have no right to that appellation. The pope, who was a priest and not a sovereign, for he was a subject of the emperor Leo, could have no right to dispose of a crown destroyed long ago, and of the dominion of a body politic long since dissolved. Yet this juggle has been made a vital principle in the public policy of Europe, and those who have worn this Birmingham crown,

have never absolutely abandoned their pretensions to the western empire as it existed in the days of Diocletian.

It will not be foreign to the purpose to say a few words on the coronation of Charlemagne at Rome; the necessary details of the circumstances which attracted his arms to Italy, will be given in the next chapter, wherein we shall consider the adventures, by which the popes increased their power.

Charlemagne was received at Rome by the pope Leo, on the 24th Nov. 779, attended by the clergy and people, with the loudest acclamations. Leo, considering the benefits he had received from Charles, studied how he could display his sense of gratitude, for having been saved from the power of Desiderius, king of the Lombards, and to secure himself so powerful a protector; he was sensible he had more to fear than to hope from the Greek emperor. It was then that he devised a most ingenious contrivance to make that prince a great patron of the apostolic see.* This project, which was nothing less than to raise Charles to the rank of emperor of the west, he executed; and this event has led the French jurisconsults to consider the empire of the west as being virtually

* Giannone.

transferred to France; when in fact it was nothing at the time, but assuming a personal title a little more specious, and which former kings of Italy might have as easily done, but which they declined. This claim, as we have already observed, has been revived by Bonaparte; and if we look into the origin of his pretensions, it will be found to be just as valid as either that of Charlemagne, or that of the subsequent German emperors. This truth may be easily understood if we define clearly our terms: the title of king may denote a sovereign whose authority is exercised over a body of people, and that of emperor, if it means nothing more, is an useless name, and a vain appendage, but, if it means more, it must denote a liege lord over sovereign princes, which however not only involves contradiction, but fosters pretensions incompatible with the tranquillity of nations. If the house of Austria disclaim these pretensions, the assuming of the title looks like lunacy; if it maintain them, it is as truly the enemy of its neighbours, as Bonaparte was, without the power of doing so much mischief.

In order to shew that Charlemagne really acquired nothing more by the pantomime acted by him and by Leo, than a mere title, we may remark that the pope and the populace of Rome

could not give him a power over states and kingdoms of the west, which had for a long course of time been under the dominion of other princes. It will also be well to consider, that, for a long time previous to the event we are treating of, the Greek emperors had lost the dominion of almost all the provinces of the west, which fell by the right of conquest to various princes, and chiefly to Charles himself: so that by this acclamation, he neither encreased his dominions, nor deprived the Greek emperor of any thing but what had been previously acquired by his sword. Giannone quotes a passnge from Eginhard's Life of Charlemagne, to this purpose; that the Saxon kings who reigned in England, were so submissive to him, that in their letters they solemnly acknowledged themselves his vassals and liege men. Had not Napoleon been stopped in his career, it would have been amusing, and perhaps troublesome, notwithstanding its absurdity, to have had this pretension put forward to ground a claim of superiority over these islands.

As a proof of the high pretensions of the barbarian emperors of the west, in consequence of the farce acted between Charlemagne and pope Leo, it will not be improper to adduce some curious facts; for as they looked upon themselves as the legitimate successors of

Augustus Cæsar, they affected to conceive, that their sovereignty extended over the whole western empire, and if the Roman senate exercised the privilege of creating kings, during the days of the Roman republic, they thought of course the same right might be exercised by them; as if the Roman republic had been overturned by the popes, or as if the Christian Pontiff had called Augustus to that pre-eminence at a time when Christianity did not exist. This was exemplified by Frederic the First, in the tenth century: he sent a sword and crown to Peter the prince of Denmark, giving him of his unbounded goodness the title of king, merely as an honorary distinction, in the same manner as Napoleon created his son king of Rome, with an express reservation that the supreme dominion and liege lordship should belong to the imperial crown: by this silly and ostentatious act, Denmark shortly after, became a state totally detached from the Germanic empire.

From these pretensions of the emperors, there arose a doctrine, that all right of sovereignty emanated virtually from themselves, and that all those who disputed this right were heretics and rebels, the emperors being in fact the lords of the whole world, and all princes their vassals. This claim, in later times, has rather been tacitly dropped, than avowedly

abandoned, and Napoleon was on the point of reviving it.

When we come to treat of the progress of that papal power, we shall see the Pontiffs, not only pretending to the same privileges, but asserting, that even the imperial crown itself was a gift of the church; and that not only all the heads of states, but even the emperors themselves were their vassals. From these opposite doctrines of the jurisconsults who favored the popes on one side and the emperors on the other, the Guelf and Ghibelline factions arose, which, thanks to the popes and emperors, deluged the earth with blood for more than four centuries!

The Rise and Progress of the Ecclesiastical Power in Europe.

As it will be seen in the course of this work, that a great part of the disturbances which have taken place among mankind, has been the effect of the injustice, ambition, and intrigues of the popes; it is essentially necessary to the right conception of the agitations they produced, in Europe, to observe the influence which the church, and that of Rome in particular, has had on them.

Before the introduction of Christianity, the Polytheism of the ancients was a total stranger to the distinction between spiritual and temporal power. The king or leader presided and officiated at the public sacrifices as high priest: the priests were subservient to the chiefs of the nation under whatsoever form it existed: and the oracles were dictated by, or pre-concerted with them. Thus were all disputes merely political, and they arose from the imperfections of government, which were the natural result of the inexperience of mankind in the difficult

and delicate science of legislation. In the second century of the Christian era, a doctrine was introduced which had before that time, been unknown among men, and which has tended to fulfil most amply the prophecy of Christ, "I come not to send peace but a sword." This doctrine includes obedience to two powers, the spiritual and the temporal: as each of these powers had a separate object, so each in consequence asserted a separate right of dominion; for though, as Mosheim says, Constantine assumed the supremacy, which was not contested by the church; and succeeding emperors called and presided in councils and exercised all external authority, except the semblance of it in matters purely ecclesiastical; still spiritual and temporal power were looked on as distinct, though not admitted to be independent.

The experience of ten centuries has shewn us that, separate and rival, they cannot co-exist in peace; and of course, when we open the pages of their history, we find perpetual struggles of each for superiority, while the earth is in the mean time deluged with blood!

The priests of Christianity considered the object of their vocation to be, not the political

* See Giannone Hist. of Naples, Lib. 1. cap. 11.

and civil tranquility of the world, but the concerns of a future state. Hence the clergy taught that their function was on this account more sublime, and nobler than that of the laity, inasmuch as divine things are superior to human, as the soul, is to the body. On these maxims and through the imprudence of the emperors, the dexterity of the Roman prelates themselves and the inconsiderateness of their bishops, the papal power was by degrees established; the gradation of these encroachments on justice and common sense, it will be the business of this chapter to describe; we may in the mean time do justice to the mitred heads of the church of England, and applaud their prudence and probity, in resigning to their sovereign that power which is so well placed in his hands, while they have enjoyed their dignities in peace with the government; and instead of exciting scandals, and troubles, as in the time of Henry the Second, have become a body distinguished for their learning, their wisdom, their virtue, and their piety.

In the first three centuries of the Christian era no dignities, though many offices, were known in the church, except those of bishops, priests, and deacons. The former of these who were originally equal, became the superintendants of

the inferior orders; and about the middle of the second century, when the primitive independance of every church was changed into an association of the churches of the same province, the several bishops of these associated churches were wont to assemble at certain periods to deliberate about the interests of the whole.

But this equality, among the bishops themselves, lasted only to the time of Constantine, who made Christianity the predominant religion: a superior priest, or archbishop was then introduced to superintend ecclesiastical affairs in each province; the distribution of which became the measure of the metropolitan bishoprics, each of which, by degrees, acquired a superiority over every diocese in the province.

The eastern empire was divided into five prefectures, with subordinate provinces, which it is unnecessary to enumerate. And those of the western were arranged according to the same order.

Under the prefecture of Italy there were three metropolitan dioceses, viz. Illyricum, Africa, and Italy; the two first are unnecessary to the present purpose of marking the progress of ecclesiastical power. In Italy there were two lieutenancies, that of Rome, and that of Italy. In that of Rome there were ten provinces; Campania, Apulia, Calabria,

Lucania, Bruttium; Samnium, belonged to Rome; Tuscany, was also joined to the same, as well as Umbria, Picenum suburbicarium, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. That of Italy, of which Milan was the capital, consisted of seven provinces; Liguria, Emilia, Flaminia, Venice, and Istria, the Cottian Alps, and the two districts of Rhætia. Such was the scheme of ecclesiastical partition in the age of Constantine; the equality of the bishops was then by degrees obliterated; and the title of patriarch was gradually introduced: at first it was confounded with the metropolitan, but by degrees it denoted the ecclesiastical head of Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria. It was assumed at Rome before that of pope was introduced. The patriarch of Constantinople claimed the primacy of all the churches of the east; that of Rome alone disputed the precedency. The former, as his see was the residence of the emperor, claimed the primacy; the latter, on the ancient superiority of Rome, and on the tradition of St. Peter having preached the gospel and introduced the faith of Christ there.

During the period which elapsed between the reign of Constantine and that of Valentinian the third, the Roman pontiffs were nothing more than the metropolitans over the bishoprics

above enumerated, and subjects of the emperors: even at a much later period, after the death of Theodoric founder of the Gothic kingdom, Atalaric his successor is praised by Cassiodorus* for the choice which that prince made of the best characters among the clergy to fill the vacant sees, without excepting that of Rome; and this right of presentation was allowed by the Catholic clergy of those days, quamvis in alienâ religione, for Atalaric was an Arian.†

Such was the state of dependance on the temporal, in which the spiritual power stood for the space of some centuries; and neither the heads of the church at Rome, nor the patriarchs of Constantinople, ever presumed to advance a proposition to the contrary. The establishment of the Goths in Italy, and afterwards that of the Lombards, extended the jurisdiction of the Roman bishops over the rest of Italy, and enriched the church by endowments: but the patrimony of the church was considered merely as property annexed to it, without supposing it

* Lib. 8. ch. 14.

† Of this circumstance, the reader is recommended to take notice, for it is one of the great difficulties which the Catholic clergy now make; and unless they give up this point, and allow the king, in his dominions, the same privilege, it can never be safe to emancipate them.

to confer any principality or territorial authority; it was looked on merely as glebe land. Rome and its territory, with the March of Ancona, were at that time under the civil administration of dukes, or governors sent thither by the Byzantine court; and this custom subsisted after the establishment of the Lombards. It is not the design of this work to write an ecclesiastical history: we touch lightly on these events, and point out such to notice as by degrees raised the Roman patriarchs to the dignity of independent sovereigns.

The Catholic church, at its beginning, had no rule of conduct and faith but the scriptures; and the canons, which their bishops from time to time promulgated, were considered in no other point of view than as bye laws, which were permitted by the sovereign with this proviso, ne quid ex publicâ lege corumpant.* From these the canon law arose, which in process of time became, through the management of the popes, not only the rival of the civil law, but even its superior: and thus, within one empire or state, against all principles of government, two codes of adverse laws, of equal authority, were openly permitted to co-exist; and from this source, the

* Giannone. Hist. Civ. lib. 1. chap. 11. sec. 5.

learned Giannone observes, that all the contentions about jurisdictions arose throughout all Europe!

Luitprand, king of the Lombards, in the year 711, fixed the seat of his government at Pavia. Contemporary with this prince, Leo the Isaurian, was emperor of the east. Rome, as have been before observed, was governed by a duke from the Byzantine court, subaltern to the exarch of Ravenna, who may be considered as governor general of the Greek dominions in Italy.

Leo the Isaurian, following the doctrines of Bardanes, impugned the worship of images. It is not necessary to trace the origin of the custom, in a religion which in its first outset professed to decry that worship as impious and profane. The custom had crept into the Christian church; and at that time the prejudices of mankind were so strong in its favor, that the attempt of Leo, named from thence the Iconoclast, afforded the popes an opportunity of extending their authority and eventually establishing their temporal power.

The circumstances which attended this event are curious, and the more so, as the temporal

* Giannone Hist. lib. 6. chap. 2.

† Gibbon Decl. chap. 49.

power of the popes once established in Europe, has on their part produced a tissue of crimes, which has since disturbed the peace of mankind; while their possession of a considerable part of Italy has been the cause of its weakness, by exposing it constantly to foreign invasions and to foreign domination; a state of things subversive of all political stability, not only in respect of Italy itself, but those states also which border on Italy, or are by any means politically connected with it.

The emperor Leo, having resolved to restore religion to its primitive simplicity by purging the church of all worship of images; began his dangerous work of reform, by first forbidding any adoration to be paid to them, and at length by ordering them to be removed from all the churches in Constantinople and the east. He extended his edict to the west, with a strict charge to Scholasticus, exarch of Ravenna; to see his orders enforced in every part of Italy subject to the Byzantine throne.

The repugnance of the Italians to this innovation was, however, invincible;* and where-

* This example will shew the danger of interfering in the religion of subject provinces, let us hope that the rage for preaching Christianity to the Hindoos, will not afford a fresh proof of this bad policy; viz. a failure in the attempt, and the loss of the country.

ever the exarch attempted to enforce his orders, he met with opposition and sedition. In the dutchy of Rome, as well as in that of Naples, his efforts were of no avail; the attempt at Ravenna only served to put Luitprand in possession of the city; who reduced it, with its territory, into a dutchy of his own kingdom. At the time of these events, Gregory the Second was Roman pontiff. He, though united with the Romans in their attachment to the *established worship*, and the declared opponent of the emperor Leo, was jealous like his predecessors, lest the power of the Lombards, by extending too far, should become one day an impediment to the independence which the popes then meditated to establish. Thus arose the policy of the popes to maintain themselves in Italy, by making it the perpetual seat of war. This pious principle we shall have to trace throughout the periods of which we have to treat. With this view, Gregory always watched over the interests of the Greek emperors in Italy; and exerted himself to maintain them, in order to oppose the design of the Lombards; that the power of the one might balance that of the other. With this motive he opposed the Lombard duke of Beneventum, and assisted the Neapolitan Greeks to prevent Cuma from falling under his dominion. It is in this manner

only, that we can explain his conduct: for though he might have been expected to exert himself to the utmost, in opposition to the efforts of Leo, to destroy the worship of images, for which he was treated very harshly by him, and even threatened to be driven from his see and to be sent into exile; he nevertheless directed all his thoughts to obviate the revolt of the Italians, who were under the Byzantine government, in order to oppose the Lombard power; this policy has ever since operated to keep that country divided.

Acting on this principle, he found means to persuade the republic of Venice to enter into his views; and by its assistance, the Lombards were driven from Ravenna, and the exarch restored. We must remark in this place, the fatal effects of this policy. Had not the popes acted in this manner, the Lombard empire would have overspread the whole of Italy; the popes would have been bishops of Rome, and primates of the kingdom; that kingdom might have subsisted to this day, and the factions of Guelfs and Ghibellines would have been unknown: the whole of Europe would have, perhaps, felt the advantage of such an event to this very day.

Gregory expected that Leo would have felt grateful for this, but he was disappointed; gra-

titude for favors received, was never a virtue of the pope, nor had Gregory any right to expect it from the emperor. Leo knew full well what motives had induced him to play this part; and he was angry with him for constantly opposing his favorite design, and endeavouring by such manifest revolt to shake off his authority. He found that he could not bring him to terms by open force; he therefore sent Maurice to Rome as duke, with instructions, to send the pope either dead or alive to him. Paulus Patricius was also sent as exarch to Ravenna in the year 725, with orders to assist Maurice in his design, and was charged with the same commission: the plot, however, was discovered by the Romans, now watchful of the safety of the pontiff. In the mean time the new exarch Patricius was continually spurred on by the emperor, to use every means to get the pope into his hands; and seeing that it was impossible to elude the vigilance of the Romans, he was at last determined to try to gain his point by force, and to deliver Gregory into the hands of the emperor. He sent all the troops he could spare from Ravenna to reinforce the imperial garrison at Rome, with orders to bring the pope to him. Luitprand, a politic prince, although he was grievously offended at the pope for having caused the Venetians to wrest Ravenna from

his power, determined at this juncture to support him: thus to hold the balance between the Greeks and Latins, and by assisting each party by turns, to weaken both, and to reduce them to a dependance upon himself. This policy in the end occasioned the ruin of the Lombard empire. He declared on this occasion for the Romans, who were now so strengthened, that they stopped the progress of the Greeks near Spoleto, and obliged the exarch to give up his enterprise.

The impolitic conduct of Leo on this occasion defeated his hopes; he ordered the decree against the images to be put in force throughout his Italian dominions, and declared the pope to have forfeited the pontificate if he did not instantly obey. This impotent mandate ruined his affairs; for it exasperated every body against him. Gregory now assured of the support of all parties in his favor, as well as of the assistance of the Lombards, excommunicated the exarch and all his accomplices, and addressed apostolic letters to the Venetians, the king of Lombardy, and to all the cities of the empire, exhorting all to be firm in their opposition to the Iconoclastic decrees. These letters had such an effect on the Venetians, Lombards, and Romans, that they all united to defend the Catholic faith and the life of the pope. The

latter, with the people of the whole Roman dutchy, openly threw off their allegiance to the emperor: they even proposed to create a new emperor of the west, which proposal however, Gregory opposed, and the plan was dropped.

This policy of the pope destroyed every trace of the power which the Byzantine court had hitherto held in Italy. The obstinacy of insisting on the destruction of the images caused the loss of Ravenna and its province, the dutchy of Rome, and nearly that of Naples, and with it their whole power in Italy. A riot happened in Ravenna between the Iconoclasts and the Catholics, in which the latter gained the victory; and for the glory of God massacred all their opponents, without even excepting the Exarch himself! Thus a great part of the province now called Romagna, declared against the Greeks, and put itself under the protection of Luitprand. The neutrality of this prince, and his motives for it have been already explained. Pope Gregory was too good a politician not to see through the motives of Luitprand; for though he had shewn every disposition to defend him against the attempts of the emperor, he felt that the motive was self-interest and a view of aggrandisement. The people of Rome actuated by the insinuations of the priests, and blinded by the con-

summate ignorance of the age, was made to understand, that deservedly as the Greek emperor might be odious to them for his sacrilegious attempts against the images, Luitprand was a more dangerous enemy, or at least an insidious friend; as his view was to get possession of the Roman dutchy, and annex it to his kingdom. This consideration, which prevented the happiest event that could have occurred to Italy, induced them to remain unanimous in the favour of the pope, whom they swore to defend against both Leo and and Luitprand. From this remarkable event the origin of the temporal power of the pope may be dated. It began during the interregnum which this event produced; though for the present, the Romans did not begin to look on the pope as their sovereign.

Eutichius the new exarch arrived at Ravenna, and though the parties were violent there, he was enabled with the forces he received from Greece, to recover the dominion of that city. Considering, however, that as long as the king of the Lombards was against him, he would be unable to overturn the power of the pope and conquer the obstinacy of the Romans; he used all his efforts to detach him from that alliance, and to bring him over to his interests, which he effected. On this occasion, when the Greeks

and Lombards were about to besiege Rome, Gregory acted a part which in our times would accuse him of the most puerile presumption, or the most desperate folly; but it will be seen that he was neither a fool, nor a child. His forces were insufficient to resist his enemies, and he suddenly went unattended with any guards, without any security for his person, accompanied only by the clergy and a few barons, into the Lombard camp, and into the presence of the king. Gregory was aware of the bigotry and stupidity of his age, and of the ignorance of the prince with whom he had to deal. The experiment succeeded, Luitprand was taken by surprise, he received the pope with that respect, which seemed due to the sanctity of his character. This generous conduct we shall shortly see, was repaid by the popes, with that ingratitude for which they have ever been distinguished. It enabled them shortly after to indulge the natural bent of their policy, to introduce fresh wars, and strangers into Italy. Had Luitprand seized the pope, and made him an engine in his hand, he would have become master of the Roman state; he could have made such terms with the clergy as would have established their subordination to the temporal power; he might have revived

the law of Justinian,* in which the civil power interfered to prevent the abuse of excommunication,† for in the Basilica he expressly forbids excommunication without legal justification and the sanction of the sovereign; the right of clerical appointments might have been secured; and Italy, united under the Lombard empire, would not have been so shortly after inundated by Charlemagne, whose proceedings at Rome we have already touched on, and whose mistaken policy produced the hydra of ecclesiastical power, which oppressed every people and degraded the human mind for so many centuries.

Gregory having perceived the impression he had made on Luitprand, assumed an air of dignity; and began in a grave and moderate tone to reprove him for the breach of his plighted faith, and the injury he did to religion, for which he had hitherto shewn so much zeal; and he had the impudence to mention to him, the mischief which would accrue to his kingdom, if he failed to protect the church, and conjured him to desist from his enterprise, and to turn his arms elsewhere. Luitprand on this

* See the 223 Novell. of Justinian.

† See Basilica Lib. 30. C. de Episcopis.

occasion displayed an imbecility unequalled in the annals of history. Without attempting to defend himself by making an arrogant priest acknowledge his subjection to the temporal power; without offering to protect the church provided he was not obliged at the same time to consider a bishop as a sovereign, he threw himself at the feet of the pope, acknowledged his impiety, begged pardon, and withdrew from Rome. Eutichius, the Greek exarch, thus left in the lurch, retired to Ravenna.

Pope Gregory having thus paralised the attack of the Lombards, and defeated the designs of the Greeks, was not yet considered as the sovereign of Rome: this dignity was not attached to the popes for a long time after these events: it will be noticed in the sequel. In the mean time the clergy were determined that no new power should arise, able to obstruct their ambitious views. About this period, an impostor arose, who assumed the name of Tiberius, pretending to be descended from some ancient imperial family; he had seduced some part of Tuscany to support his pretensions: Gregory, who wished to keep the way open to the acquisition of the supreme or temporal dominion of Rome and its dependent dioceses, at the same time thought it proper to miss no opportunity of gaining the favour of the Greek

emperor Leo. He procured military assistance from the Romans, to join the exarch, and by this means Tiberius was taken, and his head sent to Constantinople.

This conduct did not soften the mind of Leo. Although on this occasion the Greek and French writers pretend that Gregory accepted the sovereignty of Rome from the people, and that he even excommunicated the emperor, Giannone is of a different opinion; he pretends that no such decided step was taken by the pontiff; he even quotes the letters of Gregory to that monarch, in order to shew the submissive tone in which he addressed the emperor of the east; and indeed no farther proof is necessary to shew that he acknowledged the emperor's superiority than the date of letters, with the year of the reign of the sovereign of the east. No pretension to the right of excommunicating sovereign princes was entertained by the pope in those days; for we shall afterwards see that it was Gregory the 7th who boasted to have been the first to launch the thunders of excommunication on the heads of the emperors. In this state of things Leo provoked at the pope for not yielding in the dispute about the images, confiscated all the church-lands of Rome lying in Sicily and Calabria; and he was preparing a military expedition into Italy, to chastise Gre-

gory for his obstinacy and disobedience, whom he considered as the cause of all the mischief which had happened; he was however, at least entitled to an equal share in the blame, for exercising a spirit of bigotry and obstinacy against a people who were as bigoted and obstinate as himself; Gregory, foreseeing the storm which was about to break over him, now sought for a protector able to support him: he could not trust the Lombards, of whose ambition he was well aware: the republic of Venice, although equally zealous for the Catholic religion, was not yet powerful enough in Italy to contend with the forces of the Greek empire, especially as they were not on good terms with the Lombards, whom they found to be troublesome and encroaching neighbours: he could not apply to Spain, which was at that time in a deplorable condition, being almost entirely overrun by the Saracens of Africa. He resolved to apply to the Franks, whose constancy in the Catholic faith had been exemplary. Charles Martel was then mayor of the palace; and though Chilperic was dead, and no new king nominated, he continued to rule the kingdom under that title. About the year 730, Gregory sent an embassy to implore his assistance and protection for the church and the Roman people. Charles received it with the

greatest honours, and with a magnificence worthy the greatest prince of the age. The result of this negociation was an engagement on the part of Charles, to march to Italy for the protection of the church and territory of Rome, in case they should be attacked by the Greeks or Lombards. The people of Rome were, on the other hand, to acknowledge him as protector, and to give him the title of consul, as they had before done to the emperor Anastasius, and to Clovis after he had beaten the Visigoths: Gregory the 2d, however, died the ensuing year, and the third of that name was elected pope.

About the same time died Charles Martel, and the emperor Leo, who was succeeded by his son Constantine Copronymus, who pursued the iconoclastic system of his father, with the same blindness; about three years after, Luitprand also paid the debt of nature.

Astolph succeeded about the year 750, to the throne of Lombardy, finally expelled the Greeks from Ravenna, and having annexed it to his kingdom, he determined to subdue the rest of Italy, and drive the Greeks out entirely. In this enterprise he would no doubt have succeeded, had not Pope Stephen, the successor of Zachary, prevented so happy an event for Italy. The Lombards, like the Goths, by a long residence in Italy, had laid aside the

barbarous customs of their ancestors; the Teutonic dialect, common to both these nations, had been forgotten; the Latin language, corrupted by the successive establishment of these strangers, had begun to take the form of the Italian of the present day; less regular, less simple, less austere than the Latin, but softer, more melodious, and perhaps more pliable to the purposes of poetry: the Lombards had cultivated letters; they had become a courteous, and, for the age, an enlightened people; certain it is they were more advanced than the Franks, to whom the pope now betrayed his country. The Lombards had long been blended with the Italians, and formed one people with them: and certainly the happiest event which could have happened to them would have been the establishment of one power in the whole Peninsula. It will be seen in the course of this work, how often the diabolical policy of inviting strangers into Italy, begun by Narses, was repeated by the popes, to maintain their usurpations on mankind, and support their ever-vacillating power: thus, for nine centuries, continuing to be the instigators of all the desolation and bloodshed to which Italy was devoted: and yet, in the present day, it is considered as an act of common justice or policy, to restore the papal power so long en-

joyed and so constantly abused! This having actually taken place, all hope of uniting Italy into one empire must for the present be vain; its division, however, will be shewn to have been one of the principal causes of all the wars which Europe has suffered; this trial is now again made, and will by a similar division of power in Italy, produce similar results; and Great Britain, above all other kingdoms, interested in the maintenance of the general peace, will one day see that the insensibility of her negociators to truths so evident, in abandoning so fair a portion of Europe to be again and again the object of discord, will have, by this acquiescence, counteracted the very policy to which her best interests should have directed their steadiest attention.

Pope Stephen, the successor of Zachary, now saw that this invasion of the Lombards would be fatal to the establishment of a temporal dominion of the Pontiffs in Italy. It was early felt by these artful priests, that for them to advance to the rank of princes, it was necessary to sacrifice their country. Ecclesiastical ambition is incompatible with any patriotic feelings; and it would be degrading the memory of the Camilli, the Fabii, the Scipios, the Trajans, and the Antonines, to expect similar feelings and sentiments from a Pius 5—

a Borgia, a Capuchin, or a Dominican inquisitor arrived through every atrocious and criminal intrigue at the pinnacle of the temple of Rome!

The pope finding all attempts fruitless to move the emperor Constantine to protect him against the Lombards, had recourse to Pepin, the father of Charlemagne. Having arrived in France, and implored his assistance, Pepin imbued with the superstition of the times which he well knew how to render subservient to his ambition, promised not only to drive the Lombards from the Roman dutchy, Ravenna, and the march of Ancona; but that he would guarantee the same to St. Peter. Stephen highly applauded the generous offer which Pepin made him, of dominions belonging to others; assuring that prince, that by persevering in such virtuous conduct, he would surely find the road to eternal happiness. It was sworn by Pepin that these provinces should be given to the church: he even obliged his two sons Charles and Carloman to sign the treaty. From the example of this pious prince, it would seem that modern statesmen have also endeavoured to merit eternal salvation, by disposing of the sovereignty of countries belonging to others, without regard to their welfare or inclinations: and the priests

and monks of Italy will bless at least the piety of the statesmen in a late congress, who acceded to a division of Italy, from which must inevitably arise fresh miseries to that country, and causes of future wars, in which Great Britain must necessarily be implicated: they have re-mounted a system ever out of repair; every day requiring amendment; and radically defective. Let us hope, however, that some unforeseen event will abolish it altogether; and room be made for a more rational scheme of relations for Europe. Thus Pepin in his first expedition into Italy, endowed St. Peter with the territories of Ravenna, Ferrara, Bologna, and Ancona; the sovereignty of Rome did not belong to the popes for some time afterwards; that duchy being vested in the successors of Charlemagne. We have, therefore, traced the progress by which the sovereignty of Rome was step by step acquired by the popes, and though, at the period we are treating of, the object was not completed, we now touch on its consummation.

The city and territory of Ravenna having been ceeded by Pepin to the pope, the Greek exarch was expelled, and the exarchy was thus conferred on the pope, who of course presided over the civil affairs of Rome in virtue of the title of lord lieutenant. Thus the civil power

of the pontiffs was no more than a delegation, and they held it in fact under no other right or title. The sovereignty had heretofore belonged to the eastern emperors; but Pepin and Charlemagne having become patricians of Rome, the title of patrician included in itself the presidency of the city: and the patrician and the pope were at once invested with its government.

After the death of pope Adrian, his successor Leo the third left the whole administration to Charlemagne; who, from the rank of patrician being elevated to the dignity of emperor, exercised the sovereign power of Rome, and thus this power belonged to Charles, and not to the pope. In the course of time however, as the power of the emperors in Italy, who were successors to Charles, fell to decay; the popes exercised the supreme power, and finally in the year 876, Charles the bald renounced all his rights and ceded the sovereignty of Rome to the apostolic see. The kingdom of the Lombards became vacant by the death of Astolpho without issue, and by his brother Rachi's incapacity, who had become a monk. Desiderius duke of Tuscany having been by the late king appointed high constable of the kingdom, was now advanced to the throne. Rachi, although an ecclesiastic, endeavoured to get rid of his

vows and succeed to the throne: but Desiderius had recourse to pope Stephen, who, upon condition of the surrender (which was afterwards effected) of the towns of Ancona, Faenza, Secchia, and Ferrara, (which had not yet been ceded according to the late treaty) induced Rachi to return to his cell. Stephen expired shortly after this transaction on the 26th April 757, a pontiff to whom the apostolic see is greatly indebted for its advancement in temporal power; he left it in a state of growing prosperity, which Paul and Stephen his successors did not fail to improve; but which Adrian, by his arrangements with Charlemagne, advanced to a prodigious pitch of grandeur, as we shall hereafter see.

Desiderius, after having reigned two years, wished to admit his son Adalgisus as his colleague, according to the usage of his predecessors; but Stephen, who was jealous of the smallest movements which he thought might be detrimental to papal power, opposed the design. New causes of jealousy soon broke out, which finally produced an open rupture. Desiderius having conferred the archbishopric of Ravenna* on a dependent of his own, Stephen caused him to be driven from his see: he

* Giannone Lib. 5. chap. 4.

sent two legates, Christopher and Sergius, to assert the right of nomination which the popes now considerd as their prerogative. The enraged Desiderius ordered them to be blinded and sent back; but having reflected on the consequences of this cruel step, and apprehending the bitterness of clerical revenge, he made overtures of alliance to the French monarch, in order to deprive the pope of the means of disturbing the tranquility of his kingdom, by continually having recourse to Pepin.

Charles and Carloman, having succeeded to their father Pepin, who died about this time, and having divided the dominions between them were at first on good terms with each other. Desiderius considered it for his advantage to connect himself with them by marriage, and offered them his too daughters. Stephen, who had foreseen the consequences of this alliance, wrote strong letters to Charles and Carloman, threatening them, if they allied themselves with the king of Lombardy, with "*anathematis vinculum et eterni cum diabolo incendii pœnam,*" a pretty evident proof of the mental debasement of the age, when a pope could gravely write such nonsense,* to the first

* I say nonsense, because I find in no part of the scriptures that matrimony is a damnable sin.

sovereigns of the time, and of the dire villany of the priests who could deliberately meditate the subjugation of their country by foreign power! In spite of these efforts, both the daughters of Desiderius were married to the Frankish princes; and the king of Lombardy took such efficacious means of interesting Bertrade, the mother of Charles and Carloman, that it was through her means principally, that this double alliance took place. The mortification of the pontiff was only to be equalled by the satisfaction of Desiderius, who flattered himself that he had deprived his adversary of all means of assistance. Unfortunately the alliance was of short duration; for means were not neglected to persuade Charles to divorce his wife under the pretence of barrenness:* to this plea was not wanting the assistance of the priests, for the bishops were ready to declare the marriage void, and to give permission to Charles in the following year to espouse Ildegarda, of Swabia. The anger and indignation of Desiderius were excited by this measure, and the death of Carloman happening about the same time, his widow, the queen Bertha, with her two sons, apprehending it to be unsafe to remain in France, lest Charles

* Observe the conduct of Napoleon on a similar occasion.

should attempt the lives of his nephews, fled with her children to the protection of her father. Desiderius received them with open arms; hoping by this means to revenge himself of the affront he had received from Charles, who had so contumeliously sent back his daughter. Desiderius having now in his hands, the widow and children of Carloman, and feeling the disproportion of his strength to that of Charles, endeavoured to form a party in France to produce a division; that so, having occupation at home, he might give them no trouble on his side the Alps. The wisdom of this measure is obvious; and the necessity of it was indispensable, from the total want of a Balance of Power in Europe at that time; a defect which, together with the incendiary principles of the Roman hierarchy, was sufficient to annihilate the hope of settling public affairs upon any trust-worthy foundation. Adrian the first, succeeded about this time to the pontificate, in the year 772. He began by treating of peace with Desiderius; and an agreement was entered into, not to molest each other. On the conclusion of this treaty, Desiderius imagined that the new pontiff entertained views quite opposite to those of his predecessor: and in order to promote his own project of dividing the enormous power of Charles, he used every

endeavour to induce the pope to anoint the two sons of Carloman as kings of Austrasia; for from the time of the consecration of Pepin, that ceremony was by degrees adopted by Christian princes, and with the people it began to be considered as a mark of sovereignty, and legitimate authority. Adrian, who entertained the maxims of Stephen, was by no means less jealous of the power of the Lombards in Italy: he was therefore determined, not to do any thing to disgust Charles, and remained pertinaciously immoveable to all the prayers and arguments of Desiderius. This prince at last, having lost all patience, determined to obtain by force what he could not gain by persuasion; he invaded the territory of Ravenna, and having taken Ferrara, Commachio, and Faenza, laid siege to Ravenna. On this occasion, Adrian did not fail to send a legate to appease him; and at the same time to attempt by negociation the restitution of the towns he had been deprived of. To these propositions, Desiderius shewed no unwillingness to accede, provided the pope would come in person, as his predecessor Gregory had done to Luitprand at Rome, to treat personally of peace. To this Adrian would by no means agree; insisting, first, on the restitution of the towns. In this manner, says Giannone, the pontiffs began to

refuse to the sovereigns of Italy, that homage which their predecessors had always been accustomed to. On the insolent refusal of the pope, the king marched into the province of Pentapolis, now the march of Ancona. The territories of Sinigallia, Urbino, and many provinces of the Patrimony of St. Peter, were laid waste, to the very walls of Rome. This precipitate step accelerated the ruin of the Lombards. Adrian had immediate recourse to Charles, not only to ask succours, but also to invite that prince to the conquest of Italy. Desiderius on his side, testified to Charles the disposition to peace which he ever evinced in all his transactions with Adrian; who after having himself sued for peace, and having requested to see him, had declined all personal conference. By letters to various princes, he vindicated himself against the accusations of Adrian, who had alledged against him the crime of having been the destroyer of Tuscany, of being barbarous and cruel,---and of being guilty of various other crimes. Desiderius found himself under the necessity of sending an embassy to Charles, to assure him of his readiness to make peace and to restore to the pope, all he pretended to demand. Charles desired nothing so much as an opportunity of revenging himself on the king of Lombardy, for

having endeavoured to excite disturbances in his dominions by means of his nephews, the sons of Carloman. He therefore determined to overturn the Lombard power in Italy, and accepted the proposals of Adrian with great pleasure. At that time Charles was flushed with his successes in Aquitain and in Saxony. At Thionville he gave audience to the legates of the pope, and to the ambassadors of Desiderius; the latter he quickly dismissed without granting any of their masters requests: and, after having paid every respect to the papal legates, he passed the Alps at two points, cutting to pieces the Lombards who guarded the defiles. Desiderius on his part opposed him in person at the head of his troops; but was totally defeated and obliged to throw himself into Pavia. Adelgisus, his son, who was then in Verona, fled to Constantinople; the town surrendered; and Bertha, the widow of Carloman, with her two sons, fell into the hands of Charles, who sent them to France, and most probably put them to death, as we hear no more of them. Pavia was at last obliged to capitulate; and thus, in the year 774, an end was put to the kingdom of the Lombards.

We have now seen the parts acted by Charlemagne and the popes: the title of emperor conferred by the latter; the donation by Charles

of the conquered provinces; the elevation of a metropolitan bishop to the rank of sovereign prince; the ceremony of anointing princes; and the claim of the popes in consequence to the virtual investiture of princes, as a feodal vassalage.

Another circumstance about eighty years afterwards, put the finishing stroke to the aggrandisement of the ecclesiastical power. A certain Benedict Levita a deacon, published the famous Decretals under the name of Isidorus Mercator, which Riculphus archbishop of Mayence circulated through Germany.* It was customary to make collections of the decrees of ancient synods and councils: these of which we are speaking were intended to prove that the bishop of Rome was successor to St. Peter the Apostle:† that the keys of heaven were in his hands: that all spiritual persons, and their estates, were independent of the temporal power and exempt from imposts: that the pope alone had the right to nominate archbishops and bishops, and that it was his prerogative to excommunicate kings and princes, and to declare them incapable of reigning. All these pretended powers were in the decretals supposed to belong to the bishops of Rome, and

* Pfeffel. end of 4th Period.

† Pütter's Germanic empir. b. 1. c. 7.

were mentioned as if they had always exercised them, and as if no one had ever disputed them; papers in this collection were falsified by interpolations and omissions, in order to correspond with these pretensions: Pütter asserts that no less than fifty forged decrees were added to the canons of the council of Nice: and to this day, although the work of Isidorus is acknowledged by all to be an infamous forgery, the priests of the Roman church still insist on the consequences deduced from this very book in favor of the supremacy of the pope. Yet such is the apathy of the Catholic sovereigns of Europe, that not one has yet ventured to declare himself head of his own church, or to think of abolishing the papacy altogether.*

* Mr. Louis de Henricourt in his work on the Ecclesiastical Law of France, speaks of the false decretals of Isidore of Seville, and gives the following account of this work. —Page 4.

"Isidore de Seville composa pour l'Espagne une nouvelle compilation, dans laquelle il fit entrer le code de Denis le petit (Dionysius exiguus) à l'exception des canons apostoliques; il y ajouta les decrets de plusieurs papes, même de Vigile et de St. Gregoire, et les canons des conciles d'Espagne et des Gaules. Ce recueil fut suivi d'un autre composé en Espagne sous le nom d'Isidore le marchand ou le pecheur: (car on lit l'un et l'autre dans les manuscrits) cet Isidore insera dans son ouvrage de prétendues décrétales de papes qui avoient précédé le pape Sivice. Il semble que les raisons par les quelles les critiques ont montré dans ces derniers

Arrived at this pinnacle of power, the first and principal abuse which the pope made of it was inviting foreign princes into Italy. This detestable policy was not abandoned, nor did the popes cease to pursue it until their influence

temps la fausseté de ces décrétales, auroient dû frapper d'abord tous les esprits 1°. parceque Denis le Petit, qui assure qu'il a recueilli étant à Rome toutes les décrétales des papes jusqu'a son tems, n'a point connu celles qui sont rapportées dans le compilateur espagnol; où ce dernier les a-t-il trouvées? 2°. Il y a dans plusieurs de ces lettres de fausses dates. 3°. Elle sont composées de tissus de passages de Péres et de conciles, qui n'ont paru que depuis le troisieme siecle jusqu'au milieu du neuviême. 4°. Les autorités de l'écriture sainte y sont toujours citées suivant la version vulgate, et non suivant le texte grec, ou suivant l'ancienne version italique dont on s'est servi si long tems à Rome. 5°. Tout est plein dans ces décrétales d'anachronismes, et de choses qui ne conviennent point au temps auquel les papes à qui on les attribue ont vécu. 6°. Elles sont toutes d'un même style, ce style est barbare, plein de solescismes, et d'expressions qui n'ont été en usage que vers le huitieme et le neuvieme siécle. Cependant la crédulité et le peu de connoissance qu'on avoit dans ce temps des regles de la critique firent valoir l'imposture. Des que Riculphus de Mayence eut publié ces piéces fausses vers l'an 830, Plusieurs personnes crurent qu'elles devoient les respecter, comme les décrets des premiers successeurs de St. Pierre. On en inserra plusieurs morceaux dans les décrets, que le pape Adrien donna à Enguerien evêque de Metz, ou cet evêque (comme le pretend Baluze sur la foi d'un manuscrit) présenta au pape Adrien."

fell to so low an ebb in latter days, as to render them equally unable to promote or to prevent their invasion of the country; and the diffusion of knowledge, as well as the scandalous lives of the priests, has, in still later times, reduced the hierarchy of Rome to a state of comparatively great humiliation.

It cannot fail to strike every one in following the history of Europe, how impossible it was amidst such events to form any system of international federation. The perpetual causes of wars arising out of the principles of the papal hierarchy; the policy of ever extending the limits of its power by setting one sovereign in opposition to another; their anathemas, excommunications, and interdicts, at one time absolving a prince from his vows and engagements, pretending at another to liberate subjects from the allegiance due to their sovereign. These were all serious if not insurmountable obstacles to the formation of any federative union: and when we add the warlike habits which these nations had brought with them from their wilds and forests; the love of enterprise constantly kept alive by the insidious machinations of the clergy; the crusades which in aftertimes they preached, by which means they got immense property into their

hands; we cannot be at a loss to account for the disturbances which have troubled this quarter of the globe.

It is true that in these our days, the influence of the popes in Europe has been reduced so low, as to leave them nothing more than the territories acquired by their intrigues and impostures: the respect they continue to enjoy as sovereigns, is a sort of conventional homage to majesty on the part of the princes of Europe; and on that of the people, an effect of habitual veneration or devotion. They had long been conspicuous members of the great body politic of Europe; they now exist almost by sufferance. The influence they had formerly exercised over the minds of men, has gradually diminished. The cabinets even of those kingdoms which adhere to the Catholic tenets, have ceased to look on them with that awe which was felt by their illiterate ancestors.

If the violent reformers and philosophers of the two last centuries have appeared to abuse some of the advantages of their superior learning, the light they have dispersed has produced the most auspicious changes, and the most signal benefits. When we review the corruptions, the vices, the scandalous lives of the Roman pontiffs and their prelates, much allowance will appear to be due to those men of

ardent genius and highly cultivated talents, whose impatience and indignation was at length roused by the tyrannical and arrogant, as well as atrocious, conduct of the priesthood. The weakness too of the human mind merits some compassion, when we find these writers confounding too intimately the doctors, with the doctrine of religion: from which oversight preceded the absurdities into which many of them fell, particularly during the last century; as if it was impossible, without inculpating that doctrine, to shew how a religion sent from heaven to enlighten and improve mankind, should have been abused to so contrary a purpose as to have counteracted its own intent; which was to render the whole earth the seat of piety and virtue. These writers, we all know, have been confuted, and charity requires that we should pray for their forgiveness; but we must hope that the wisdom of these times will, for the future, keep the priesthood within due bounds, lest they again make religion an engine of ambition, rather than a means of virtue. It would have been fortunate for mankind, if the evils they had to contend with during the meridian of ecclesiastical power, had been solely confined to the crooked policy of the church. The reader, however, will have to remark sad effects produced by the confused

mixture of those tribes which established themselves and formed the nations of modern Europe, by the principles they brought with them; by the policy they have established, and its concomitant vices; by the fragility of feodal states; by the turbulence and independence of powerful chieftains, growing by degrees from rebellious governors to legitimate sovereigns; in short, by continual fluctuations of power which no rules and principles could controul, and consequently no balance could affect. On the other hand he will see, with less dismay, the change operated in the art of war by the invention of gunpowder; the improvements in military discipline; the introduction of standing armies; the consequent change of the nature of public revenue; the fall of the feodal system; and the encreased stability of governments. All these events have altered the state of nations; and will be found, as might be expected, to have diminished the obstacles which hitherto had prevented the settlement of a balance among them.

Luther who, though long posterior to Huss and Wickliffe, may be considered as the first efficient reformer, was one of the principal instruments in changing the face of Europe, and he broke the chain which had held it enslaved. The press; the improvements in physic; all

prove to us, that were the princes and statesmen of Europe to take the resolution of acting on great principles, many of the causes which have hitherto disturbed the general tranquillity, might for a considerable period be removed.

New causes of mischief might indeed arise; internal commotions, commercial jealousies, &c. but it is in the political body as in the natural, the physician must continue to seek remedies for the disorders which actually annoy the human frame; he must not neglect them because a new species of malady, epidemy or contagion, may hereafter declare itself, and sweep off his patients; he must not hesitate to apply a remedy to present ills, for fear of generating unforeseen diseases; were we to reason generally in this manner; no improvement in any science could be expected.

FIRST EPOCH.

From the Death of Charlemagne, 814; *to the Succession of Rodolph of Hapsburg,* 1273.

The accession of Pepin the founder of the Carlovignian dynasty, has been noticed; it is not necessary to enquire further into the state of Europe prior to that period; numberless nations and associations had overspead its whole extent, and each followed whithersoever fortune led them.

Charlemagne, his son, founded a great empire in the centre of the continent, extending from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and from the frontiers of Hungary and Poland to the Atlantic Ocean, including a considerable portion of Italy, some provinces of Spain with the Balearic Isles. No public right of nations, and scarcely any international reciprocity seems to have been established.

Charlemagne after having formed this mighty empire, laid also the foundation of its destruc-

tion, and that of the imperial authority; it was he, in imitation of his father Pepin, who opened the door to the lofty pretentions of the Roman pontiffs; to this policy may be attributed all the evils which resulted from the interference of priests in the affairs of government. The division of his empire among his sons, which was fatal to his descendants, was a proof of his incapacity as a statesman and of the ignorance of the age in which he lived.

From the establishment of the empire of Charlemagne may be traced the origin of the modern kingdoms of Europe. The Roman empire of the West, had crumbled to pieces; that of the East was rapidly declining, and the multifarious tribes of barbarians by degrees attached to the soil they had seized, had begun to form themselves into regular states. The conquests of the Franks again transiently brought them under one sceptre; but this held them together by ties so weak, that they broke again into pieces and formed new combinations.

The Greek empire was separated from the Franks by the settlements of the barbarous nations on the Danube and the coast of Illyrium; in Asia the Saracens had conquered the greatest part of its provinces; and the disputes of churchmen in the capital, together with

its general weakness and degeneracy, could by no means render it an object of fear to them. In the south of Italy remained the dutchy of Beneventum, which had formerly comprehended what we now call the kingdom of Naples, excepting the provinces of Apulia and Calabria, which were still governed by a Greek lieutenant under the title of Catapan. As the Lombards had adopted the imperfect and vicious system common to that age, the dutchy of Beneventum was divided among brothers; who again sub-divided their portions among their sons; and by this means a constant division and sub-division was taking place, to which may be attributed the ruin of the Lombards in this southern establishment.

Spain was at this time overcome by the Saracens, and divided into separate lieutenancies all nearly independent of the sovereign, who resided at Damascus.

Great Britain was of no consequence; the times of Egbert and Ethelwolf recall the heptarchy to our minds, which, in a general scale, would be nothing; a kind of international balance, within the isle, must have been nearly the utmost extent of the politics of its rulers. A short time previous to this epoch, the Normans had begun to make themselves known

by their depredations in the Low Countries, and by their removal from Friesland into the province of Neutria, since called Normandy, which territory was confirmed to them by a treaty with Charles the Simple in the year 912.

The Saracens in the South were infesting the courts of Italy by piratical expeditions, fitted out from Sicily, then entirely subdued by them.

The Danes were in the same manner pirates in England, and on the opposite coast of the continent. From this sketch of the face of Europe, it requires but little discernment to perceive that no system of political relations could subsist among the different powers. The empire of the Franks in the centre, was too solid at that time to feel the desultory attacks of the northern and southern nations, neither strong enough in themselves to excite terror, nor united by any interest sufficient to combine their measures; nor had they in fact any object but plunder.

But this great empire failed some time after the death of Charlemagne, and tottered for want of unity, during the whole century in which his descendants continued to enjoy the imperial dignity. That prince had divided the succession amongst his three sons by a will made in

the year 806; but Charles and Pepin dying in the year 813, Louis the survivor succeeded to all his dominions, excepting Italy, which he had given to a natural son of Pepins named Bernard; and thus the bad policy of Charlemagne in dividing his dominions, being counteracted, the evil effects of it were also suspended; but a great extent of country conquered by the force of arms, without commerce, without arts, without great cities, could not be susceptible of a very regular civil administration; and of course there were no means left, but to distribute the different provinces into great fiefs or dutchies, held as military benefices; which were granted at first during pleasure, and afterwards for life. from whence arose another cause of the divisions which shortly after took place; and which ended by totally changing the scene at the conclusion of the epoch now before us.

Louis, the Debonaire, having mounted the throne, Bernard assumed the government of Italy, and at the same time the Saracenic empire was divided into four distinct governments; the first comprehended Egypt and Africa; Spain was divided into two, and Syria and Palestina made the fouth.

Charles had succeeded in an expedition against the Danes in the north; and Bernard had defeated the Saracens of Spain; but now

a fresh quarrel arose, and Bernard refusing to consider his uncle Louis his liege lord,* and fortifying the passes of the Alps, was attacked defeated and beheaded at Aix la Chapelle; the bishops at whose instigation he had rebelled, were degraded from their sees and condemned to live the rest of their lives in monasteries. These events were followed by the appointment of Lothaire to the kingdom of Italy, with the title of Augustus. Having found that obedience was refused to his government, he obtained troops from Louis, and punished the principal rebels with death, in the course of whose trial it was discovered that the Pope had been the instigator; the Pope however was permitted to clear himself by oath, and perjury became a support to the popes, who afterwards exercised the prerogative of sanctifying perjury in others.

In the interior of this great empire it had been felt that the great vassals of the crown, could easily shake off their allegiance, and during the reign both of Charlemagne and Louis, a controul over them had been exercised by

* The cause of this dispute is of no consequence to the present Treatise, suffice it to observe that in 817, the diet of Aix la Chapelle promulgated some regulations relative to the succession, and contrary to the interest of his sons, and which caused Bernard to revolt.

the Missi or Royal Commissionaries, who were appointed for this purpose.

The arrangements made by Louis for the succession like those of Charles, tended to the division of the empire. Charles, by the death of his two sons, had been prevented from undoing his own work, Louis accomplished the plan. This primary division of the empire is the leading cause of the subsequent distributions which Europe has undergone. Lothaire was created Cæsar after the plan of Diocletian, and successor to the imperial crown; Pepin, the second son, was made king of Aquitain; and Louis king of Germany, at the famous Diet of Aix la Chapelle holden in the year 817. It was stipulated at the same time, that, if any one of these three princes should die, leaving legitimate male children, his inheritance should not be divided among them, but that a successor should be elected by an assembly of the nation; and that the eldest of the surviving brothers should acknowledge him, in the place of the deceased. This premature division was the cause of all the misfortunes which Louis met with in the following years of his reign, and to the same cause may be attributed the destruction of the Frankish empire.

The first effect of it was the rebellion of Bernard and, as we have seen, his consequent

defeat and death. Not content with having done so much to destroy the unity of the empire; in the year 829, a diet held at Worms made a fresh division, in which a fourth son named Charles received for his portion the dominion of Swabia, part of Bavaria, and some districts of Burgundy. This new arrangement produced a rebellion on the part of the sons of Louis le Debonaire: Lothaire who had consented to this and had guaranteed its execution, revolted at the instigation of Count Hugh, his father-in-law, and drew his brothers into the quarrel. Wala, Abby of Corby, through private pique encouraged the disorder; and uniting with the insurgents, obliged the emperor to summons the Synods of Paris, Lions, Toulouse and Mayance. The two elder sons of the emperor arrested their father at Compiegne: he however found means to sow discord among his rebellious children, by promising to add to the portion of the two younger, to the prejudice of Lothaire. These latter leagued against Lothaire, turned the scale, and the emperor was re-established in his authority, at the diet of Nimeguen in the year 830. Lothaire was banished to his government of Italy; the Saxons whom Louis had allowed to return to their native country on account of their frequent rebellions, contributed to this

event. A fresh revolt took place the following year (831). Pepin took arms against the emperor for intending to give Aquitain to his son Charles, but he was taken and shut up in Treves. The clergy headed by Agobard archbishop of Lyons, Elbos archbishop of Reims, and Wala archbishop of Corby, excited Lothaire and Louis against the emperor, and drew over to their party pope Gregory the 4th, who had come to France to accommodate these disputes. These events again produced open war; the emperor marched at the head of his army against his sons; but being abandoned by his followers when on the point of engaging the rebels, he became again prisoner to his sons, who shut up the empress in a convent, and Charles her son in the monastery of Prum. Lothaire and Louis assembled a diet at Compiegne, at which they formally accused their father of encouraging the irregularities of the empress, of the murder of Bernard, and other crimes of a less serious nature: Louis was deposed by a decree of this diet; the clergy obliged him to do public penance for his sins, and Lothaire was elected emperor by the pope and the people.

These convulsions shook the stability and unity of the empire and prepared the way to

still greater changes.* The tyranny of Lothaire soon disgusted his brothers; they assembled their armies against him; Lothaire fled to Italy; Louis managed to get absolution from the clergy assembled at St. Denis; obtained a declaration from them of the injustice of his deposition; and was by this means reconsecrated, and recovered his wife and son Charles. Lothaire and his brothers submitted, and begged pardon of their father. Thus the feuds of the family seemed to be at an end. Louis instigated by the empress spent the rest of his life in plans for the partition of the empire after his demise; but the death of Pepin his second son happening about this time, she persuaded the emperor to dispose of Aquitain in favor of her son Charles, to the prejudice of the sons of Pepin; and in this she was supported by Lothaire, who had obtained an increase of his own share, which had before been guaranteed to him by his brother Louis the German. The people of Aquitain revolting in favor of the sons of Pepin, the emperor reduced them by force to submit to Charles; and being obliged to march against his own son Louis of Germany, he died at Mayence on this expedition in the year 840.

* A. D. 834.

The detail of these events was necessary to shew the striking contrast between the empire under Charlemagne and Louis; under the former all authority emanated from the crown; the bishops humbly supplicated the emperor to confirm their decrees by his authority, *if his piety considered them worthy of that honor*, and to make such emendations as he thought fit. The language held by his son Louis was totally the reverse; he invited the bishops to recur to him for support, in all cases declaring that his authority was ever ready to second their wishes. The loss of his government twice, after his accession to the throne, ought to be a lesson to princes of the danger of paying too much deference to the clergy.

By the death of Louis the Debonaire, the partition settled at Worms took effect in favor of his three surviving sons, but to the prejudice of the children of Pepin of Aquitain, who had died before him. Lothaire whom he had associated with him in the empire assumed the imperial title, but without authority over the other princes of his family. To his lot fell the kingdom of Italy and those of Lorraine and Burgundy. Louis the German, possessed all the states on the right bank of the Rhine; and Charles, the youngest son, received Neustria

and Aquitain comprehended within the limits of the Meuse the Soane, and the Rhone.

As soon as this had taken place, the brothers of course quarrelled ; the division of the supreme power by degrees gave that ascendency to the nobility and clergy, which broke the whole into so many independant sovereignties, held together by the supremacy of the empire, which in fact has never been any thing more than a fiction in law.

Excuses cannot be too often made to the reader for entering into these details, which give to this work rather the form of an history, than that of a treatise : but it is indispensable, in order to shew how the blind concurrence of events which continual discord, and imbecility produced, laid the foundation of the motley mass called the Germanic body. This confederation, or more perfectly speaking this chaos, has subsisted under various aspects, down to the present times ; and when we have traced it, through these periods, it will perhaps be more clearly seen, that the greatest part of the miseries of Europe has originated in its defects ; It was neither the result of foresight, wisdom or good policy ; its vicious constitution, after having, with the assistance of the popes, ruined Italy, has, since the Treaty of Westphalia,

been the greatest incentive to the ambition of France. Tedious as these complicated details may be, the English reader cannot but be interested in them, inasmuch as this country, whose prosperity can never cease to be connected with the peace and tranquillity of Europe, ought at last to understand that neither the power of her rival France, nor the ambition of Russia, can ever be contained within due bounds, unless a radical reform take place in the political state of Germany as well as Italy. These objects the reader is requested never to lose sight of, as the tendency of this work cannot be perceived without them.

The last partition of the monarchy, at Worms, was no sooner effected than it was overturned. Louis and Charles joined together against Lothaire: at the battle of Fontenay, in the year 841, the army of the emperor Lothaire with the partizans of the sons of Pepin was totally defeated. The war ended by a treaty among the three brothers, signed at Verdun in the year 843, mediated by the bishops on both sides, and enforced by the states of the empire; its basis was the partition of Worms. The vast monarchy of Charlemagne was divided into three portions nearly equal: Lothaire had the imperial title with the nominal sovereignty of Rome: he held the kingdom of Italy as it

had been taken from the Lombards; and the provinces of France bounded by the Alps and Rhine on one part, and the rivers Soane, Rhone, Meuse, and Scheld on the other. Louis had all the other provinces on either side of the Rhine, with the cities of Spire, Worms, and Mayence. The dominions of Charles the son of Pepin have been described.

The treaty of Verdun divided this vast empire into three portions; we shall now see that of Lothaire again subdivided into three others. By this arrangement, Louis the 2d was made emperor and king of Italy: Lothaire the 2d was made king of the countries bounded by the Soane, the Rhone, the Meuse, the Scheld, and the Rhine, which were henceforth styled the kingdom of Lorraine or Lotharii regnum: and Charles received the kingdom of Provence, bounded by the Rhone, the Mediterranean, and the Alps. But as Charles died without heirs, as did also Lothaire the 2d, Louis the 2d pretended to the succession of these two thrones, on which Charles the bald seized on Lorraine. Louis the 2d however died two years after; and the greater part of these possessions reverted to Charles, who got also Italy. He was invited to this enterprise by pope John,

* A. D. 870.

in order to defend the country from the invasion of the Saracens. Thus the weakness of Italy in consequence of the false policy of the pontiffs, reduced them to the necessity of recurring to the same bad system, in order to remedy the very mischief which that system had originally produced!

These events excited the ambition of Louis the German, of whose share of the empire we have already spoken. A fresh war was the result, and Carloman, son of Louis the German and duke of Bavaria, was sent to support the pretensions of his father to the succession of his nephews, in virtue of his right of primogeniture. This war ended by an agreement between Charles the bald and Carloman, on the Brenta in Italy, which province the latter ceded. Louis the German however invaded France without success.

Thus Charles the bald mounted the imperial throne; and the popes began to interfere openly in elections.

By the same absurd policy adopted by the Carlovingian race, Louis the German left his inheritance to three sons, among whom he divided his kingdom. Carloman duke of Bavaria his eldest, inherited that province with its dependencies, and the pretensions to the crown of Italy: Louis the third was made king

of Saxony and of Oriental France or Franconia, with eastern Lorraine: and Charles the fat received Swabia, Switzerland, and Alsace.

Charles the bald dying about the same time as Louis the 2d, the Germanic empire was disputed by Louis the stammerer son of Charles, and Carloman of Bavaria. This event produced a new face of things. Louis the stammerer became king of France; and Germany was divided into three portions, of which Carloman held Bavaria and Italy; Louis the third, Saxony; and Charles the fat, Swabia. This arrangement was not more permanent than the foregoing; a succession of wars constantly varied the political aspect of the empire. Charles having survived Louis the stammerer, became in his turn king of France; so that the sons of Louis the German recovered that crown, after the death of Louis the third and of Carloman. This confusion destroyed all ideas of regular succession. Charles the fat died in the year 888 without children, having been first deposed by the states for his incapacity in the war with the Normans, who had laid siege to Paris. A nobleman named Eudes, great grand uncle of Hugh Capet, was elected king of France; but Eudes dying in 898, Charles the simple succeeded to the throne. Under this prince a treaty of peace was made

with the Normans. Rollo married a daughter of Louis, who thus became duke of Normandy, which he held as a fief of the kingdom of France. The reign of Charles the fat was terminated by the attempt of Robert, the son of Eudes, to usurp the throne: Charles, however, though he defeated and killed him, escaped to Germany. This abdication placed a duke of Burgundy, named Raoul, on the throne; who dying without issue, the crown reverted to Louis the 4th, son of Charles the simple. In Germany, Arnulph, the bastard son of Carloman of Bavaria, assumed the imperial crown. And from henceforward Germany became divided from France. The Carlovingian race was extinguished in Germany shortly after, for Arnulph being poisoned at Ratisbonne, the male line of the house of Charlemagne ended in Louis the 4th of Germany, son of the deceased, who reigned eleven years and died in 911. Lothaire and Louis the 5th, close the dynasty of Charlemagne in France, which however lasted about eighty years longer in Germany.

Charlemagne had by his conquests formed a vast empire, and although the ancient Germans had been accustomed to elect a chief to lead them in war, like the Tartars and other barbarians; the great success he met with, did not fail to enlarge the bounds of his authority.

Thus Tamelane and Genghis Khan became the masters of those, who had elected them merely as their leaders in war. The conquered countries affording to the successful chief the means of imposing his yoke on all. His authority cannot be considered, as less than monarchic; and as he named his son to succeed him, it shews that he did not think himself bound to apply to those, who had first elevated him, to confirm his choice. If the succession had not been divided, and if the power delegated to lieutenants, had been more confined, the succession of Charles might have continued much longer to unite the greater part of Europe under one sceptre. The system which was pursued, caused, as we have seen, both the misery of the subjects and the downfall of the dynasty. These events lead us by degrees to the distribution of states under which Europe subsists to this day.

Louis the 4th dying, left the inheritance greatly altered from its condition, in the time of its founders. The treaties of Verdun, Marsen, and Poron, had dismembered France from Germany. The feeble character of Charles the simple, in whom centred all the rights of the house, rendered him incapable of wielding so heavy a sceptre. The Germans elected a king from the body of their own nation. This change

of dynasty diminished the authority of the crown. The states, consisting of the great prelates and nobles of the kingdom, assumed privileges, excessive in themselves, and destructive of the unity of the nation. The dukes and counts who had hitherto governed their several provinces as lieutenants, now affected to consider them as hereditary fiefs; and the same change took place in France; so that about the end of the ninth century, every great baron may be considered as, in fact, an independent prince. The prelates taking advantage of these circumstances, gradually assumed the same rights as the nobles. The princes who granted them these privileges by erecting their benefices into fiefs, were in hopes of making the clergy a balance to the nobility: but this policy turned against themselves, for both orders united to reduce, as much as they could, the authority of the sovereign. The inferior tenants in the great fiefs pursued the same maxims; so that a complete dislocation of the whole body politic was the consequence. Every duke holding immediately of the crown, assumed the right of war on his neighbours, and even on his sovereign: every gentleman also claimed the same privilege: so that each castle formed a principality, and neither civil subordination, nor legal authority could be

maintained. Rights of nations could not be better respected than those of individuals, who in the course of a short time, might be an overmatch for their rivals, or be unable to defend themselves. All must have depended on the caprice of their own vassals.

In such an era as this, it would be absurd to fix any notion of political balance; anarchy and war pervaded every country; no title could be respected but from the right of the strongest; and therefore no basis for partial or general tranquillity. Such was the state of Europe in the beginning of the tenth century: popes and prelates fought among the nobility, and priests led armies to battle!

From the sources we have been investigating spring the titles, in virtue of which the princes of Europe claim a perpetual and indestructible right to the thrones, not only in their actual possession, but even those which have been lost by their misconduct or misfortunes. Let any sovereign in Europe dispute the proposition, that fraud or force or both, have been the original means by which his ancestors have acquired what he now inherits: nor let it be supposed, that this reasoning is intended to encourage subjects in a contempt of public authority, or to urge princes to extend it by the same means by which it was acquired, and

for the same ends for which it was used. We propose to suggest means for its due consolidation, and beneficial exercise: but we assert from the recorded origin of power in Europe, that justice has scarcely ever had any share in its establishment: and we think that lawless ambition will derive no new pretences from the doctrine that the general welfare should be the measure both of power and possession among states: the promotion or reduction, the formation or extinction of individual states being of inferior importance to the public happiness and security which is to be affected by their existence or condition. We shall develope this doctrine as we proceed.

The Carlovingian dynasty having lost the throne of Germany, a new scene opens upon us. The empire had hitherto consisted of two principal nations, the Germans and the Franks: a final division of it had taken place, by the accession of Arnulph, the natural son of Carloman of Bavaria. At this time several dukes were independent: Conrad, duke of Franconia; Arnulph, duke of Bavaria; Burkard, duke of Swabia; Otho, duke of Saxony, who reigned over that province, together with Thuringia. All these princes, excepting the duke of Swabia,

whose lineage is not known, were descended from female branches of the family of Charlemagne.

The disrepute into which Charles the simple had fallen, excluded him from the succession to the German throne; and the equal pretensions of three powerful lines of the family of the founder, together with the firm possession which they had gotten of their respective domains gave a new aspect to the diet. The equal pretensions of the competitors gave them the power of disposing of the crown, which they afterwards considered as a right. Their decision was of course in favor of the one who would make them the most ample concessions; and from hence are derived the independence and privileges of the members of the Germanic body. The emperors were now no more than the phantoms of sovereignty; the dignity gave them little or no additional weight. The chiefs of the Germanic body were held together by no civil ties; each was supreme in his own district; each assumed the right of making war on whom he pleased; and the Germanic confederation became no more than a rope of sand. We shall henceforth see emperors possessing scarcely any thing in Germany, and often at

war with their own vassals. Such was Germany in the year 911, when Conrad, duke of Saxony, was elected emperor.

The state of France was at this period little better than that of Germany. Charles the simple had lost the command over the great vassals of the realm: Burgundy and Lorraine were fiefs of the Germanic crown: Normandy had been seized by Rollo, whose feudal tenure was such as to make him virtually independent: Britanny became at the same time an appendage of Normandy: and in the south, the kingdom of Arles had been dismembered at the death of Louis the second.

After the death of Charles the fat without heirs, the princes of Italy had wisely resolved to prevent if possible the dominion of Italy from going out of their hands. On this occasion Berenger duke of Friuli, and Guido duke of Spoleto, nearly equal in power, claimed the crown. The princes of Beneventum, by the constant division of succession, had been reduced to comparative debasement, and were not in a situation to become candidates.

The Normans began at this period to render themselves terrible throughout Europe. They had now formed a permanent establishment in that part of France which still bears its name;

they had also about the close of the ninth century laid the foundation of the Russian monarchy. Ruric the Norman is acknowledged to have been the founder: this chief and the great dukes his successors, extended their conquests from the Baltic to the Euxine, and made the eastern emperors tremble on their throne during the 10th century. They often embarked on the Dnieper and the Borysthenes, infested the coasts of Asia and Europe, and obliged the Greeks to become tributary. Other Normans, taking a westerly direction, invaded Ireland, and settled in the Isle of Man and even in Ireland: we shall soon see them founding the kingdom of Sicily.

On the eastern side of Europe, the Hungarians, founded their kingdom; and continued to practise their predatory incursions on the frontiers of the Frankish empire. Henry and his son Otho the great, first gave them that check which tended to fix them within their own limits.

The elevation of Conrad to the empire in the year 911, may be considered as the first exertion of the power of the great feudatories. During the course of the Saxon dynasty, the hereditary right of succession to their fiefs being established, Germany was finally divided.

These great lords in one point of view considered themselves the princes of independent states; in another, their domains were supposed to be feudal patrimonies. They were in fact the lords of the manor; they exercised a power originally delegated, but which afterwards became sovereign; and yet, by a fiction of law, they supposed a power still superior to themselves, which they disregarded, and always endeavoured to diminish and oppress. This tissue of absurdity and contradiction is in truth the spirit of the Germanic constitution: and on this basis of right do all the dukes, margraves, burgraves, &c. consider themselves as legitimate sovereigns.

The extinction of the Carlovingian dynasty having brought forward new claimants to the crown; and the great lords having become hereditary possessors of their principalities; the states at the same time, consisting of the assemblage of these nobles with the great feudatory prelates, having obtained a leading influence; the head became every day more feeble; and no title was acknowledged but that of force. The princely houses of these times had not yet taken root on their thrones, if the term can be admitted: the enterprises of barbarous nations were not yet at an end. This state of things rendered the permanency of

every establishment more precarious than in our days; as every kingdom was held by right of conquest, and of recent conquest, each thought that if he could command the power, he might acquire the right; and public justice was unknown or disregarded.

During the Saxon dynasty, we see this maxim prevail universally. Conrad endeavouring to deprive Henry, the Fowler of Thuringia, who recovers his province after beating his liege lord in two battles: the Hungarians invading Germany and repulsed: the erection of Franconia into a dutchy, thus adding a new member to the Germanic body, and still farther dividing its unity, and this again extorted from the weakness of the emperors: contests between the emperor and the duke of Swabia, for the imperial crown: wars with the Slavi and Venedi: conquest of Brandenburgh and of northern Germany; wars with Denmark and disputes for provinces; duke of Bavaria refusing homage to the chiefs of the empire.* At this epoch the disorders of Italy, caused by the tyranny of Berenger and the ambition of the popes, invited the Germans into Italy. Otho having dethroned Berenger the 2d, subdued the Romans and elected an anti-pope. From this

* A. D. 962.

expedition into Italy, is dated the origin of the custom, that the crown of Italy with the imperial dignity should be vested in the emperor; and hence the practice of the emperor going to Rome to be crowned.

France at this period was torn into seven distinct states or dutchies; while the king, Lothaire, was reduced to the town and territory of Laon, and each of his great vassals were more powerful than himself. Shortly after, while every thing in Germany was fluctuating and uncertain, the evil which had arrived at its greatest height in France, found its remedy.* The advancement of Hugh Capet to the crown gave it a new lustre and new power. The Normans were kept within due bounds: the nobles obliged to be more submissive; the domains of Capet were added to those of the crown, which gave it that weight in the scale which was necessary. In this third dynasty, the kings of France recovered the regal power which had been oppressed under the Carlovingian. Hugh and his successors recovered all the authority which the great feudatories had usurped. This was the result of a policy which they never lost sight of. Had the German emperor been able to act on the same maxims,

* A. D. 987.

Europe might have arrived long since at a state of comparative maturity; instead of which it was, precisely at that very moment, verging towards its decline. The great authority of the emperors was gradually melted away: and the popes by degrees assumed a superiority over their ancient lords and protectors. This was the natural consequence of the vicious constitution, introduced at the elevation of the Saxon dynasty, which had rendered the imperial crown elective. The states now shared with the emperor in the legislative power, and in the right of making peace and war. There were no standing armies, no fortresses, no impositions, no regular system of finance. The government was without vigor, equally incapable of protecting or punishing; and unable to keep within the bounds of obedience distant provinces inhabited by nations differing in language, in custom, and in laws; one sedition was scarcely quashed before another arose, the yoke was as easily shaken off as it had been imposed. The perpetual wars of the emperors in Italy, subsequent to the expedition of Otho, prove the weakness of their government; on the least disturbance which took place in Germany, the Italians revolted, and obliged the emperor to reconquer the country. It would, perhaps, have been better to have renounced it altogether,

than for so many ages to have expended so much blood and treasure for a province, which, as we shall observe in its proper place, Austria still holds by such feeble ties that it is a question whether it does not diminish rather than increase her real power. Yet we see that acquisition of power in Italy is one of the favorite maxims which the Austrian cabinet has inherited with the imperial crown.

In Spain the Mahomedans were on the decline, and the Christian princes began to press heavily on the Spanish Khaliffs. The kingdoms of Leon and Navarre were already founded, and, at the close of the tenth century, the county of Castille and that of Barcellona. Sancho the Great, united these provinces into one kingdom, about the time of the fall of the Khalifat of Cordova.

Contemporary with these events the Anglo-Saxon made room for the Norman dynasty. William established the feudal system in England; Scotland and Wales were independent of him. In Ireland four barbarian princes reigned, so that the British islands contained seven independent governments.

In Italy, the sons of Tancred laid the foundation of another Norman kingdom; the first investiture of these lands being granted by the emperor Henry the 1st.

Bohemia, as far back as the year 894, had embraced christianity: the dukes of Bohemia were vassals of the Germanic crown. Poland rises to notice in the tenth century; Silesia was one of its provinces. In Russia, Vladinir, the great grandson of Ruric the Norman, was the first duke who became a Christian; he was baptized at Cherson on his marriage with the daughter of Constantine the 8th, by this means the Greek ritual was introduced into Russia, and with it the claim of the Russian emperors to the Byzantine throne. In the year 1000 the Hungarians, embraced christianity under Stephen, who united the whole into one kingdom.

It is not necessary to trace the history of the Turks to this period; it is enough to point out that having overthrown the Khaliffs of Bagdad in Asia, they also founded the kingdom of Iconium in Asia Minor. This occupied the interior of that peninsula, leaving the sea coast on every side to the Greeks.

Such was the position of the various states and kingdoms about the year 1074. The barbarian tribes had now settled themselves in the provinces they had conquered. Europe was now beginning to assume a form which led to its present division. Two intermediate kingdoms separated France and Germany,

namely those of Burgundy and Lorraine. No new hords of Northern nations will now change the scene: the collision of those already before us, and their action and re-action on the rest of Europe have produced the present appearance of things. The more complicated the system of nations be, and the more numerous the independent states become, the more will be the points of collision and consequently the causes of disputes. At the period now before us Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, were not united under the Austrian sceptre. The union of these has since tended to simplify the system of Europe, and to give it greater stability. The union of the various parts of Spain, and of the British islands, under one monarchy, have no doubt tended to diminish internal wars; the wars of Europe since these unions, have indeed been increased in magnitude, and importance; but larger masses of men have enjoyed their settlements and security than in the tenth century. Germany and Italy require a still greater degree of simplification. The number of independent sovereigns is much less than it was formerly: but there yet remain too many. If in the course of events the number should be still reduced, the international system would be

improved, and the peace of mankind more durably secured. But to return to the thread of the subject.

In the reign of the emperor Henry the 3rd of Germany,* a schism had taken place in the papacy; three pontiffs were seen at one time. Henry took advantage of this circumstance to restore the papal election to its ancient footing: and it was resolved that no one should be chosen without the consent of the emperor, nor even without his confirmation: he even went a great way towards regaining the prerogative of nominating the dukes and governors of the provinces; he often deposed them and replaced them by others. Had Henry lived to have firmly established this system, the Germanic empire might have preserved its unity; but his premature death broke all his measures; and the accession of Henry the 4th, at the age of six years, afforded to the famous Hildebrand, Gregory the 7th, the means of raising the imperial, and of establishing also so great an ascendancy over the temporal princes of Europe, that they all acknowledged themselves the vassals of the holy see. This new power, elevated over all the others, was greater than the imperial; as it

* A. D. 1046.

united in one hand both the spiritual and the temporal authorities, which had been separated by slow degrees, as we have seen, between the sixth and the eleventh centuries.

In order to understand by what bond the various powers of Europe were connected at that time, it is necessary to enquire into the nature of the ecclesiastical policy founded by Gregory the 7th: a policy grounded in the universal ignorance of the age, and depending on the continuance of that ignorance for its own duration and success. The finesse and subtlety however with which it was established deserve consideration. If that policy had been exercised innocently, and had been made instrumental to the general good; the authors and abettors of it might have escaped the reproaches of modern times in justice to their motives, if not in honor of their example. They found mankind ignorant and uncivilized: they might in that case have been excused, perhaps justified, for leaving mankind uncivilized and ignorant: but their policy was criminal and destructive; they degraded the laity to elevate the priests; and the clergy, who should have been only the ministers of religion, were authorized to plunder the property and arbitrate the destinies of mankind. They arrogated to themselves supreme universal

power; and they have left in the records of its universal abuse, and too frequently in the examples of their domestic lives, the most shocking proofs of the defect or contempt of every christian virtue.

The first attempt of Gregory to complete the papal despotism was while he was yet only a cardinal in 1059: he persuaded his predecessor pope Nicolaus the 2d to make a treaty with Robert Guiscard, and to sanctify his expedition into the kingdom of Naples; and Robert consented to declare himself the vassal of the church. The emperor Henry being a minor, Hildebrand was the principal agent in carrying the famous decree in the synod held at Rome in the same year,* by which the election of future popes should belong to the cardinals. The prerogative of the emperor to confirm or reject such election was at first admitted, but only as belonging personally to the present emperor, by no means as inherent in his crown. This was a step gained towards abolishing altogether the allegiance, which in the beginning was owing from a bishop to the sovereign. What a pretension would this be for an Archbishop of Canterbury to set up in England!

* Pfeffel. Henry 4. 1059.

Scarcely had Hildebrand, under the apellation of Gregory the 7th,* mounted the papal chair, than he conceived the vast design of creating to himself an empire on a new plan, over the princes as well as the clergy of Europe. He began by rendering himself the arbiter in all affairs both civil and ecclesiastical; pretending to this prerogative as vicar of Christ on earth. By degrees he emancipated the clergy in every country from subjection to the civil power, which by this means he assumed himself; and so subverted all legitimate authority every where. He abolished the custom by which the emperors invested the bishops with the ring and crozier: and though the lands held by the clergy had been granted by the emperors, he declared them to belong to the church, and to be held in vassalage of the see of Rome. Having thus obtained the church patronage in every state, and having vassals every where, he rendered the clergy formidable to the laity, and himself tremendous to the sovereigns. He enforced the celibacy of the clergy, and separated that order completely from the rest of mankind. The clergy were the dupes of this arrangement; for soon after, the monastic

* Koch. Revol. Period 4.

orders ruined the power of the clergy, who were afterwards called *secular*, to distinguish them from the monks who were stiled *regular*. We have already noticed the false decretals published under the name of St. Isidore of Seville, on which the pretensions of the popes are founded. When Gregory had advanced thus far, he proceeded to oblige every diocese to contribute a portion of its revenues to the holy see. He then interfered with the sovereigns themselves in the exercise of their authority. We find him shortly after excommunicating the emperor Henry the 4th, and obliging him to receive the imperial crown as a fief of the papal see. Thus by degrees the popes extended themselves: like the jacobins of the French revolution, their policy was to excite sedition in all countries, and to establish their own influence every where.

Gregory knew so well how to cover his ambition under the mask of religion, that he found means to engage every prince in Europe to acknowledge him as liege lord. William the Conqueror was the only one who flatly refused his protection; but the successors of that prince had neither the power nor the firmness to reject this shameful servitude. The causes which operated to favor the growth of this extraordinary power, were the barbarism

and ignorance of the times, with its concomitant superstition. The pontiffs of those miserable times were almost adored as gods on earth. The rebellious and ambitious barons, in order to raise themselves and to humble their respective sovereigns, gave into these impostures: and this is the source whence the electors, dukes, landgraves, margraves, &c. of Germany, have procured the sovereign authority which they now enjoy. They encouraged the priests in the dispute about investitures, in which the emperors were forced to yield; while the clergy fomented the refractory spirit of the nobility. This is the true origin of the weakness of Germany in our days, which has made it a hot-bed of dissension and cabal, and keeps the whole of that extensive country in disorder or war. When these little impotent princes lose a part of their territory, they appeal to justice for the violence they have suffered; and an outcry is raised, because a little miserable duke of Saxony is obliged to cede a part of his territory to encrease the stability of the whole European system. Upon this subject we differ from Mr. Gentz: to keep Europe in its present form, and to persuade the princes of Europe not to go to war, is to expect by preaching to cure the endemical disease of nations. Remove the cause

and the effect will cease: if palliatives will not suffice, the surgeon must use the knife and eradicate the evil.

The emperor being obliged to give up the patronage of the church to the pontiffs, tarnished the lustre of the imperial crown: and the subsequent cession of the sovereignty of Rome to the popes by the house of Hapsburg, completed the elevation of this non-descript and monstrous authority. How far justice has been concerned in restoring this charlatan government in our days, is a question which posterity will decide. It never did any thing but mischief as long as it had the means, and now that it is a cypher in the affairs of Europe, it can do no good: by its existence it only fosters bigotry and ignorance. If the sovereigns flatter themselves that, by supporting its authority at the expence of human improvement, they will secure their own, they will be mistaken; if it be allowed to regain its influence on the vulgar, it will again attempt to turn that very influence on their heads: it will renew all the impudent pretensions of past times, and teach the unlettered people to look to it for authority and protection.

One of the great engines which the popes made use of to advance their power, was the

multiplication of religious orders. These communities, placed in every town of Europe, became a kind of spiritual garrisons, dependent on the popes. Their influence over the vulgar made them the confessors of the people and the directors of their consciences: they usurped the proper functions of the clergy who had betrayed their sovereigns; and being independent of the bishops, the authority of the latter was reduced to nothing, while the popes promoted or removed them at pleasure. In those days no prince was master of his own subjects in those cases where his authority was necessary or beneficial; the monks could insult the government of every country with impunity. Innocent the 3d was one of the most hardy of the successors of pope Gregory; he was not content, with usurping the executive power in different states, but he even ventured, by what he styled *the plenitude of his power*, to dispense with every established right. The foundation of the inquisition is another obligation which mankind owe to this pope since the year 1204.

Let us pause here for a moment, to consider the unhappy state of Europe at this period. In its whole extent it was occupied by various nations subsisting under no precise form of government. The sovereigns of each reduced to a state of dependance on those, who, in

league with the pontiffs and their agents, had usurped and divided their authority: the great prelates holding fiefs, like the lay lords, independently of the regal power, and looking up to the Roman pontiffs as their chiefs: these prelates checked in their authority by the usurpations of the monastic orders, on their rights and functions: the popes, to extend their authority, sowing discord every where: and, under pretence of arbitrating, encreasing the confusion, and exciting wars in every quarter! Not content with doing so much mischief in the interior of Europe they took advantage of the most extraordinary events to encrease their power, at the expence of oceans of human blood. The Crusades, which every nation undertook, were undertaken at the instigation of the clergy and the popes, now become the acknowledged head of he world. These wars, termed holy, because religion was the pretext, merit some attention, but we cannot detail them at large; the reader may peruse their history at his leisure: it is well known, that they lasted upwards of two centuries; they were not confined to the holy land alone, but to the unbaptized nations on the coast of the Baltic, and to the Christian nations who differed from the pope in dogma. During these calamitous times every thing breathed war and

violence; the pain of damnation was threatened to those who contributed neither with personal services nor pecuniary means to these execrable enterprises; the pope and his clergy sat aloft in ease and opulence, in licentiousness and vice, and enjoyed the storm. The deluded people sold their property to the clergy, who bought at what price they pleased, to fit themselves out for these wars! And thus the landed property every where belonged principally to the church; all the reciprocal connection of states and kingdoms were in some measure suspended; and repose banished from the earth! Mankind were too ignorant to reflect justly on the calamitous state of nations, and to appreciate the cause. The obvious intention of civil societies was counteracted; princes without authority, barons without letters, governments without revenues, and clergy without principles; an imperium in imperio established every where by the monastaries! Who could imagine that in such times, a public right of nations, and a peaceful reciprocity among independent states, could ever possibly exist? We shall however see these evils produce by degrees their own remedy. By the Crusades, the barbarians of Europe learnt to appreciate the value of civil institutions, by their connection with the Greeks and Arabians,

letters had been cultivated and encouraged by the Khaliffs of Bagdad; Constantinople had not been violated by the hands of the Turks; the literature of Greece and Rome was still preserved within its walls, the monuments of art were there collected. The Crusaders returning to their native country, brought with them the germ of improvement which has since develloped itself in modern Europe. Venice, and the Italian cities, by becoming the carriers of the crusaders, acquired great riches; and by making establishments in the different parts of the Levant, extended their commerce. These events, with the institution of corporate towns, by degrees changed the face of Europe, and inspired mankind with some liberal notions of civil freedom, but these effects could only be felt by slow degrees.

In tracing these events to their causes, although in every stage we see new wars and disturbances, we ought not to despair of more tranquil times, if a wise and moderate spirit would actuate the rulers of mankind. All this succession of calamities, while it makes the reader shudder at the miseries of human nature, indicates a certain progress through which it must pass, before it arrives at a more perfect state. Much as we may lament the horrors of the French revolution and its effects; yet, if we

except the short period of the reign of terror, the state of Europe was happy in comparison with that of which we are now treating: and if we reflect with attention on the effects of our latest wars, we may perceive that the world is approaching still nearer to a better system of international connexion. The utmost the historian and philosopher can do, is to mark out its progress, pointing out at the same time the rocks and shoals which lie in its course, which, if not avoided, must inevitably, by superinducing new calamities, retard our arrival at the desired port of perfection.

We have already touched on the municipal freedom given to the towns during this century and the foregoing. The progress of industry occasioned by this innovation increased their consequence, and made them potent auxiliaries of the sovereigns in repressing the disorders of the feudal system. A total change now took place in the state of society: the free cities in the principal kingdoms began to form a third order in the state, distinct from the nobility and the clergy; those in France and England supported the power of the throne, and restored to it many of the prerogatives which it was too feeble to exercise; the admission of their deputies into the general assemblies of the nation tended materially

to support the due authority of the crown. In Germany, the head of the empire being elective, the cities assumed the form of independent republics; and instead of restoring unity to the mass, rather increased the division. The distinct interests of the emperors, and those of the empire, evince the truth of this remark.

In Italy the free cities, profiting by the contentions of the pope and emperor, produced a difference still more striking. The Italian cities, though they acknowledged the supremacy of the emperors, and though some of them received a potestà or chief magistrate from him, yet like the states of Germany they coined their own money, and reserved to themselves the right of making peace and war, as well as of forming alliances. When we come to speak of the Guelf and Ghibelline factions this subject will be better understood; suffice it at present to observe, that the freedom of cities had an opposite effect in France and England, and in Germany and Italy: for in the two former kingdoms, it consolidated the unity of the states by balancing the influence of the barons; in the two latter, it increased the complexity of the system, by increasing the number of independencies.

The times succeeding the epoch known in Germany by the appellation of the great inter-

regnum, felt the effect of that difference, and shew the progress of the states of Europe from a complex to a more simple form. The German crown being elective had lost that unity which the hereditary crowns of England and France had preserved; and thus divided against itself, it has in later times been the seat of almost perpetual war. The princes and states of the empire, ambitious of increasing their own individual power, sought to elect emperors whose weakness would render them incapable of asserting the prerogatives of the crown. Those who had voices in electing the emperors, made a point of giving their votes to that candidate, who would give the largest sums of money, or who would grant to them the widest tracts of the imperial domains; to the system of bribery and corruption the present newly made kings in Germany owe their indefeasible right to their states!

The encroachments of the princes of Germany on the imperial crown, produced a curious change in the relative weight of the independent provinces; the princes of the Germanic body considering the provinces and fiefs in which they had originally been invested by the emperors, as their patrimony, adopted the practice of dividing their territories among their children, according to the system of

Charlemagne. This produced a sub-division of states still more prejudicial to the general good. The emperors, however, too weak to reassume their authority over their powerful vassals, encouraged these partitions; which by rendering each portion more feeble, might in the course of time lead to a resumption of their power; but the natural course of events counteracted this policy. The ecclesiastical states being by their nature not susceptible of these divisions remained as they had always been; but the secular states, by the extinction of an incredible number of families, were finally reunited during the interval which elapsed between the twelfth century and the present time. By this means has existed a mass of small independent states, too strong to become subject to the imperial power, and too feeble to give a proper unity to Germany when it was necessary to repel the invasion of foreign powers.

The bigotry of Matilda, countess of Tuscany, was instrumental in adding new territories to the church, and increasing the papal power.

The innumerable free cities of Italy, assuming, as we have remarked, the form of independent republics, sometimes favoring the pope when the emperor pressed too hard on them, sometimes supporting the emperor when they were in danger of being overwhelmed by the

pope, gave rise to the faction of Guelfts and Ghibbellines, which caused for so long a period all the miseries of Italy.

The confederation of the Anseatic cities in Germany added still to the complexity of the picture; from commercial they became ambitious; and carried on wars against the northern powers, in defence of what they considered their privileges, but in reality to maintain a monopoly in trade. The dukes of Savoy were the only Italian princes who had a seat in the diet of Germany. The death of Matilda, and the arrangements she had made, afforded room for the republican spirit of Italy to expend itself; and for the popes to increase their power by means of their incendiary policy. Under such circumstances as these no peaceable accommodation could possibly be effected. That such an extent of country as the continent of Europe, in the position here described, should never enjoy one moments repose; is certainly not a matter of wonder; and when we reflect that the present order of things has grown out of this chaotic mass of violence and imposture, it may reasonably be suspected to contain, at least some of the defects inherent in its original formation. If these can be pointed out by reasoning on clear and self-evident principles, it must be concluded that unless we negociate

on different maxims, all the treaties and conventions which the plenipotentiaries of all nations will make for centuries to come, will exhibit the same or similar imperfections. The right to the throne has been grounded on the same maxims, as that of private property: portions of men with the territories they inhabit have been transferred like farms with their live stock, according to the present convenience of the parties who disposed of them. The public advantage has never been consulted on these arrangements, and princes, considering their interests as separate from that of the people they governed, have sacrificed themselves as well as their subjects, in the short-sighted policy which they have pursued.

It was not till the reign of Henry the 5th of Germany,* who had deposed his father at the instigation of the pontiff, that the imperial crown became decidedly elective. The circumstance which favored the establishment of this custom, was the extinction of the Franconian dynasty, at the death of that prince a new election became necessary: the choice fell on Lothaire duke of Saxony, who left an only daughter: her husband Henry, surnamed the Proud, duke of Bavaria and Saxony, and an-

* Pütter, Book 2, Chap. 10.

cestor to the royal family of Great Britain, was passed over in favor of Conrad the third: at whose death his son was not elected, but his cousin Frederic the first, who was raised to the throne by a perfectly free election. These three elections following each other, the elective right to the imperial crown has since become a maxim hardly to be questioned. Frederic the first, obtained the nomination of king of the Romans for his son Henry, in the year 1196, when he was only four years of age. This prince endeavoured to restore the hereditary succession, but he was obliged to be satisfied with the nomination of his son Frederic the 2d, to be king of the Romans. This appointment was of course opposed by the pope, who now began to set up anti-emperors; so that between these and the anti-popes, fresh discords were naturally engendered. The right of electing was, soon after the establishment of the usage, vested in a few of the princes. At the election of Frederic the first, it is expressly mentioned that he was chosen by six or eight princes, who held the high imperial offices. During this reign, Bohemia was in possession of the office of arch-cupbearer, the palatinate of high steward, Saxony of grand marshall, and

* Pütter ut supra.

Brandenburgh of grand chamberlain; which high offices, with the respective prerogatives annexed to them, have remained to this day. The term *elector* is expressly mentioned in a grant of Frederic the 1st to the house of Austria, in which that house was allowed to take precedence, immediately after the electors. Since that time the emperors have been elected at Frankfort, and crowned at Aix la Chapelle: from whence they proceeded to receive the crown of Lombardy at Milan, and the imperial crown at Rome.

The political connexion of Germany with Lombardy was now established; the Roman pontiffs however pretended that the title of emperor was a gift of the head of the church; which pretension, after having seen the origin of the title in the person of Charlemagne, is evidently unfounded. The pope however pretended, that the imperial crown was a fief of the church; and that the emperor was his vassal; with the same foundation the archbishop of Canterbury might pretend that the crown of Great Britain was at his disposal, and the king his dependent: for by degrees, the oath extorted from the emperors at their coronation resembled that of allegiance taken by vassals on securing the investitures of their fiefs. This heterogeneous and absurd system produced new

disorders in Germany and Italy.* The numerous republics which arose in Italy about the beginning of the eleventh century, now threw off all obedience to the emperors, though they nominally acknowledged them as their sovereigns. At first the emperors were too weak to repress this spirit. Frederic the first resolved to restore the crown of Lombardy to its original lustre. The cities however formed a confederation against him; he called a diet of the kingdom at Roncaglia, and after having there published a declaration of his prerogatives, he marched with his army to enforce them, and chastised Milan by destroying that city. The Italians were not however discouraged: they confederated in 1167, and gained the king of Sicily to their party, as well as pope Alexander the 3d, whom the emperor treated as an anti-pope. This war was carried on with doubtful effect, and by that means was protracted; but Henry the Lion returning to Germany to protect his own dominions from the attempts of his enemies, the imperialists were beaten at Lignano, the emperor was obliged to make his peace with pope Alexander, and in the year 1177 a treaty was signed at Venice for six years

* Koch. Par. 4.

with the confederate republics. In the year 1183 this truce was converted into a definitive treaty of peace, and signed at Constance; by which the government which the cities had adopted was guaranteed. The pope had been the soul of this rebellion, whom the emperor had offended by taking hold of the wrong stirrup of his holiness; and his insolence caused an affray at Rome in which Frederic had nearly lost his life, and eleven hundred of the Romans were slain.

It is with disgust and indignation that we describe the calamities that followed these disorders. Henry the Lion had accompanied Frederic to Rome; and having saved his life in the affray just mentioned, he became an object of jealousy to the emperor on account of his great power in Germany; his return to that country at the time of the war against the confederated cities of Italy, afforded a pretext for the spoliation of his domains, and for the proscription of his family. All this was the natural consequence of the titles by which dominions were held in those days: the princes of the empire who were his enemies, his accusers, and his judges, dismembered his extensive possessions; the present kings of England, as descendants of the Guelfic house, might claim the duchies of Saxony and Bavaria, together

with the adjoining countries through Hanover to the Baltic. On the spoliation of this family, which had also by usurpation become independent of the imperial crown, the modern kings of Saxony and Bavaria ground their indefeasible right to their states!

We have seen in the course of these details the bad effects of elective governments: if the right of hereditary succession was introduced to remedy these evils, it should never be forgotten that this right is allowed to particular families for the good of communities at large: when it is considered in any other point of view, it ceases to be right in the sense in which it was allowed; and therefore, (if for no other reasons) all testamentary legacies of sovereignties, by which nations, and even families, are divided and torn asunder, are noxious, degrading, and unjustifiable assumptions of right. It is from not knowing where the line should be drawn, that so many disputes arise concerning the rights of princes to their states.

Let us turn our attention to the kingdom of Naples. Bounded by the ecclesiastical state, it had been since the sixth century a province of the Greek empire. A branch of the Longobards by degrees subdued the best part of its provinces. The Lombard dutchy of Beneventum had extended itself nearly over the con-

tinental portion; the island of Sicily was nearly under the power of the Saracens. The Greeks, commanded by an officer with the title of Catapan, still governed a part of Apulia and Calabria; and the city of Naples had become a free republic under Greek protection.*

About the year 1000 a few Normans, in the character of pilgrims to the sanctuary of St. Michael in Monte Gargano, engaged themselves as soldiers in some of the local wars eternally arising between the Greeks and Lombards. Having distinguished themselves; on their return to their native home, they gave such an account of the beauty of the country, the fertility of the soil, and the pusillanimity of the inhabitants, that they inspired their countrymen with a desire of seeking their fortunes in that happy region. About the year 1017, a party of Normans went as pilgrims again to the shrine of St. Michael. The leader of this party was a chief named Osmond Drengot, who being in disgrace with Robert duke of Normandy, was obliged to leave his native country. This chief with his followers arrived in Apulia, just at the time when Melo, an opulent citizen of Bari, was endeavouring to liberate his native city from the yoke of the Greeks:

* Denina. Rivol. lib. 10. cap. 7.

he engaged the Normans to return home, and bring back with them a sufficient number of their countrymen to assist him in the enterprise. In a short time they came back in a considerable body. Melo furnished them with arms: they beat the Catapan in several battles, and took many places. Being however at length defeated by the Greeks on the plain of Cannæ, their partizan Melo was killed, and their number was so much reduced that they lost all they had gained. After this, the few who remained hired themselves as mercenaries to the Lombard princes of Beneventum, and sometimes to those of Salerno and Capua. These divisions of the Lombard territory had caused the general weakness, and afterwards gave rise to the first Norman establishment at Aversa, which was granted to them by the princes of Beneventum as a post to keep the Neapolitans in awe.

The success of these first adventurers invited a new tribe of Normans into these provinces. Tancred duke of Normandy had twelve sons; of these, three were appointed to head the party: William, Drogon, and Humbert. Arriving on the spot, they found Rainulf, count of Aversa, not in a situation to admit them to a participation of his territory, from the smallness of its extent; they therefore determined to hire themselves as mercenaries to Guimar

the 4th, prince of Salerno, who employed them against Pandolfo, another Lombard prince who reigned in Capua. About the year 1036, the emperor Conrad the 2d. having come into Italy to quell a revolt of the Milanese, granted such privileges to Guimar that, with the help of his Norman auxiliaries and his titles from the emperor, he nearly reduced the whole of the kingdom of Naples under his authority. Having attained to this height of power by means of these strangers, he began to grow jealous of them; and as he dared not offend the Normans by dismissing them from his service, he sought an opportunity of turning their arms elsewhere. The affairs of the Greeks in Apulia were then in a very bad state. The Saracens who had established themselves in Sicily, pressed hard on the adjacent continent. Michael the Paphlagonian, having usurped the crown of Constantinople, sent an army under George Maniaces, to recover that island from the Mahomedans. The Normans having engaged in this expedition, which was crowned with success, a dispute arose between the parties about the distribution of the spoil: from words they came to blows; the Greeks were beaten in Apulia and Calabria; and the victorious Normans acquired a degree of consequence they had never before enjoyed. They elected William, the

eldest son of Tancred, for their chief: the other brothers, with the principal chiefs both Lombard and Norman, divided the territory among them into great fiefs, and founded an aristocratical state, governed by an assembly of lords held at Amalfi. In the course of time the Greeks found means to sow dissention between the Lombards and Normans; which obliged the latter to assume the tone of masters: in order to strengthen their authority, they accepted the feudal investitures of the provinces from the emperor Henry the 3d. in the year 1046.

The popes, now becoming jealous of the rising power of the Normans, lately made vassals of the emperor, sought means to check their authority. On this occasion Leo the 9th, led an army in person against them: but being worsted and taken prisoner, the superstition of the times again rendered the defeat advantageous. The Normans, instead of reducing the pope and his cardinals to their original rank of bishops metropolitan and suffragans, subject to the temporal power; and uniting the Roman territories to their own; treated him with respect and submission.* This event laid the first foundation of the papal pretension to the kingdom of Naples. At the same time the

* Giannone.

counts of Aversa having allied themselves by marriage with the family of Tancred, encreased their dominions by the conquest of Capua and Naples. For this depredation they received an investiture from pope Nicolas the 2d. Thus the dutchy of Beneventum, founded by the Lombards and divided by their princes, together with the Greek territory, contributed to form the Norman kingdom of Naples. These investitures, granted by the popes, produced wars for three centuries; it seems that wherever these priests were concerned, wherever their sanction and blessing was bestowed, the natural consequences were uniformly massacres, wars, and every human calamity. We ought rather to have considered them as the vicars of Ahriman the evil principle of the Persians, than of the good principle either of the Christians or the magi.

From these beginnings arose the Norman power in the south of Italy. The contest between Henry the 4th and Gregory the 7th, had rendered their friendship useful to the pontiff; the countess Matilda of Tuscany being the only ally of the church, he allowed himself to be persuaded to favor the views of Robert Guiscard; though he afterwards excommunicated him through jealousy of his power. The Norman aristocracy becoming monarchic, two suc-

cessive princes governed the kingdom after the death of Robert: the next heir was Bohemund prince of Antioch, but Roger, the second count of Sicily, whose father had in the mean while conquered that island from the Saracens, and had accepted the investiture of the same from the pope, united the two kingdoms of Sicily under his sway. The male descendants of this family ending in William the 2d, the crown fell to Constantia the daughter of Roger the 2d; who, being married to Henry the 6th, king of Germany, became mother of the emperor Frederic the second. Thus the kingdom of the two Sicilies fell to the imperial house of Swabia.

The right of a female to succeed to the Norman sceptre was not in those days established; and although William the 2d had declared Constantia his successor, and in an assembly of the states of the kingdom held at Troja had publicly acknowledged her as such, and had caused the nobles to swear allegiance to her and to Henry of Swabia her husband, the Sicilians dreading the sway of a foreign prince who then was in Germany, began to plot together to raise up a competitor for the throne. They pitched on Tancred count of Lecce. This produced a division of the nation into two parties, one for

Constantia, the other for Tancred. This prince was a natural son of Roger the 1st. Tancred had no kind of hereditary right, and could ground his claim only on the choice of the people; but the crown was not considered as elective. This irregularity was countenanced by Pope Clement the 4th, who was contented to see the crown of Sicily on any head but that of the emperor, for fear of encreasing the imperial power in Italy. This produced a bloody war. The bastard race was at last dethroned by William the 3d; and the death of Henry left Constantia the guardian of her infant son, afterwards the emperor Frederic 2d.

Thus the kingdom of Sicily was transferred from the Norman to the Swabian line;* but Henry the 6th had been obliged to draw his sword in opposition to the papal investitures in order to assert his right: a misfortune for mankind whenever the occasion happens, and especially when distant possessions, so difficult to retain, are the objects of contention.

Contests for succession have always been the consequence of claims of hereditary right by females.

* A. D. 1198.

In this respect France has given an example worthy of universal imitation. The Salic law which excludes females from that throne, has prevented much mischief; for since the election of Hugh Capet, only two dynasties have reigned in the course of eight hundred years. In our own country, and in all those where a female succession is admitted; history presents a very different picture: and might convince us that the Salic law is alone a powerful prevention of disputed succession; this subject will not be forgotten, when, at the end of this work we apply examples of past for the benefit of future generations. The Emperor Frederic the 2d. had been left under the tutelage of his mother Constantia, who died before he became of age to govern his states, and bequeathed the guardianship of her son to Pope Innocent the 3d. This event produced afterwards the worst effects; for it gave the Pontiffs the facility of establishing many pretensions over the kingdom of Naples; and among them that of being the tutors whenever a minority occurred, whether it had been so devised by the deceased or not. Clement the 4th. made the same special condition in the investiture which he afterwards gave to Charles of Anjou; and this, no less than the other pretensions

of the popes, contributed to involve the kingdom in perpetual wars.

The accession of Frederic the 2d. to the crown of Germany and the two Sicilies, continued the scene of contention between the pope and the emperor. The emperors had received the imperial crown with the title of emperors of the west from the hands of the bishops of Rome. On this ceremony were founded the pretensions of the pontiffs to pre-eminence over all the sovereigns of the earth, and the right to grant investitures of dominions which had never belonged to them. We have seen how the princes of the Carlovingian race laid the foundation of all this mischief, by imposing the authority of the popes upon an ignorant age, as a sanction of their usurpations; and how succeeding pontiffs in their turn usurped all authority, and trampled all human power under foot. If the right of the sword be not a sufficient sanction to hold a conquest; surely a title made out by a priest whose only credentials are forgeries, and whose only authority is imposture, cannot give it validity.

In these days the old fashioned right of conquest is cried down: and as investitures

* A. D. 1212.

by popes are not yet in vogue again, we patiently wait the result of those charitable alliances and christian conventions, by which these harsh or ridiculous titles, the only titles hitherto recorded in history, may be innocently exploded, or quietly superseded. The emperor Frederic the 2d. being at once the heir to the Germanic dominions of Frederic the first, and to the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily in right of his mother, and having made new efforts to recover his rights in Italy: a second league of the republics was formed under the auspices of Gregory the 9th. That pontiff, who perceived that, if the emperor, with his dominions in the south of Italy, should recover his authority over the cities of Lombardy and Tuscany, he would himself be obliged to submit; blew up the flames of war. He, with his successor Innocent the 4th. went so far as to preach a crusade against the emperor as against the infidels. That prince after a very severe struggle was obliged to give up his purpose, and leave the republics independent.

By this league the popes, it is true, maintained themselves; but at the expence of their country. No sooner were the republics deli-

* Koch. p. 4.

vered from the fear of the emperor, than all Italy was divided into numerous states; and the factions of Guelfs and Ghibellines arose to their highest pitch, so many points of contact could not fail to produce this effect, the misery was for mankind at large, the advantages for the pontiffs alone. These wars however ultimately destroyed the liberties of the cities; and in our times, Venice and Genoa alone have survived.

The death of Frederic the 2d., the history of his grandson Conradine, the usurpations of Manfred, are all well known. The popes taking advantage of these events, offered the crown of Naples to Charles of Anjou. The conditions of this investiture reduced the crown of Naples to a fief of the holy see. Manfred was killed in battle, and Conradine endeavouring to recover his paternal kingdom was taken prisoner, and the pope caused Charles to execute him on a scaffold at Naples, in order to secure the throne to the house of Anjou. That prince was beheaded on the 29th of October, 1268. Twelve years after this event, we find the pope entering into a conspiracy against the French and the house of Anjou; bringing about the Sicilian vespers in 1282; and inviting the princes of the house of Arragon to seize the kingdom of Naples.

A war was the consequence, which lasted seventy years, by the providence of these vicars of Christ; by whose usual machinations all Italy, from the Alps to its southern extremity, continued to be one frightful scene of war and bloodshed.

The rivality which arose betwen France and England was prior to these events. Philip the first was king of France during the time that William the Norman invaded England. By this means the vassal became superior in power to his liege lord. The duke of Normandy with the weight of England in the scale, was a dangerous rival. War ensued in the year 1087, which was the first between these two nations. This rivalty was increased by the divorce of Louis the 7th and Eleanor of Poitou in the year 1152. This princess married Henry the 2d; by which means Poitou and Gascony became subject to the kings of England. Subsequent to this, Philip Augustus successor to Louis the 7th, wisely profiting of the intestine troubles, during the reign of king John, recovered the provinces of Artois, Vermandois, Evreux, Auvergne, Alençon, Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Touraine, and Poitou; and maintained his conquest by the victory which he gained at the battle of Bovine, over the English and im-

perialists with the count of Flanders at their head in the year 1214.

The crusades at this time preached by the pontiffs added to the confusion. That against the Albigenses is an eternal reproach to their memory; this crusade, published by Innocent the 3d. in the year 1208, against these unfortunate heretics, laid waste all Languedoc: Simon de Montfort received the inheritance of the counts of Toulouse as a reward for this murderous expeditions, which he commanded. Thus no title was secure but by the donation of the pope; and no dependence for the future but by the most abject and stupid submission to these apostolic assassins.

Pfeffel is of opinion that the popes would not have been able to maintain themselves against the emperors, if Henry the 2d. and Conrad the 2d. had not permitted the Normans to form an establishment in Italy. These princes having reckoned on the Normans for the means of driving the Mahomedans from Italy and Sicily, did not foresee that it would be more difficult to reduce the conquerors than the conquered. The Normans raised, on the ruins of the Saracens, an empire to which nothing was wanting but the means of shaking off the German yoke. They had no way of accom-

plishing this end, but by giving assistance to the church, and by raising a barrier of independent states in the north of Italy. Here we may observe an imperfect attempt in Italy, to counterpoise Germany; but the divided state of that country, and the maxims on which the government of the ecclesiastical state was established, prevented the coalition of its parts: this internal incongruity has been the permanent cause of the debility and political evils of Italy; it must one day or other produce the complete conquest of the whole peninsula by a foreign power, if means are not taken to consolidate the whole under one independent government: that can not take place without the abolition of the temporal power of the pontiffs; as long, therefore, as that power exists, Italy will never cease to be the seat of war between contending parties.

After the Norman conquest of the southern part of Britain; Ireland still remained divided into five kingdoms, Ulster, Munster, Connaught, Leinster, and Meath: what was the consequence? The overthrow of these kingdoms, and the conquest of the whole island by the English. Russia in our days is a great empire, governed by one supreme will; but Italy has by the treaty of Vienna 1815, six independent states, without reckoning the

provinces of the house of Austria: and Germany no less than thirty-eight! By what machinery can a steady balance be erected for powers so constituted and so proportioned? Do they not, on the contrary, present constant opportunity for the treacherous enterprises of impatient subjects, the malevolence of jealous neighbours, and the cupidity of strangers?

There only remains to take a view of the north of Europe, before we close this chapter. These kingdoms presented for the most part a scene of horror and bloodshed, interior and exterior: no regular succession to the throne; no fixed principles of reciprocal rights. In Denmark the throne was elective, but in the person of one of the reigning family, as it was also in Norway. Bastards were allowed to become candidates for the crown, upon equal terms with legitimate issue: the exclusion of them was not determined till the year 1209. The power of the clergy was increased by the great authority usurped by the archbishops; and the bishop of Drontheim had the chief influence in electing the kings of Norway. Swerer king of Norway, endeavouring in the years 1191, and 1198, to put some limit to their authority, was excommunicated by popes Celestine the 3d. and Innocent the 3d. this contest afterwards terminated in a compromise between the king

and the clergy, by which their interference was set aside, and the way opened for the establishment of an hereditary succession.

The coasts of Denmark being at this time infested by the piracies of the Slavi, a people who inhabited the southern shore of the Baltic; Waldemar the 1st. attacked them, and took many of their towns; among them were Arcona, and Carcutz in the isle of Rugen, Wollen, and Stettin in Pomerania; the princes of Rugen became his vassals and tributaries, and the Danish power was established in Pomerania.

Before the end of the 10th century, no mention is made in history of Prussia nor the Prussians; about the year 1215, an abbot of Oliva, named Christian, declared himself the apostle of that people; and Innocent the 3d. named him the first bishop of Prussia. This nation, followers of the religion of Odin, not being disposed to embrace christianity, pope Honorious the 3d. published in 1218, a crusade against them. A swarm of crusaders immediately invaded the country with fire and sword, and the extermination of the inhabitants rather than their conversion, seemed to be their object. The Prussians revenged their injuries on Poland. The Teutonic knights were called to their aid; and the territory of Culm was given in recompence to the knights of that

order. Frederic the 2d. confirmed this grant; the knights extended their dominions by conquest; and by degrees all Prussia became their apanage. The original inhabitants, instead of being converted, were nearly exterminated; and the country was given to the crusading banditti who had taken arms in this pious and murderous war. In 1201 a new order was founded called the Army of Christ; which, being afterwards incorporated with the Teutonic order, subdued Livonia and Courland: this joint order completed the reduction of Prussia in 1283.

In the midst of the political tempests of this continent, an event took place in Asia which had well nigh overturned all that was established. The enterprizes of Tchinglis Khan, his conquests from the eastern part of China to the province of Silesia, made all Europe tremble; the decline of the power of the Moguls as rapid as its rise, saved Europe; but the dukes of Moscow became the tributaries of the Golden Horde.

The Russia of these days has an awful resemblance of the Golden Horde of those: oh! let not the divisions and discord of Europe prepare the way for new nations, new customs, new languages, new masters! But if this disgrace is in reserve for us, let not the folly of accelerating be added to the shame of deserving

it. The present anomalous and disproportioned distribution of the states of Europe exhibits but equivocal proofs of sensibility to dangers which seem remote, but which nevertheless experience admonishes us to anticipate, and good policy to provide against by times. As the political events illustrative of the state of Europe in this epoch hung principally on the contentions of the emperors and popes, it will be necessary to pursue them till the extravagant ambition and tyranny of the popes produced at length their own ruin. The scene will then open wider; the reflections will become more general; and the narration will take a wider field.

The reign of Conrad the 4th was disturbed by the contests with William count of Holland: the anti-emperor supported by Innocent the 4th, being defeated by the count returned to Naples. The pope invaded his kingdom, after having first done all he could to ruin him in Germany. He reigned but four years, being poisoned by his natural brother Manfred. The reign of William was but two years: after whose death Germany was a year without a head, when Richard duke of Cornwall, and son to king John, became king of the Romans. The whole of this space is filled with the contentions of the princes of Germany, and the intrigues of the popes. Two years of interregnum

succeeded after the death of Richard. Such was the state of Germany in consequence of the dispute between the Swabian dynasty and the popes. The cities of Italy had by their union nearly annihilated the influence of Germany beyond the Alps. The pontiffs favoured the cities from jealousy of the emperors, who being at the same time kings of Naples, had by their preponderance driven the popes to Avignon. By means of this league of the Italian cities, and by inviting Charles of Anjou brother of Louis the 9th into the kingdom, they overthrew their opponents and prevented the union of all Italy under one head: the consequences of which event we have already noticed.

We may consider the close of this epoch as the crisis of the evils of Europe. The accession of Rodolph of Hapsburg, and the gradual decline of the papal power beginning with the next epoch, will mark the slow approximation of nations to a better state of things. To this state it has continued gradually to approach, and it is to be hoped will approach still nearer; though it be still distant from that point to which all well-wishers to mankind would desire to see it arrive.

SECOND EPOCH.

From the Accession of Rodolph of Hapsburg, 1273; *to the Treaty of Westphalia*, 1648.

THE succinct view which we have taken of the great events of the former period may serve to shew us that the right of every princely house now existing is founded on force. If regard for the happiness and interest of mankind is the motive for permitting the lapse of ages to throw a veil of oblivion over the rapine and usurpation of past times; the same motive, at the conclusion of every war which is justly undertaken, places a victorious party in the right, and imposes upon it the duty to consider the public relations, and change them if the public good requires it; even though it should be necessary for this purpose to use the arm of power, against prescription or any other conceivable title which may obstruct the way.

We have seen that a great military empire like that of Charlemagne is naturally liable to division and sub-division: that the contact of many independant states, their inequality, jealousies, and diversity of interests, generate eternal discord and

render confederations among them difficult, and generally ineffectual: we have seen an attempt made by the only enlightened men of the time, the clergy, to bind the whole of this heterogeneous mass together under the despotic rule of the pontiffs of Rome; and that one hand was not able to wield the weighty sceptre of such dominion without making it an engine of universal destruction or oppression: it remains to be seen whether no possible partition of it can be suggested, no equilibrium proposed, no securities interchanged, by which Europe may be at length redeemed from the desolation and outrages of a thousand years of misrule, and become the theatre of a steady, wise, and beneficent policy, for ages to come.

The number of reigning families and of independent states has been greatly diminished since the times we have been lately considering, and greater spaces of territory have in consequence been spared from the ravages of war: this is matter of fact, and should encourage an experiment upon an enlarged scale, to meet the wishes and to satisfy the wants of our own times. If the reader is of the same opinion, he will be able to apply the contents of the ensuing chapter to the views of the writer, and perceive with some satisfaction, that not only the doctrine is not so chimerical as some will suppose,

but that events themselves are tending towards its practical demonstration. Violent measures may sometimes be necessary; the less frequently they are employed, no doubt the better, and the more durable will be the work. To endeavour to build the edifice at once, would be to defeat the purpose in view, it is sufficient, never to lose sight of it, and as opportunities occur in the course of the frequent negociations of these days, the principal powers who take the lead in Europe, should content themselves with giving an occasional bias, as they may be able, and wait other events to mature and accomplish the object; these ideas will be further developed, as we proceed.

The accession of Rodolph of Hapsburg, after a course of anarchy and confusion, subsequent to the death of Richard, was owing to his talents both political and military; the smallness of his patrimonial domains made him at the same time less an object of jealousy to the electors, who feared that the great fiefs of the empire usurped in the late confusions might be resumed, should the crown of Germany be adjudged to a great chief, who could exert a power equal to that of the emperors of the Swabian and Franconian dynasties: and though the imperial crown was not by custom confined

to the house of Austria for some time after, yet it furnished that house with the means of increasing its patrimonial possessions to their present extent: but in order to trace these events to their real causes, we must first consider the decline of the papal power from the pinnacle at which it was at this period arrived; an event intimately connected with the subject.

On the accession of Boniface the 8th, in the year 1294, the papal power was at the summit of its grandeur. The pontiffs loudly declared themselves to be the masters of the world; they pretended that, by divine right, their authority was supreme both in spiritual and in temporal concerns. Boniface carried his pretensions further than any of his predecessors; according to him the temporal power was derived only from the spiritual, and the twofold power of the pope was founded on the scriptures, and of course was an article of faith. He declared that God gave to St. Peter and his successors, two swords, one spiritual, the other temporal: the first exclusively to be wielded by the church; the other by the secular princes of the earth, but for the service of religion and according to the will of the pontiff; that the secular power therefore depended on the spiritual, and was to be judged by it; but

that God alone was competent to judge the spiritual. Thus all who refused submission to the pope were destined to eternal damnation.

With such maxims as these, in which every one in those days of ignorance acquiesced, no wonder the pontiffs assumed the whole patronage of the church in all countries, and imposed on the bishops and chapters such contributions as they thought fit: by this means they raised a great revenue at the expense of all Europe, which they increased by the sale of dispensations and indulgencies to so licentious a degree, that all moral distinctions were at length obliterated or neglected, and the christian religion itself was made the pander to every vice which its holy precepts prohibit. They even ventured to excommunicate any sovereign who dared to levy taxes on the clergy of his own country, even for the defence of his dominions: they interfered in all disputes between sovereigns: issued their orders to all: to one prince to lay down his arms, to another to forbear attacking a third who had claimed his protection. The history of the popes at this period is the history of all Europe; they treated the sovereigns of the earth as their vassals; pretended to liberate princes from their oaths and people from their allegiance; they put whole kingdoms under interdict to revenge their

own quarrels; gave the dominions of one prince whom they had excommunicated, to another whom they affected to protect; in short they acted as the sovereigns and despots of the world. Such was the power of the church of Rome in the beginning of the fourteenth century; such means did the pontiffs possess of alleviating the evils of humanity, had it ever occurred to them to employ their influence to so worthy a purpose: but no benevolent principle could actuate such monsters; and the good which they had the power of doing, can be perhaps best estimated by the evil which they did. A dispute at last happened between Boniface the 8th and Philip the Handsome of France, which served to humble the pope: he had published a bull putting the kingdom under an interdict, filled with such scurrility and abuse that the king ordered it to be publicly burnt: a council was then summoned, to which it was agreed to appeal against the pope, and Sciarra Colonna was sent to announce these proceedings to his holiness. Sciarra besieged the pope at Anagni, seized his person at Narni, and at their first interview gave his holiness a sound slap on the face, and carried him a prisoner to Rome where he died.* From this example it

* Corio. Hist. p. 2.

was seen, in what consisted the power of the popes, and how they ought to be treated.

In the year 1338, a diet was held of the princes of Germany, and on the report of the electoral college it was thought fit to put some limitation to the endless and exorbitant pretensions of the popes. This decree has ever since been considered as a fundamental law of the empire: it declares that the imperial dignity is dependant on God alone; that he who is chosen by the plurality of the electoral voices is the real king and emperor, without needing the confirmation of the pope; and that whoever declares the contrary is guilty of high treason.

The simplifying principle had now began to operate in Italy; the republics in the north were on the decline. Milan was fast falling under the power of the Visconti, and the others were verging to a dependance on it. The same was operating in Tuscany, where events were tending to establish the superiority of Florence over the other cities of that province. The translation of the residence of the popes from Rome to Avignon, was the consequence of the failure of the haughty pretensions of Boniface the 8th. By the intrigues of the king of France in the conclave, after the death of Benedict the 11th, Bertrand archbishop of Bordeaux was

elected pontiff under the name of Clement the 5th. By this means, and the power of the Colonna family in Rome, the pope remained in France, where his successors continued to reside until the year 1376, to the great loss, says Denina, of the Italians; according however to more just views, to their great advantage if they had known how to profit of it, as we shall shortly see.

While the enmity which subsisted between the emperors of the house of Swabia and the papal chair was bringing about the ruin and extermination of that family, the counts of Anjou had been invited by the pontiffs to invade the kingdom of Naples. The enterprise had succeeded; but the pontiffs, jealous of its success, again plunged that kingdom into a civil war, by giving the investiture of the same to Peter of Aragon, on condition that he would drive out Charles. According to the Sicilian historians, the pope was concerned with John of Procida in bringing about the massacre of the French in Sicily; they even recount a voyage of that chief to Constantinople, to apprise the Greek emperor of the intention of Charles to invade the eastern empire, and that John corresponded with the pope, and obtained a subsidy from Palealogus for Peter of Aragon; in short that the pope was the soul of the

whole conspiracy. This atrocious transaction, on which the Sicilians bestow so much encomium, has proved to be the greatest misfortune of Italy, and a principal cause of the present degraded state of their own island. It produced a war between Naples and Sicily, which lasted seventy years. Robert, the successor of Charles, was by it prevented from extending his empire over the whole of Italy. That prince had formed the design, and on very good grounds, Henry the 7th of Germany was dead; he was allied with all the cities of upper Italy; and he would probably have succeeded, had not the war of Sicily,* and the Ghibelline party under Castruccio Castracani, and Ugoccione della Fagiola, prevented him. The continuance of the popes in Avignon had weakened their authority in Italy,† and diminished the veneration in which they had hitherto been held. Their absence also lessened their personal au-

* Denina rivol. l. 11, ch. 6.

† Had Italy been united under one power by the success of this plan, it might have remained so to this day, and presented an homogeneous form, like Spain, France and England. When we recollect that its division into so many small states, facilitated the conquest of it by Buonaparte, we cannot refuse to allow that the Sicilian vespers, by their consequences, caused the overthrow of all Europe in our days. Its present state is a great incentive to Austrian ambition, and will sooner or later produce new wars.

thority in Rome and the ecclesiastical state. The Romans now, not checked by their presence, obeyed their representatives with reluctance; and they began to form schemes of restoring the Roman republic on the footing of ancient times. The famous Rienzi profited of this disposition to obtain the command of them, under the specious title of tribune of the people. The fall of Rienzi did not restore to the pontiff his former authority; the greatest part of the cities of the ecclesiastical state, having assumed a republican form, were so torn by factions, that they gradually fell under the power of the different nobles who assumed the tyranny,* and left scarcely a shadow of it to the pope. Alexander the 6th, and Julius the 2d, with all their arts and intrigues, had great difficulty to re-establish the pontifical authority. The great schism which divided the church at this time,† tended also to diminish its power. Gregory the 11th having quitted Avignon to return to Rome, and dying there in 1378, the Italians chose a pope of their own nation, who was called Urban the 6th, the French cardinals elected, nearly at the same time, Robert of Geneva under the name of Clement the 7th, and placed him at Avignon. All the nations divided themselves

* Τυραννις. † A. D. 1378.

between these two popes: and the schism lasted untill the year 1417. At this time the princes of Europe had an opportunity of suppressing the papacy altogether; but the ignorance of the times saved the popes: had their schism been allowed to remain, and others to be encouraged, every bishop would in time have become pope in his own diocese; and instead of two, we might have seen two hundred or even two thousand popes at the same time; by which means the temporal princes would have recovered their authority; and the clergy must have returned to the allegiance they owe, in common with their fellow citizens, to their sovereigns; the debased figure the pontiffs must then have exhibited, would have exposed the impostures on which their pretensions were founded; and a pope, par excellence, would have become an object of ridicule or contempt in the eyes of all mankind. The sovereigns were as yet too little enlightened; and instead of letting these charlatans settle their quarrels their own way, they called the council of Constance: they restored the unity of the papacy; they contented themselves, by means of this council, with limiting its supreme authority by making it a maxim that councils should be superior. Since that time princes have better understood their own rights, and

the pontiffs, reluctantly and by slow degrees, have become more moderate, although not without many struggles and manœuvres, to recover their influence.

The invention in this age, of printing, extended the means of knowledge to all classes of people, and learning ceased to belong exclusively to ecclesiastics. Henceforward it became necessary to govern mankind on more liberal principles. The discovery of gunpowder, and the use of fire arms, by causing a revolution in the art of war and the œconomy of armies, had its effect also on government, and produced essential service. The feudal militia, consisting of the disorderly and undisciplined vassals of the barons, who were bound to bring a certain number of men into the field, according to the stipulations of their respective grants, became ineffective as the improvement of society advanced; and the military discipline introduced by the Swiss was gradually adopted by forming compact bodies of infantry analagous to those of the Greeks and Macedonians. The use of fire arms made the tumultuary forces of the barons contemptible; they were more rarely called out, sovereign princes learned how to maintain a regular and permanent force at their own expense. This new military system caused a

great change in the politics of nations; war was carried on with more regularity; the sovereign power gained strength by its unity; and the barons were unable to resist it.

It was owing to these changes, that many kingdoms acquired a consistency hitherto unknown. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, England and France, now began to take steady positions according to their natural limits. Germany and Italy alone remained divided; for though the component parts of these two great portions of the continent were better assorted, the consolidation of them was prevented by the natural defects of the Germanic constitution, in one case, and the peculiarities of the papal state in the other; which if they were not the elements, have been at least the aliment, of every succeeding war.

These effects were visible in the changes which happened, in the fourteenth century, both in Germany and Italy. The ties which united the numerous states of Germany were so feeble, that those parts which were furthest distant from the centre either became quite independent, and were detached from the body; or the prey of neighbouring kingdoms. It was in this way that several provinces of the kingdom of Arles, or Burgundy, were in their turns united to France. Philip the Handsome, pro-

fited of the disputes between the archbishop and the people of Lyons, to oblige him to cede the sovereignty of that city and its dependencies to the crown of France. Dauphiny fell to the same power, in virtue of a cession of Hubert the 2d, in the year 1349, to Charles, grandson of Philip of Valois, who became first Dauphin of France. Provence became also a domain of the crown of France, by the will of Charles, the last count of Provence, of the second house of Anjou, in the year 1481. As to the city of Avignon, it was sold in the year 1348 by Joan the 1st, queen of Naples, and countess of Anjou and Provence, to pope Clement the 6th; to whom Charles the 4th emperor of Germany, abandoned the right of sovereignty, as he also yielded that of all the states of the church in Italy.

At this time * the resistance of the Swiss to the Austrian emperors, gave to their cantons the form which they have preserved to the present times.

A power had now arisen in Lorraine, which retarded the effects of the simplifying principle. Philip the Bold, youngest son of John the Good, king of France, having been created duke of Burgundy by his father, mar-

* 1415.

ried Margaret, daughter and heiress of Louis the 3d, last count of Flanders: by this marriage he obtained Flanders, Artois and Franchecomté, Nevers, Rethel, Malines, and Antwerp. He left this inheritance to Philip the Good, who bought the county of Namur in the year 1428. He afterwards, in the year 1430, succeeded to the duchies of Brabant and Limbourg by the death of his cousin Philip of Burgundy.

Another of his cousins, Jacheline of Bavaria, ceded to him by treaty Henault, Holland, Zealand, and Friesland; he afterwards acquired Luxemburg, and Chimay, by an agreement with Elizabeth, niece to the emperor Sigismond. By this means the dukes of Burgundy were on a footing with the first powers of Europe. France and Germany were divided by a long narrow slip of territory stretching from the Rhone in its course from Geneva to Lyons, and extending on either side the Rhine to the Low Countries; whence it included the countries lying on the coast of the ocean from the present frontier of France near Dunkirk, to the mouth of the Weser. This awkward and heterogeneous state could not have stood long even if the princes of that family had not become extinct. The evil effects however of this kingdom we shall have to remark in the sequel. Bohemia was united to Germany

by the extinction of the Slavian kings in the person of Wenceslaus the 5th, assassinated in the year 1306. The emperor Henry 7th invested his son John with the kingdom, who had married Elizabeth the daughter of the late monarch, in the year 1311.

At this period* the house of Wittetsbach, which was in possession of the Palatinate and of Bavaria, was divided into two principal branches. It was agreed at Pavia in the year 1329 that they should mutually succeed to each other† in case of the failure of the male line of either branch. The very event foreseen happened at the death of Maximilian Joseph in the year 1777, and we shall see in due time the disputes which this occasioned, notwithstanding the solemn agreement just mentioned: it will serve, along with many other examples, to shew that there must exist some capital defect in the public right of Europe. How else should the extinction of a line of princes, as if it was an event beyond calculation, beget all sorts of agitations and convulsions, and suddenly overthrow or derange all existing relations and settled Balances of Power, which twenty or thirty years of war and misery would

* 1329.

† Pfeffel. Hist. of Germany, cod. anno.

not be more than sufficient to restore? can no alternative be found to prevent the constant recurrence to precedents of outrage and violence as often as the course of nature, or even of common accidents, disturbs the wonted order of affairs? The German system of feudal tenures, consisting of a mixture of baronial and royal rights confounded together, is the cause of all this confusion. Nations and territories are transferred like farms and cattle; so many thousand heads are specified in some of the articles even of the late treaty of Vienna, 1815! Until states and kingdoms are (as it were) nationalized, and adequate security for the proper existence and maintenance of every one is provided by reciprocal guarantees among the different powers, this eternal strife must recur. We only touch on this subject in passing, with a view to impress the reader with those principles which must become maxims of state, before any improvement can take place in the public right of nations, and the diplomacy of Europe. When we shall arrive at the conclusion of this work, we shall have only to sum up the evidence of these complicated events, and make those deductions which are the object of our present undertaking.

In considering the aggrandisement of the principal republics of Italy, we find the right of

the sword predominate every where. Venice, situated in the bottom of the Adriatic, encreased its territories at the expense of the Carrara family, which had raised its fortunes on the ruins of Lombard cities heretofore erected into free states by the weakness of the emperors and their contention with the popes. That republic encreased its power by conquests on the archbishop of Aquileia, and on the kings of Hungary. The riches also which it acquired by commerce, enabled it to measure its sword with those of the greatest powers. If we look to Naples, we there find all the ills resulting from a disputed succession to the crown accumulated; these pretensions of different princes, incompatible with each other, all arising out of the intrigues of the pontiffs.

In Spain, we find a perpetual state of internal war among the Christian princes, and sometimes against the Mahomedans of that peninsula.

The direct line of the kings of France of the Capet dynasty being extinguished in the year 1328, the house of Valois, a collateral branch, succeeded; which in the space of two hundred and sixty-one years furnished a succession of thirteen kings. The Salic law had been wisely established in France to prevent collaterals by

marriage from disputing the succession. But at this time we find the claim of foreigners to reign over the nations again brought forward, and in consequence a succession of wars to the year 1460. Edward the Third of England, in right of his mother Isabella, sister to Charles the 4th, pretended to succeed to the rights of the Capet dynasty, now extinct in the direct line: and though it was contrary to the fundamental law of France, useless wars were waged, in favor of his pretension; the expedition of Henry the 5th and his successes, served only to raise a fabric, which in the reign of his successor, crumbled to dust; and which, had it stood, would have, perhaps, made the British isles a province of France.

The history of Europe is full of similar events. The blood unnecessarily spilt, by princes and states of all denominations, cries aloud to an enlightened age, to improve its maxims; and to arbitrate its differences upon principles which may vindicate its honor without betraying its interests; and preserve its establishments without sacrificing the human race and desolating the earth.

We come now to an event* which, although it had not the success it merited, deserves par-

* 1397.

ticular attention, when we consider the turn it would have given to the affairs of Europe had it been permanent, namely, the union of Calmar. The wars subsequent to its dissolution, would have been prevented; and the Russian standard would not perhaps have been planted on the shores of the Baltic.

The kingdoms of the north,* after having been agitated by intestine wars, were at this celebrated period united under one sceptre by Margaret surnamed the Semiramis of the north. She was the daughter of Waldemar the 3d, last king of Denmark, and widow of Hakin the 7th, king of Norway. She was elected queen of Norway and Denmark, after the death of Olof the 5th, her son by Hakin: the Swedes, never content with their kings, deposed Albert of Mecklenburgh, and offered her the crown.

This union however could have but little consistency: a confederation of three monarchies without proper stipulations of union, and an equality of privileges to cement them together; and the consequent partiality shewn to the Danes, excited jealousies which finally dissolved it. Norway and Sweden are now again one empire; the son of Gustavus the 4th, being declared illegitimate, it would surely be

* Koch.

no great injustice to General Bernadotte and his son, if the succession of the three kingdoms were to revert to the king of Denmark, at the death of the duke of Sudermania the present king,—were the errors and defects of the union of Calmar corrected in the re-union of these kingdoms, a system of unity highly beneficial to Europe in its present perilous situation might be the result. Russia in this century was subject to the Moguls of the Golden Horde. The Poles and Lithuanians now undertook the conquest of Western Russia; Volhynia, Podolia and Kiew, were the reward of their enterprise. The claim to these provinces by the Russians in our days was grounded on this event: a precedent of violence, and an excuse for reprisals, which modern writers have agreed to stigmatise in declamations against the injustice of more recent partitions of Poland: considered as violence, no doubt they were unjust; considered as reprisals, there was surely no statute of limitations to obstruct them: but this example of retaliation in the 18th century for injuries sustained in the 14th, may be vindicated from the ignominy with which it has been treated, by its beneficial effects; for Poland had long ceased to maintain itself, and it was used as an engine of ever ready mischief by some of the principal powers of Europe,

who were either not able to improve, or not willing to change, its tumultuous existence.

The establishment of a Mahomedan state in Europe on the ruins of the Greek empire,* characterizes this period, and changed the relative position of the Christian states, the Greek empire, sinking daily into decline, gave no umbrage to the rest of Europe; every kingdom was at liberty to prey on its neighbour: but as soon as the Turkish standards were unfurled on this side the Bosphorus, the Christian world was threatened with destruction. Had this happened a century earlier, such was the barbarous state of Europe, and such its defect of unity, that it may be a question whether this whole continent would not, at this day, have been governed by the laws of the Koran.

These great events, which we have traced through the first half of the fifteenth century, entirely altered the face of Europe. They were not the result of any deeply laid political scheme: the defects of one system had served to give force to another; power without regard to just or unjust, and the accidental extinctions and intermarriages of families, brought about the distribution of territories as they then existed. These causes, joined to the change

* 1453.

operated in the art of war, by the invention of gunpowder and the consequent revolution in the very nature of military force; the invention of printing; and that of the mariners' compass; opened new views to mankind, introduced new opinions, and gave a different turn to their affairs. Religion, manners, customs, government, everything underwent a change. The barbarism now began to disappear, which had darkened Europe for ten centuries. The principal states from this time acquired force and consistency, and began to assume the shape which they have ever since nearly preserved. We have already seen in some parts of the continent, that in the same proportion as sovereign power was simplified, that is to say, the power of the great feudatories reduced, and smaller independencies absorbed by greater; the quantum of discordant and incompatible interests was diminished, and many points of collission destroyed, by which as many causes of war were removed. Every province of Spain, France, and Great Britain, had been constantly at war with its neighbours: the consolidation of these masses, by the same simplifying principle, secured them from further contention: a glance at the map of Europe according to its partitions at this time, and during the middle ages, will convince us of its improvement in

this respect. If we look upon that of the middle ages, we shall see in France and Spain, independent states by the dozen; and in Germany and Italy by the hundred: and when we consider that bodies moving on so many different centres, must inevitably impede and obstruct, or derange each other; can it be matter of wonder or regret that so salutary a change has been operated? If then those parts of the continent which have been the most simplified, have enjoyed the longest seasons of peace and of domestic security, it ought surely to be a principal object of the policy of the leading powers, to reduce the remaining parts of Europe to the same simplicity. Small states in the neighbourhood of great empires, must and always will serve to embroil them all.

At the period now before us, for instance, while the emperors were losing their authority in Italy, they were reviving their claims on Switzerland; and it was not till the treaty of Westphalia, by the intervention of France and Sweden, that these pretentions were finally abandoned. Again, during their decline, and particularly under the feeble reign of Frederic the 3d. a number of republics had started up, and from the variety of their interests, and even from their decay, something like a system of balances had arisen. The popes who had en-

feebled the emperors, by exciting the princes, of Germany, were themselves too feeble to usurp the dominion of the whole of Italy; and jealous of any predominant power, they were constantly raising up a competitor against that state which threatened to preponderate; and as soon as they had promoted one stranger, whom they had introduced, they set up another, to demolish him: from which it is clear, that for some centuries, the papal power was sustained by dint of keeping the whole of Italy in a state of warfare; and of causing every part of it to be disputed, by every potentate whose ambition had made him the dupe of the insidious policy of the pontiffs. Thus it was that foreign powers were induced to waste their resources in attempting conquests in Italy. The kings of France Charles the 8th. Louis the 12th. and Francis the 1st. were drawn into those enterprises, sometimes for the dutchy of Milan, sometimes for the kingdom of Naples. In these attempts the kings of Spain, already masters of Sicily and Sardinia, (the happy consequences of the famous papal massacre of the Sicilian Vespers) crossed the ambition of the French monarchs. Ferdinand the Catholic, grandfather of Charles the 5th. of Germany, drove the French out of Naples in the year 1504; and Charles drove them from Milan and

obliged Francis the 1st. to abandon their pretensions to that dutchy. What was the real cause of all this disorder ?—the divided state of Italy, Had that country been united, and had it been ruled by a line of its own princes, these contentions either would not have occurred at all, or would at least been much less frequent. This obvious truth however has either not yet been perceived by the cabinets, of princes, or the idea of erecting one great independent government in Italy, has not yet been entertained with the favor which it deserves. New contentions will therefore arise, whenever the present Austrian power, which is seated there, becomes a sufficient object of jealousy.

We cannot quite omit, though it is not of essential interest to or present enquiry, to notice in this place the discovery of the mariner's compass; which exposed a new hemisphere to the view of Europe, and opened a road to India and China, which was soon traversed by the enterprise, industry, and avarice, of the Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, and British people. The treasures of the East, which first flowed into Spain, swelled for a time, and afterwards extenuated, the power of the Spanish monarchy; but the riches which it dispensed, and which commerce cir-

culated in Europe, contributed to the strength and importance of those powers who finally amassed them. A mixture of good and evil has been derived from these maritime discoveries, which we leave to the reflection of the reader and pursue our subject.

The changes in religious opinions, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, prepared a revolution, which produced the most important consequences in Europe. The art of printing had diffused knowledge, and put new and terrible arms into the hands of some spirited reformers, who were exasperated by the tyranny and disgusted with the profligacy of the clergy, and scandalized at the abuses of the court of Rome. Luther and Zwingle began by attacking the system of ecclesiastical indulgencies: Leo the tenth, at first, despised his antagonists, and it was too late when he thundered out an anathema against them. The council of Trente, summoned to compose these differences, served only to widen the breach, and the pope's bull was burnt at Wittemburg, together with his decretals, before a crowd of doctors and students of different nations: the reader is referred to the history of this council for more particular information; this will suffice for our immediate object.

These changes in the civil and ecclesiastical orders produced a new system of politics. Before this period each state was feeble and unconnected: nations embroiled by their own internal differences could not look beyond their respective limits: the feudal system had debilitated all Europe: no government could undertake any regular plan of politics: all were ill-concerted or rather not concerted at all. But feudal anarchy now began to disappear; instead of irregular troops of vassals, disciplined armies were seen; and sovereigns liberated from the fear or factions of powerful nobles, began to extend their views of aggrandisement and conquest: the action and re-action of different states on each other began to manifest itself more visibly: and the notion of establishing a balance of power ceased to be considered chimerical. It now began to be customary to have accredited agents established at different courts; and treaties of alliances defensive, offensive, or both, and treaties of subsidy, &c. were negotiated. Wars now became more general, they were carried on, if I may use the expression, by wholesale, because every state was in some measure implicated in the event. If these changes had not occurred before the ruin of the eastern empire by the Turks; there

is little doubt but that they might have overrun and conquered all Europe.*

We have left the history of Germany for some time, and will now avoid details which are not necessary. The progress of the house of Austria during the interval from the fall of the Swabian dynasty and the accession of Rodolph the 1st, to the period now before us, had served as a corrective to the division of Germany. Had not such an empire arisen, with the fortunes of that house by the union of Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, Hungary, &c. under one sceptre, nothing could have withstood the Ottoman power; and the little insignificant princes of Germany would have become extinct, by making the last of each family end his days perhaps an eunuch of the seraglio. This illustrious house, which draws its origin from Rodolph the 1st elected king of the Romans in the year 1273, owes its elevation in the scale of Europe to the imperial dignity, which it knew how to support; and to various marriages by which its domains were encreased.

* In Asia where no such connection has ever existed among the potentates of that quarter of the globe, we find that every Tartar conqueror has succeeded in overturning kingdoms wherever he has directed his course.

Maximilian of Austria son of Frederic the 3d, married Mary of Burgundy in the year 1477; she was daughter of Charles the rash last duke of Burgundy, and heiress to his states. Thus the kingdoms of Burgundy and Lorraine, which had arisen to a great pre-eminence during the preceding century, now swelled the states of the house of Austria: and the Low Countries, Franche-comté and Artois, became dependent on the greatest power in Germany. Philip the son of Maximilian and Mary, espoused 1496 Jane infanta of Spain, and only child of Ferdinand and Isabella, in whom all the christian kingdoms of Spain had centered, except Portugal. Two sons were the fruit of this marriage, Charles and Ferdinand; the first, known in history as the emperor Charles the 5th, inherited the Low Countries in right of his father Philip, who died in the year 1505. He inherited the whole Spanish succession at the death of his maternal grandfather, who died in the year 1515; that is, Spain, Naples, Sicily, and the conquered countries of South America.* To these great possessions he united the domains of his family in Germany, which his paternal grandfather, Maximilian the 1st, left him in 1519; at the same time the

* Koch.

electors chose him to be emperor of Germany; so that no monarch had ever been seen in Europe so powerful as Charles the 5th.

This prince, in the year 1521, concluded a treaty with his brother Ferdinand, by which he ceded to him the hereditary possession of his house in Germany. These two brothers became afterwards the founders of the two principal branches of the Austrian house, the Spanish which began in Charles the 5th or first of Spain, and which became extinct in the person of Charles the 2d, in the year 1700: and that of Germany, of which Ferdinand the 1st was the head, and whose male line terminated in Charles the 6th of Germany in 1740.

These two families were strictly united together, and acted in concert for their mutual advantage; each of them encreased their fortunes by marriage: Ferdinand the 1st, head of the German branch, married in the year 1521 Anna, the sister of Louis king of Hungary and Bohemia, who was killed at the battle of Mohats against the Turks; and these kingdoms were united to the house of Austria: Charles the 5th, by his marriage with Isabella daughter of Emmanuel king of Portugal, gave to Philip the 2d his son, the inheritance of that kingdom, vacant by the death of Henry the cardinal, who of course

could have no legitimate heir. All equilibrium of power was by these combinations nearly overturned; the strength of Austria was now nearly an overmatch for all the rest of Europe; whose independence being menaced, the necessity of opposing a confederacy to this enormous mass was felt by all. The views of every court for a long time tended to this point; France was therefore thrown into the same scale with England, and even the marriage of Philip the 2d with Mary Tudor, could not prevent her successors from an alliance with France. The policy of Francis the 1st and Henry the 2d was inimical to the house of Austria; and as its power was encreased by the decay of feudal influence, they supported that very same disorder in Germany under the specious title of the rights of the Germanic body. They took part with the protestants of Germany, as Henry the 4th and Louis the 13th did afterwards. All Europe now took up arms against Ferdinand the 3d. This was the real cause and motive of the famous thirty years war, though the pretext was religion. Had not the combination of so many kingdoms into one mass, by which means the independence of all other nations was endangered, taken place, it is not probable that they would have interfered in a dispute which could in no other way affect them. Here we see the

simplifying principle had been allowed to go too far; and had it been obviated by preventing the marriages just mentioned, much mischief would have been avoided. This example shews the danger of allowing females to carry their right out of their own country, especially when they are of sufficient importance to derange the balance of power.

Germany now suffered all the calamities incident to a state which had lost its unity and vigour; and, what was still more vexatious, the balance of Europe could not be restored without supporting that very system, which had been the cause of so much previous mischief. It is since this time that the rights of the princes of Germany have become a subject of discussion too sacred to be touched on; and though the occasion is now passed by, the prejudice still remains.

Although in Germany private wars were now abolished by the enactment of the *public peace*, the institution of the aulic council, and the promulgation of the *imperial capitulations;* and though Germany was divided into ten circles, and many inconveniences were prevented; yet the political power held by the electors and princes, continued to destroy the unity of Germany, as they could make alliances wherever they pleased without the least regard to the common interest. This

state of affairs in its results was the great cause of the rise of France to the same alarming and preponderating influence, which it has been the business of Great Britain ever since to repress.

The emperor Charles the 5th, on his first diet held at Worms, promulgated an edict of proscription against Luther and his disciples, by which they were outlawed, and placed out of the public peace, declared enemies of the empire: and were to be pursued with the utmost rigour of the law. This proved to be one of the capital mistakes of Charles. As the view of extending the imperial power in Italy had never been abandoned, his entering so warmly into the defence of the catholic religion was in fact supporting the popes, who had been the rivals of his predecessors, and who had humbled some of them to the very dust. If, as emperor of Germany, he had constituted himself the impartial arbiter between the religious parties, instead of becoming himself a party, he would not have drawn such a confederacy upon him, but while he weakened himself in Germany, he shut the door of Italy in his own face: on the contrary, had he done justice to the protestants, their tenets might have found their way into Italy; and the pope no longer having the public opinion to support him, must have fallen from his power, and there

being in that country no union nor disposition to unite, all Italy must have submitted to the Austrian sceptre.

This absurd violence against the Lutherans was corrected not by prudence but necessity. An irruption of the Turks into Hungary was the cause of the religious peace of Nuremburg: but the protestants distrusted the catholics, who still insisted on the authority of the popes in the councils, and the league of Smalkalden was formed. Charles however having made peace with the Turks, was determined to make war against the league: he began by an edict of proscription against the landgrave of Hesse Cassel and the elector of Saxony, the two chiefs of the protestant confederation; and by allying himself with Maurice, the head of the younger branch of Saxony and nearly related to the elector, he transferred the seat of war from the Danube to the Elbe: at the battle of Muhlberg in the year 1547: these two chiefs were defeated and taken prisoners; and the league of Smalkalden was dissolved. Maurice received the investiture of Saxony as the reward of this alliance.

These successes rendered Charles the dictator of Germany. Maurice however, now elector of Saxony, felt as an elector, and was of course jealous of the independent sovereignty

newly obtained; he suddenly attacked his benefactor, and nearly took him prisoner at Inspruck; the emperor however escaped, but was obliged to come to an agreement with the protestants at Passau. Maurice now became the ally of France, another example of the effect of small states in the neighbourhood of great ones. The transactions of Passau generated fresh disputes; two opposite leagues were formed by the rival parties, and Germany, divided, afforded the usual opportunity for strangers to interfere.

The history of this war consists of four distinct periods: the first, in the attempt of the elector Palatine to become king of Bohemia; the second, the irruption of the Danes; the third, the campaigns of the Swedes; and finally, the interference of France. This long war produced at last, the famous treaty of Westphalia: but as this great event has had a lasting influence on the politics of Europe, its merits will be examined in the next chapter.

THIRD EPOCH.

From the Treaty of Westphalia 1648; *to the Peace of Utrecht,* 1713.

In order to take a just view of the state of Europe at this epoch, it is necessary not only to understand how the treaty of Westphalia bears on the question before us, but the political causes which produced the war of which it was the conclusion.

The contests between the emperors and the popes, together with the ambition of the princes of the empire, had reduced the imperial power to nearly nothing. The princes wishing to perpetuate their own usurped authority, sought to elect emperors whose hereditary resources were not of magnitude enough to give them uneasiness. We have seen that this was the motive for electing Rodolph of Hapsburg to that dignity. In process of time however, the fortunes of the house of Austria dissappointed this policy; the successes of the emperors of that house, together with their acquisitions by marriage, rendered them so powerful, that Charles the 5th. had nearly overturned what is called the "Germanic Constitution;" and the

accession of Hungary, Bohemia, Lorraine, and the Spanish succession, made it the terror of all Europe.

Had not the connection of the house of Austria with that of Spain taken place, and had only Hungary and Bohemia with the German provinces been added to their fortune; there is very little doubt but that Germany might have recovered its unity, by the destruction of all the inferior states: for if religion had not been the pretext for hostilities, some other would have occurred equally good, though perhaps not quite so imposing: even in that case, Germany forming one state, would have been out of all proportion with Spain, France, and the British united kingdom; but the Spanish succession being added, the interest of all nations concurred to support the German princes, particularly when, after the defeat of the duke of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, the independence of the electors was in danger of being destroyed. Maurice, though he had been invested with his dignity by the emperor, not willing to diminish that authority which he had inherited from his predecessors, turned against him; and allied himself with the king of France, by the treaty of Chambord, signed the 15th January 1552. At this period the house of Brandenburg,

had not risen to its present greatness, and there was no alternative between permitting all Germany to become one state, and dangerous to the liberties of Europe; and admitting strangers who would be able to reduce it, partly by dismembering, and partly by maintaining smaller powers within its bosom; both of which were effected by the peace of Westphalia: for it weakened Germany by adding Metz, Toul, and Verdun, to France; and it weakened Germany by re-establishing the independence of the petty princes of the empire, and guaranteeing to them the right of making whatever alliances they pleased; as may be seen by reference to an article which, in fact, constitutes Germany * a confederacy, held together by no tie, and consequently, a contradiction in terms. The union of the three houses of Spain, Burgundy, and Austria, was the cause of the wars which ensued for near a century.

By the agreement between Charles the 5th, and his brother Ferdinand, the low countries fell to the lot of Spain; a possession difficult for that kingdom to hold, and in every way mischievous in its effects. Franchecomté by the same means belonged to Spain, and her possessions in Italy were in right of the suc-

* See article 8, treaty of Osnaburg, Bougeant.

cession of Charles the 5th, whose right to Italy was connected with the imperial crown, and derived from the original juggle between Charlemagne and the pope, when the Lombard kingdom was overturned. By this disposition the Spanish monarchy held a part of the low countries; the province of Franchcomté, with which it could not well communicate; and the kingdom of the two Sicilies.

The north of Germany was a kind of nursery for royal families whose estates and revenues were inferior to those of some private gentlemen in England; and Italy divided and weak, remained the scene of disputed successions.

It is true that the universal sovereignty of the house of Austria was prevented by the arms of France, but France was obliged to take the part it did, for its own safety; and the increase of territory it acquired was necessary to effect a balance against Austria, up to that period France and England had been naturally allied, in order to check this great power; but from the moment that treaty was concluded, the smaller powers of Germany looked to France for a support against the emperors: and the influence which thus accrued to France has caused the discord which has since existed between her and Austria. The Spanish branch of the Austrian house, was still powerful,

though it possessed provinces in no way suitable to it, which its ambition or pride would not yield in favor of its better interests without a painful struggle. The peace of Westphalia was then no more than a rough hewing of the form which Europe was destined to take; the simplifying principle was still to operate in order to bring us to the position at which we are now arrived, and as we may say, within view of the ideal point most desirable for us to attain: whether we shall ever reach it is yet problematical, because many prejudices must be overcome and unforeseen events may concur to throw us back: but if statesmen would admit the truth of the principle here contended for, and would keep the object constantly in view, there would be a succession of leading men ready to give a right direction to affairs upon every contingency, and to propel them in that course to which they already incline, and which would ultimately lead to perfection; much has been gained since the termination of the revolutionary war, but much remains to be done. Let us return to the thread of events, which will serve to elucidate our theory more clearly than premature reasoning.

The treaty of Westphalia acknowledges two remarkable parties existing in Germany, the catholics and the protestants; the latter of whom

could not have kept their ground had they not been supported by France; and France could not perhaps have given its assistance so efficaciously, but for the increase of territory which she had acquired. The influence she then gained in Germany awakened the ambition of Louis the 14th, who had received his kingdom in a very flourishing condition, relieved by the talents of cardinals Richelieu and Mazarine from the intestine discord which the league of nobles against the crown had so long fomented.

The ambition of Louis has been blamed by almost all writers; but much good has resulted from his enterprises, of which the final evacuation of the Low Countries by Spain was one of many examples; for they were not only distant, but mischievous possessions in the hands of Spain, and added to the complexity of the general system. The treaty of Aix la Chapelle, as well as the triple alliance, checked the progress of Louis; but, impelled by his restless spirit, he soon after attacked Holland, and drew on himself a combination of all Europe: he then abandoned the advantages he had gained over the Dutch; and turning his arms against the Spaniards, he added Franchecomté to his empire. So far his effort rendered France more perfect; and by giving to it nearly every where its suitable limits, he certainly advanced

the general state of Europe nearer to perfection. What he acquired by the peace of Nimeguen deserves approbation. France under his auspices was now strong enough to resist all attacks; and had his moderation been commensurate with his fortunes, he might still have farther promoted the general good; especially after he had, by the truce of Ratisbonne, added Luxemburg, Bovine and Chimai, to France. The arrondissement and consistency which this kingdom acquired, would not have been alarming to the rest of Europe, had not the north of Germany, with the countries bordering on the right bank of the Rhine, occupied by a multitude of little powers, presented a barrier too weak to preserve peace: the treaty of Westphalia therefore, constituted France the arbiter of Germany.

The Revolution in Great Britain, by placing the prince of Orange on the throne, created that barrier to French ambition, which could not be found in Germany, on account of its divided states. In the year 1688 the emperor, the empire, Britain, Holland, Spain, and Saxony, joined in the confederacy: the French arms were nevertheless successful on all sides; but as Louis had views on the Spanish succession, he shewed an inclination to peace, in order to dissipate this combination against him.

By the peace of Ryswick, Louis remained master of the course of the Rhine from Huningen to Landau; his moderation towards England and Holland, which facilitated the conclusion of that treaty, was no more than a dupery: Charles the 2d. of Spain, the only male descendant of the emperor Charles the 5th, was now near his end, and Louis was preparing to claim the succession of Spain contrary to his most solemn engagement.

By the treaty of the Pyrenees France had remained in possession of Artois, consisting of Arras, Hesdin Bapeaume, Lillers Lens, Terouane, the county of St. Paul and all Artois, excepting St. Omer and Aire.

In Flanders Gravelines, Bourbourg, St. Venant, and their dependencies; in Hainault, Landrecy, Quesnoy, with their Bailiwicks and dependencies.

In the dutchy of Luxemburg, Thionville, Montmedy, Damvillers, Ivry, Chavancy, Marville, and their dependencies.

On the side of Spain France acquired Roussillon and Conflans, excepting such places as were on the south of the Pyrenees, which became the frontier between the two kingdoms.

The thirty third article of the treaty of the

* 1659.

Pyrenees regulates the conditions of the marriage of Louis with the infanta of Spain; her dowery of 500,000 gold crowns; and a formal renunciation both on the part of Louis and herself, to any claim on the Spanish crown. Notwithstanding this solemn agreement, Louis no sooner saw the death of Charles approaching, than he was determined to claim the succession. The French court declared the act of renunciation null and void; that neither the infanta nor her husband could by any act prejudice the claims of the children, founded on their birth, and on the fundamental laws of Spain. Nothing could shew worse faith, nor carry with it an appearance of more unblushing aggression than this declaration; for if the declaration was just, the renunciation at the treaty was a fraud; and had not these assurances been looked on as sincere, the marriage would not have taken place.

If the validity of the renunciation was admitted, the order of succession called the younger sister of Charles the 2d. to the Spanish throne; Margaret Teresa, who by marriage with the emperor, Leopold the 1st. had left a daughter, Mary Antoinette, wife of the elector of Bavaria, and mother of Joseph Ferdinand, heir apparent to the electorate.

The emperor wishing to preserve the crown Spain in his own family, had required of this princess on her marriage with Maximillian of Bavaria, a renunciation of her claims in his own favor; and by putting in his own claim in right of his mother Mary, daughter of Philip the 3d. and aunt of Charles the 2d. he hoped to secure the succession.

Thus the throne of Spain becoming vacant, and the right of female succession being admitted, the body of the nobility and the people of the country were not considered as having any voice in the business; force alone was about to determine whether a frenchman or a german should reign over them. Here then was a war, merely for the private interest or the ambition of two individuals, without the least reference to the advantage of the state, which could get nothing whichever way the contest was decided, but bloodshed and devastation! As long as the inheritance of kingdoms is left open to the intrigues of foreigners and the laws of succession admit of so much chicanery, equivocation and abuse, so long must mankind suffer by the effects of their own neglect; for no remedy can be offered for these evils without a reform, in this respect, of the public right of nations, and without guarantees of that reform, in the persons of all

the reigning princes of Europe. We shall return in due time to this subject.

These opposite pretensions made a general war a probable event. Great Britain and Holland agreed with Louis the 14th. to a treaty of partition, by which the prince Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria was to succeed to the throne of Spain, and the Dauphin was to have the two Sicilies, to hold the presidii of Tuscany, and the little province of Guisposcoa in Spain, in the bottom of the Bay of Biscay.

One would suppose that the crowned heads of Europe who could on one side propose, and on the other accept, such a scheme, were mad! or that they thought that the more circumstances they could create or accumulate, in order to occasion disputes, the more honor would shine upon the crowns they wore!

How were the two Sicilies, the ports of Tuscany, and a little corner of Spain, to form one body politic? or how were such provinces to be defended by a king of the two Sicilies? besides, the Dauphin being heir to the crown of France, and carrying with him these dominions, France would obtain a footing in Spain; and for the sake of the two Sicilies all the wars of Italy were to be again renewed!

The prince of Bavaria dying, a new will was made, or supposed to be made by Charles the 2d.

in favor of Philip of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin.

Louis was content with this disposition, and the Spaniards proclaimed Philip on the 14th of November 1700. All Europe was now raised against Louis the 14th. The French armies entered the Spanish Netherlands, and war became universal: its events are too well known to the reader to need any details. The victories of prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough brought the French affairs to the brink of ruin. In the year 1709, M. de Torcy being sent to the Hague, preliminaries were agreed to, in virtue of which France was to restore all the conquests she had made since the peace of Westphalia; Strasburgh was to be restored to the emperor; and France was to retain Alsace according to the litteral sense of the treaty: the Archduke was to be king of Spain, and the cause of Philip of Anjou was to be abandoned. Things were in this progress towards peace, when two unexpected events broke off these conferrences which had been transferred to Gertrudenburg, and changed the face of affairs. The first was the death of Joseph the 1st. in the year 1711 without male issue, by which means his brother the archduke Charles, who had assumed the title of king of Spain, became emperor and inherited all the possessions of the house of Austria in Germany; the

second arose out of it; for a fresh difficulty now occurred: France had agreed that the succession of Spain should not be confounded with that of France, but should belong to the younger branch of her house: by the change, therefore, which had happened at Vienna Charles, like his predecessors, would have united both the Spanish and Austrian empires in his own person; and thus, the very object for which all Europe had been fighting for ten years, namely, the separation of two powerful states, would have been defeated; and the danger which had been apprehended from one quarter would have arisen in another. The state of parties in England now favored the views of Louis the 14th. The whig administration having fallen, of which the duke of Marlborough was the leader, the tories came into power; and the queen of England who had personal motives for the Duke's disgrace, thought, that the surest way of destroying his influence, was to make peace with France. Preliminaries being therefore signed between her and Louis, on the 8th of October 1711, a general congress for peace was opened at Utrecht.

The great object of the allies in these negociations was to curb the preponderant power of France; and by this treaty it was agreed to fix as a fundamental maxim, that the kingdoms of France and Spain should never be united. To

this end Philip of Anjou, who was now in possession, made a formal renunciation of his right to the crown of France; and at the same time the dukes of Berry and Orleans gave up all their claim to the Spanish succession. These acts were inserted in the treaty of Utrecht; signed and sealed by France and Spain, in the presence of the British ambsssador; and the letters patent which Louis the 14th had given to Philip of Aujou, to secure to him the eventual succession of the crown of France, were formally annulled. It was further agreed, that in case the descendants of Philip should fail, the succession should fall to the duke of Savoy, in exclusion of the princes of France. Another fundamental clause of the treaty of Utrecht determines, that no provinces, town, or fortress of the Spanish Netherlands, shall be either ceded or transferred to the crown of France, nor to any prince or princess of the French line, under any pretence or title whatsoever. These provinces were designed as a barrier for the republic of Holland, but were adjudged to the emperor and the house of Austria. The defects of this arrangement have since been felt; for the barrier treaty has never been more than a cobweb, which the French have broken through, whenever they pleased; jealousy on the part of Great Britain towards Holland, pre-

vented the cabinet of St. James' from uniting those countries to that republic; by giving them to Austria, the court of Vienna enjoyed the revenues in time of peace, and Britain the expence of their defence in time of war. This fault is now at last corrected, and Holland forms a stronger body; but still the system is imperfect, as we shall hope in the sequel to demonstrate.

The kingdom of the two Sicilies, the ports of Tuscany, and the duchy of Milan, were also to be ceded to Austria; but as the emperor had not yet acceded to the treaty, it was agreed that the Low Countries should remain in the hands of the States General, until he had made the necessary agreements with them touching the barrier. The same conditions were stipulated respecting the French Netherlands which Louis the XIV. ceded to the emperor, namely, Namur, Tournay, Furnes, and Furner Ambacht, the fort of Knock, Ypres, and their dependencies.

England obtained many considerable advantages; the pretender was to be abandoned, and Louis engaged not to give him an asylum in France: the succession to the throne was guaranteed to the house of Hanover; and other advantages accrued to England, in America, and in the possession of Gibraltar and Minorca.

To the king of Prussia was allotted the Spanish part of Guelderland and the province of Kessel, in lieu of the principality of Orange which was ceded to France. To the duke of Savoy was adjudged the kingdom of Sicily, and an encrease of territory in Lombardy. Lastly, the island of Sardinia was given to the elector of Bavaria, who had been the ally of France in this war.

The good features in this treaty were, first, the tranquillity assured to England by the settlement of the succession; and secondly, depriving the Spaniards of possessions which they must sooner or later have lost.

No comment need be made on the barrier, as it has been corrected so lately: suffice it to observe, that if it had not been evident that the emperor could not well defend the Netherlands, and that the insufficiency of that treaty had therefore been proved; the new disposition of them by the last treaty of Vienna would not have been suggested. The giving Guelderland to the king of Prussia is a similar oversight; because, as long as he has cause of jealousy of the house of Austria, it is giving him a point of contact with France, prejudicial to the tranquillity of Europe: in other circumstances, it is giving him such eccentric possessions to defend, that his strength

must be reduced by them if ever the Russians press hard upon him. In either of these cases it will be an aliment to his ambition; for if he does not sooner or later renounce all his possessions on the left bank of the Elbe, he must desire to round them in that quarter, intersected and separated as he is by so many neighbours. The defects of all these arrangements will, by dint of arms and bloodshed, be at last corrected.

As the duke of Savoy, without a ship of war, could scarcely communicate with Sicily, much less defend it; the plan failed in respect of him almost as soon as it was agreed to: but the most impracticable and absurd of all schemes, was to give to an inland prince like the duke of Bavaria an island of the Mediterranean: one might have thought that the ministers of the congress of Utrecht had laid aside all their gravity to put off a hoax upon the duke. They might as well have agreed that Otaheite should be ceded to Switzerland!

Observe besides, that this cession was a reward avowedly given to the elector for his infraction of the eighth article of the treaty of Westphalia, which says, that although the princes of the Germanic body shall be permitted to make what alliances they please, the privilege must not be exercised to the prejudice of the emperor or the

empire: posterity must laugh, even while they deplore the fatal consequences of such contradictions!

Neither the experience of the past, nor a distinct notion of the causes and effects of political arrangements, seem hitherto to have actuated the negociators in these congresses, which resembled a fair more than an august assemblage of wise men; it seems as if their principal intention had been to drive each man the best bargain for himself; as if the future good or evil which might ensue had been quite out of the question; as if nothing more had been required than to patch up matters in order to gain a short repose from the efforts of war. When we consider the blindness and eagerness with which each party pursues its favourite point, one is surprised to find how little they consider what probability there is, even in the event of their success, that the desired acquisition will be permanent. Wars arise from the nature of human affairs; the more causes of dispute are left, the more frequently will peace be interrupted. If the intention of these congresses be no more than to negociate compromises among princes in order to augment their revenue and increase their splendor; and if the losses which some of them experience, be only regarded by others in the same light as the loss of property to an indi-

vidual; and considerations, bearing on the general good of nations, their security and happiness, make no part of the discussions; no peace can ever be permanent, because the sovereigns who divide the plunder, must be naturally enemies to each other, and every one of them must see in the downfall of his neighbour his own aggrandisement. A system of public right reposing on such maxims must ever be defective; as fast as one treaty is concluded, new views must arise, and new schemes of ambition must be formed, tending to produce new causes of war. The princes themselves are not individually to be blamed for this: could they act otherwise than according to the circumstances of the times, they would not be human beings. The grand object then for statesmen ought to be to discover whether those circumstances could not be so managed as to make it the interest of princes, to leave their neighbours in the undisputed enjoyment of their territories, rather than to overreach and oppress each other. According to the maxims of the present times, this is certainly impossible: Europe must continue to have her bosom torn by her offspring as long as they remain as they now are. That they cannot be altered without some acts of violence is also obvious: mankind

have therefore to chuse, between their own advantage, and the justice which is personally due to princes. If there exist any real or supposed compact between the governor and the governed, it must be protection, and justice given on one side for obedience, and veneration on the other; but if a little feeble prince is unable in the moment of danger, to give the necessary protection in return for his advantages and his pre-eminence, let us ask what right he has to be a prince? when he is obliged to mendicate that defence from others which he cannot set up for himself?

Two years after the peace of Utrecht,* Louis the 14th died, and left the throne to his great grandson Louis the 15th, after a reign of seventy-two years.

We cannot proceed to our next and last epoch, which will commence from the treaty of Utrecht, without first bringing up to that treaty the general affairs of the rest of Europe; that we may thereby not only shew that the wars which terminated in the events in which we shall describe, themselves proceeded from the same defects in the public system which have been so often exposed; but also the better to

* A. D. 1715.

introduce our own conclusions and inferences, after the most comprehensive survey of our subject.

As our principal business will be with the continent, we may take this opportunity briefly to notice the union of England and Scotland into one kingdom, in the year 1707; and that of Ireland at a later period; events, which are forcibly illustrative of our doctrine of unity, and the effects of which will one day demonstrate its truth.

The treaty of Westphalia had created an eighth electorate for the palatine branch of the house of Wittelsbach; the emperor Leopold the 1st, created another for the younger branch of the house of Brunswick, the first elector of this branch, called Brunswick Lunenburg, or of Hanover, was the duke Ernest Augustus, whom the emperor invested in the year 1690, to descend to him and his male issue, on the condition of his furnishing considerable subsidies in money and troops for the war against the Turks. The other electors, with the duke of Brunswick Wolfenbuttel, opposed his advancement; and in the year 1700 an assembly was held at Nuremburg, in which it was agreed to raise an army of their confederates, and to call

on the guarantees of the treaty of Westphalia to oppose this innovation. France and Denmark espoused their quarrel, and it was agreed to declare war against the ninth electorate. Thus miserable Germany tumbling to pieces by the weight of its own complicated and cumbersome structure, was obliged to appeal to foreigners on every occasion to interfere in its internal concerns! This affair was however arranged without bloodshed, and Hanover was made an electorate.

Shortly after this event, three of the electoral houses of Germany became royal, viz. Brandenburg, Hanover and Saxony, the first by obtaining *in capite* the sovereignty of ducal Prussia, and the two last, by being called, one to the throne of Britain, the other to that of Poland. Augustus the 2d, elector of Saxony, after having professed the Catholic religion was chosen in the year 1697 king of Poland; and the same dignity was conferred afterwards on Augustus the 3d, his son and successor: this promotion of the electors of Saxony to a foreign throne, implicated that dutchy in the affairs of Poland and nearly ruined it.

The effects however of a similar change in the condition of the house of Brandenburg were very different on the fortunes of that family. The elector, John Sigismond, in succeeding to

the dutchy of Prussia, acknowledged himself the vassal and tributary of the crown of Poland.

His grandson Frederic William, surnamed the great elector, taking advantage of the deplorable state of Poland at the time of the invasion of Charles the 10th of Sweden, obtained from the states of Poland the sovereignty of the dutchy by a treaty made at Welau in the year 1657. Frederic the 1st now being sovereign *in capite* of Prussia, took on himself the title of king. The elevation of the prince of Orange to the British throne, and that of Augustus to Poland, probably had awakened his ambition. He entered into a negociation with the court of Vienna: the emperor Leopold promised to acknowledge him as king, provided he sent 10,000 men to his assistance in the war for the succession of Spain. All Europe acknowledged this new king, except France and Spain; for though the Teutonic knights and the pope, made protests; no kind of notice was taken of them.

This negociation which brought the house of Brandenburg to the dignity of royalty, laid the foundation of a very important change in Europe: and it was said that Austria, by giving her consent, had promoted that power to the rank of a rival, within the confines of Germany, who would be capable of maintain-

ing a balance against her, and of eclipsing her grandeur.

By the advancement of Prussia to nearly an equality with the house of Austria, it was natural that the influence of France in the empire should be diminished; and that Prussia should hold the balance that France would drop. This was a great improvement in the general system of Europe. Germany united into one body, would have been too heavy for France; divided into two, she needed less the influence of strangers; and had it not been for the little contemptible states, which yet remained separate and independent, the simplifying principle would have operated with still greater effect. Germany was, however, not yet ripe for such comprehensive alterations, nor can we consider her as being in that state of maturity even at the present day. Experience, by dint of repeated misfortunes, will enlighten us more every day, and we shall at length perceive that nothing like stability will be effected, untill the greater powers absord the smaller, and by their contact, or mutual attraction, insure that good, which the old system has never been able to realize.

The war for the succession of Spain made great changes in Italy. Spain, which hitherto had been a predominant power, gave way to

Austria; the treaties of Utrecht and Baden having conferred the dutchy of Milan, the two Sicilies, and the ports of Tuscany upon the latter, who was previously in possession of the dutchy of Mantua. This new increase of Austria awakened the jealousy of the British cabinet, who apprehended that the old pretensions, invented by Charlemagne and the popes, were to be revived: and in order to anticipate this mischief, or at least to provide against it, the statesmen of those times conceived the absurdity of elevating the house of Savoy. This porter of the Alps, as he is called by diplomatists, has served the purpose of keeping the gates of Italy, in the same manner as one would pretend to stop a passage, by leaving a great spider to hang his web in the door-way!

Let the statesmen of all Europe consider the circumstance of those times; let them recollect those events, and their consequences; and ask themselves on what grounds they can expect, that a pitiful state, with very few resources, even though the territories of Genoa be added to it, will be sufficiently firm to resist the shock of the two great powers between which it is compressed!

Italy from its extent must always be a point of importance; to give the predominant power in it to any neighbouring state has been

found dangerous, because it has excited jealousy: and jealousy will excite contention. This has already produced a series of changes, all insufficient to prevent the recurrence of the evil. If all the princes of Europe are in their turns jealous of him who has the chief power in Italy; to what end is it, to take it out of the hands of one and intrust it to another; again to grow jealous of the second, and allot it to a third? it is only to perpetuate a contention! Lords of the earth, open your eyes at length! give to Italy an independent, a personal existence; give Italy a prince, if you please; no matter whether he be taken from the Seraglio of Constantinople, the son of a Tartar, or whether he be generated in some village of Germany, by a sovereign as great and as powerful as the baron de Thunder den Tronkh. But let Italy be one great state; and Italy will then, by its own weight in the general scale, prevent the endless strife which exhausts your resources, and oppresses your subjects! Observe also, that in all the wars since that of the succession of Spain, the bloodshed which has ensued has been the effect of your not knowing how to dispose of the mangled limbs of Italy and Germany! Like Pelops, who was stewed at the feast of the gods, let both Italy and Germany recover their consistence. Let the gods

of the earth agree to put their limbs together, and let all endeavour to improve the internal advantages of their respective dominions!

The origin of the house of Savoy may be traced back to the eleventh century; at that time we find a prince of the name of Berthold in possession of Savoy, which before had been a province of the kingdom of Arles or Burgundy. The grandson of Berthold espoused Adelaide of Susa, daughter and heiress of Manfred, marquis of Italy, and lord of Susa, by which marriage the house of Savoy acquired considerable domains in Italy, viz. the marquisate of Susa, the dutchy of Turin, Piedmont, and the vale of Aoste. Humbert the 2d, count of Savoy, conquered the Tarantaise, in the year 1082. Thomas, one of his successors, acquired in 1320, by marriage, the barony of Faucigny. Amedeus the 5th, was invested, in 1313, by the emperor Henry the 7th, with the town and county of Asti. In the year 1388, Amedeus the 7th, received the voluntary submission of the inhabitants of the county of Nice, which were thus dismembered from Provence; and the counties of Tende and Beuil; which acquisition was the consequence of the intestine divisions which followed the contest of the factions of Durazzo and Anjou for the succession to the throne of Naples, and the

county of Provence. Amedeus the 8th, in the year 1401, bought of Otho of Villars, the Genevese territory, and was created duke of Savoy by the emperor Sigismond.

The contests which had taken place since the end of the fifteenth century between France and Austria, placed the house of Savoy in a very perilous situation; it was several times on the brink of ruin but for the misfortune of Italy, it still exists. Charles the 3d. duke of Savoy, having allied himself to Charles the 5th, was deprived of his dominions by France, and his son Philibert did not recover them till the peace of Cateau Cambresis, in the year 1559. The duke Charles Emmanuel and Victor Amedeus the 2d, experienced similar misfortunes in the war between France and Spain, and during the seventeenth century, at the treaties of the Pyrenees and Turin, they again recovered their dominions. It is needless to urge the propriety of maintaining such a porter of the Alps as this: if he is to do any good, it is by assisting the weaker of his neighbours against the strongest; and if he can never do this without being turned out of his own territories, his being placed as he is, with means insufficient for his functions, is nugatory and absurd. In our days we have again seen Buonaparte annihilate for a time the state of Savoy: such

repeated experience ought really to make us change our maxims; yet that same state is now again set up: Cui bono?—to be again put down? one might however expect that wars and treaties should have some better object, or at least some better result, than those of setting up and throwing down without end!

The war for the succession breaking out, Victor Amedeus declared at first for Philip of Anjou; but being persuaded of the dangerous consequences of this step from the facility with which the Austrians might deprive him of his Italian provinces, he joined the great alliance against France; and Savoy and Piedmont then became the theatre of war: the French having laid siege to Turin, the duke of Savoy, with prince Eugene, forced the French entrenchments, and obliged them to evaeuate Italy. The peace of Utrecht, confirmed the duke of Savoy in his dominions: and, by way of giving him additional power, Great Britain insisted on his being made king of the island of Sicily!

We cannot help expressing our astonishment, that the ministers of Queen Anne should have thought of giving a distant island to a weak prince like the duke of Savoy, which he had neither the means to command nor to defend: without a ship of war; without co mmerce; without resources; and this b

way of increasing his power! an island, moreover, by its form of government, purely aristocratical; and which would need a standing army to keep it in subjection! when we meet with such wonderful strokes of policy as this, we might be excused for thinking that the genius of nonsense presided at the congresses of those days. That the necessity of maintaining a strong power between Austria and France was felt in that quarter, is, however, sufficiently evident, from the insufficient attempts made to strengthen the house of Savoy. But the root of the evil is in Italy itself nor will it ever be torn up without constituting Italy one great kingdom.

Switzerland, since the confirmation of its independence by the treaty of Westphalia, has invariably maintained the system of neutrality which it then adopted: and all powers acquiesced in this policy till the French revolution overthrew it: the restoration therefore of such a state was a safe experiment.

During those times, Sweden had the leading influence in the North: and had acquired this predominance by the vigour of its government, the weakness of the adjacent states, and the advantages gained by the treaties of Stolbova, of Stumsdorf, of Broemsebro, and Westphalia. On the abdication of Christina, in the year 1654, Charles Gustavus, count palatine of

Deuxponts succeeded under the name of Charles the 10th. This prince, brought up to war, was ambitious of distinguishing himself: he declared against John Casimir king of Poland for having protested against his accession; he marched into Poland with his ally Frederic William elector of Brandenburg, and beat the Poles at Warsaw in 1656; and that country would have submitted to him had the Tzar Alexis Micaelovitch, who was then at war with Poland, joined with him in a plan to divide the kingdom: the Tzar however made a truce with Poland, in order to attack the Swedes themselves in Livonia, Ingria, and Carelia. The emperor Leopold and the king of Denmark followed the example of the Russian monarch; and the elector of Brandenburg having obtained the sovereignty of the dutchy of Prussia, which had been ceded to him by the treaty of Welau, joined in the league against his ally.

Charles the 10th, finding he could do nothing on the side of Poland, withdrew his troops and attacked the Danes; and being master of Holstein, Sleswic, and Jutland, he passed the Belts on the ice, and marched to Copenhagen; which so intimidated the Danes, that they signed a peace under very hard conditions: but the treaty was scarcely signed

before Charles violated it, and again laid siege to Copenhagen. His intention was utterly to destroy the city, and by annihilating Denmark to fix his own capital in the south of Sweden, and become king of Scandinavia. The besieged made a vigorous defence, but the kingdom must have fallen had not Holland interfered to protect the commerce of the Baltic: the Dutch sent a fleet to the assistance of Denmark, the Swedes were repulsed, and the capital was relieved.

The king of Sweden no wise discouraged by this reverse, and in spite of the confederacy of France, England, and Holland to maintain the equilibrium of the north according to the maxims of those times, still persisted in his design; but his death in the year 1660 put an end to his gigantic projects. Peace was concluded in the next year at Copenhagen by the regents of the kingdom during the minority of Charles the 11th, and the provinces of Bohus Halland, Scania, and Blekingen were ceded to Sweden; an accession of territory which comprehends the whole sea coast of modern Sweden, from Fredericshall in Norway to the coast opposite the south point of Öland. The war with Poland was ended by the treaty of Oliva in the same year, by which the king of Poland

renounced all claim to the crown of Sweden, and ceded Livonia and Esthonia to that power: the duke of Courland was restored to his duchy: and the sovereignty of ducal Prussia was confirmed to Brandenburg. The peace between Sweden and Russia did not take place till the following year. Sweden met with nothing but calamities from its engagements with Louis the 14th in the war against Holland; it lost the province of Pomerania, which it did not recover till the treaties of Zell, of Nimeguen, St. Germain, Fontainbleau, and Lunden, concluded in the course of the year 1679 with the powers leagued against France.

Immediately after this peace a revolution took place in Sweden, which rendered the authority of the crown independent of the states. The abuse of the power exercised by the aristocracy, and the usurpations of that body on the domains of the crown, had excited the jealousy of the commons in the year 1680, and a diet was summoned at Stockholm: the regents were impeached for malversation during the minority; the constitutional privileges of the assembly were disputed; and the king supported by his guards so intimidated the diet, that they decreed that the authority of the king in council was sufficient to govern the kingdom. The absolute power thus

obtained by Charles the 11th was transmitted entire to his son Charles the 12th in the year 1697. This prince, by the bad use he made of his power, plunged his country into misfortunes from which it has not yet recovered; and his errors have been the great cause of the strides to tremendous power which have been made by Russia. This vast colossal state, by its weight, has now altered all the relations of Europe; and it will become hereafter a subject of discussion when we approach nearer to the conclusion of this work.

The view we are now about to take of the affairs of the north will serve to elucidate our theory more clearly: in certain circumstances, war is the natural consequence of the very position of affairs; and the regard which some princes have to justice, will present no sufficient obstacle to enterprises dictated by the ambition of others, or prompted by the fear or jealousy of a neighbour: whoever calculates events by such considerations will always find himself deceived. An elective kingdom must be viewed as a political nuisance, which will necessarily embroil all the neighbouring states. Look at Poland, torn by factions, and offering the crown to different competitors, and then suppose the most just and virtuous monarch of a neighbouring kingdom, determined not to interfere, from a scrupulous re-

gard to justice: is not that prince responsible to his country, to posterity, and even to political justice itself, for allowing others, less delicate, to profit by his reserve, and to establish such an influence in the disputed country, as may affect the peace, the security, or the interests of his own, and perhaps alienate an inheritance from his lawful successors. Self-preservation is the duty of every prince, because the independence of his people is implicated in the continuance of his own prosperity and power.

The warlike spirit of Charles the 12th, operated more in bringing Russia forward on the grand theatre of nations, then even the efforts of Peter the great, for by the impolitic enterprises of Charles, his very successes became so many legacies which expiring Sweden left to her rival, and which Peter knew well how to turn to his own advantage.

The province of Livonia, which had been the cause of the former war among the northern powers, became also the motive for the great confederacy against Charles the 12th.

Augustus the 2d, king of Poland and elector of Saxony, wishing to render himself popular with his new subjects, and to fulfill the engagements entered into by the *pacta conventa,* in which the king solemnly engaged to recover the provinces, dismembered from the kingdom,

determined to attempt the recovery of Livonia: which was suggested by the discontents of that province, arising from the harsh government of the Swedes.

Augustus opened a negociation to that purpose with the king of Denmark who entered into the plan; the early youth of Charles seemed to promise a favourable result. A secret alliance was formed between them; and their first care was to invite Peter to join in the enterprise.

Peter the great had at that time just atchieved the conquest of Asow on the Black sea, and had fitted out a fleet from that port: he ardently wished to establish also a maritime power on the Baltic, and on those very shores, of which his predecessors had been deprived by the Swedes: he therefore readily acceded to the alliance. Hostilities commenced in the year 1700 in Livonia, where the king of Poland marched with an army of Saxons, but failed in his attack on Riga.

The king of Denmark at the same time attacked the duke of Holstein Gottorp, the ally of Sweden, on pretence of claiming the dutchy of Sleswic.

Peter in the end of the same year, having first made peace with the Turks, advanced with 80,000 men, and laid siege to Narva. The

king of Sweden attacked at once by so many enemies, first turned his arms against Denmark, where the danger seemed most pressing; England, Holland, and the duke of Brunswick, declared in his favor; and in that of the duke of Holstein Gottorp, whom they considered themselves as bound to defend, being guarantees of the dutchy of Sleswic. The Swedes with the king at their head, assisted by the English and Dutch fleets, attacked the Isle of Zealand, and marched to Copenhagen; the Danes were obliged to sue for peace, and it was concluded the same year at Traventhal*.

Charles now liberated from the pressure of Denmark, turned his arms against the Poles and Russians, Augustus and Peter were unfortunate in having a Polish diet to manage; like all deliberative assemblies, they served only to perplex those with whom they had to deal; when it was too late, they shrunk from the contest, and shewed a disposition to accommodate matters with the Swedes, in direct opposition to those very pacta conventa which were dictated by themselves!

By this half measure they threw away their means of defence, while they failed in stopping the progress of the Swedes; who continued

* 1710.

to advance into the province, defeated the Russians at Narva, and ruined at one blow the whole plan of operations.

The defeat of Peter at Narva, is a great epoch in the Russian annals; it was shortly after followed by an interview between the king of Poland and Peter. Augustus demonstrated to him, the necessity of making a total change in his military establishment, if he wished to measure his arms with the nations of Europe. Thus it was that the Saxons became the first military institutors of the Russians, who upon this foundation have raised that empire which has become so formidable to Europe.

Charles flushed with victory, resolved to follow up his blow by attacking the king of Poland. The Saxons were defeated by him in three successive battles, which induced him to insist on the dethronement of the king of Poland, as the only condition of giving peace to that kingdom. This dangerous experiment was another event which in the end has proved greatly instrumental to the advancement of the Russians; for as it encreased the weakness of the Polish government, and divided the nation into two factions; it reduced it to a condition out of all proportion with its neighbours, whose relative strength was thereby augmented.

Stanislaus Lezcinsky was elected, and was no more than a puppet: but the policy of the neighbouring powers has continued to exhibit similar puppets upon the same stage, till the final partition of Poland put an end to the farce. The faults committed in these transactions by Augustus, are evident from their consequences. Had he possessed the wisdom of John Casimir, who had reigned little more than forty years before his time, he would have foreseen what the resources of Russia would one day become, if properly developed; and he would not have been the first to teach the Russians the European art of war: before he attempted to reduce Sweden, he would have hesitated, because he would have perceived that he was giving to Russia the means of future pre-eminence: but on the contrary, his conduct ensured it to her, and has since been the principal cause of her predominence in the north, a position which would have been much more innocently maintained by Sweden.

The Sendomir faction which held for Augustus, made but feeble efforts against the party at Warsaw which adhered to Stanislaus, and was seconded by Sweden. Peter sent military assistance to the former, but Charles defeated the confederate army of Poles and Russians, at Punice in Pomerania. Augustus

fled from Cracow into Saxony; Stanislaus was crowned king; and peace was signed at Warsaw in Nov. 1705. By this event the strength of Poland was turned against the Czar. Charles then carried the war into Saxony, when Augustus, by the 3d article of the peace of Alt Ranstadt, renounced his right to the crown of Poland.

Had the king of Sweden stopped here, or contented himself with recovering the provinces which he had lost on the Baltic, he might have preserved the predominence of Sweden in the north much longer, because he would have arrested the progress of the Russians. Peter had now evacuated Poland and retired to Moskow: Charles followed him thither, in hopes of dethroning him, his subjects being discontented with his new regulations: arriving at Mohilow, Charles committed a fault which ruined all his affairs; he separated himself from his other forces under general Lowenhaupt, and marched into the Ukraine, to form a junction with the Cossacks: the battle of Pultava, which was the consequence, eclipsed at once the glory and the power of his crown.

A fresh confederation against Sweden took place, the German provinces dependant on that kingdom were attacked; the Czar, with Augustus, fell on Pomerania, and the Swedes who

defended the province were finally obliged to lay down their arms in Holstein, which has since constituted a part of Denmark. Sweden, thus deprived of troops, met with nothing but reverses: and the duke of Holstein lost his sovereignty, and was effaced from the long list of little powers, the king of Prussia having put the finishing stroke by appropriating Stettin, the only possession which remained to him. Charles the 12th returning from Turkey after these events,* disappointed in his hopes of exciting a war between the Turks and Russians, now found that the king of Prussia had joined against him. This prince had already overrun Swedish Pomerania, when Charles had the additional misfortune of finding that Great Britain had joined the confederacy; not indeed from any deep political views, but merely that Bremen and Verden should be ceded to the electorate of Hanover! It was for this important consideration that the British cabinet lent its aid to introduce a new and gigantic power on the theatre of Europe, without considering the danger of allowing Sweden, one of the principal defences of the civilized world, to be so enfeebled as to yield its place to Russia. A British force

* 1714.

been made with the Danes; Bremen and Verden were the price of British friendship; and the government, without turning its attention to greater considerations, was ready to join any side which would make good these two pitiful townships to the elector of Hanover! The example of England was followed by the other powers, who now made peace with Sweden, perhaps beginning to see the effects of their own errors, in permitting the Russians to advance so far: it was however too late: Russia has ever since continued to extend herself to the west; and is now of such consequence in the affairs of Europe that nothing can be done without her consent.

At the end of this war, Denmark, which had twice escaped annihilation, was reduced to the lowest degree of humiliation.* The principal feature of the negociation of Aland, has since been recognized by the treaty of Vienna in 1815, the cession of Norway to Sweden. Denmark is of course become a very inferior state in the scale of nations. Nothing now remains but to amalgamate it with Norway and Sweden; to renew the union of Calmar, in order to give the greatest weight possible to the Scandinavian mass; and by that means to present a bulwark

* 1721. Peace of Nystad.

to the farther encroachments of Russia in the north.

After this picture of the affairs of the north, let us take a retrospective view of the state of Poland during the former part of this epoch. It presents a dreary scene under the reigns of John Casimir and Ladislaus the 4th; torn to pieces by factions and foreign wars, and, even then, tottering to its fall. No state deserves less commiseration; its misfortunes are all deducible from the misconduct of its rulers, a refractory body of nobles impatient of any authority; who robbed the crown of its prerogatives, that they might rob the people of their liberty; and who, when they had quitted the anchor of the state, drove it upon the rocks, where it foundered.

The war between Russia and Poland, which was terminated by the truce of Andrussow, took its rise from the folly or temerity of the Polish government.

The Cossacks were originally Russians: their language and the Greek ritual which they observe show their connection with that people. They are divided into two principal branches; viz. those of the Don, who have at all times been subject to Russia; and those of the Borysthenes, who were formerly dependent on Poland, and formed the frontier militia of that kingdom al-

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ways ready to march against an enemy; they were commanded by a chief styled the Hetman, and covered the kingdom from the attacks of the Turks and Tartars.

The utility and importance of their services had induced the kings of Poland to grant them at different times considerable privileges, of which Sigismond the 3d attempted to deprive them: he began by forbidding them to make incursions on the Tartars; he placed them under the command of the general of the royal army; and obliged their clergy to separate themselves from the Greek church, and to acknowledge the authority of the Roman pontiff. These innovations, aggravated by the tyranny of the Polish nobles, drove them into rebellion, and they made an incursion into Poland which the Poles successfully repelled: in consequence of which they threw themselves under the protection of Russia. Chmelniski made a treaty with the Czar Alexis Michaelovitch, by which the town of Kiew, and the rest of the Ukraine which was in the hands of the Cossacks, were to receive Russian garrisons. On this occasion the Czar took Smolensko from the Poles, and all the country which by former treaties had been ceded to them by Russia: he also took Wilna, and was penetrating into Lithuania, when Charles the 10th king of Sweden in the year

1656, invaded Poland and threatened its utter destruction. The Czar, obliged to turn his arms against the Swedes, concluded a treaty with Poland at Wilna, by which the Russians restored their conquests to the Poles, who held out to him the hope of becoming their king. This project has never since been lost sight of as may be seen by the present state of Poland. Thus, on all sides, the Swedes and Poles had been fighting for two centuries, for the advantage of Russia.

In the year 1658, war broke out again between Russia and Poland. The Hetman Chmelniski dying, a dispute for the succession divided the Cossacks. The Russians were beaten in several battles, by the Poles, who recovered part of their provinces. The Tartars were ravaging Russia at the same time. This war lasted until the year 1667, when the truce of Andrussow, for thirteen years, put an end to hostilities; and the Russians retained Novogorod, Tchernigow, Kiew, and all the Cossack country situated beyond the Dnieper and the Borysthenes; those on the west remained to Poland.

During these wars, Poland was torn asunder by its intestine factions. John Casimir, disgusted with a crown so painfully worn, determined to abdicate, and retire France: he

executed this project in the year 1668, and there ended his days.

A remarkable speech is recorded of this prince, which he addressed to the diet in the year 1661 to the following effect. "In the midst of our intestine divisions, we have to fear the invasion and dismemberment of Poland: would to God, I may prove a false prophet! The Russians will invade those nations who speak their own language; the great dutchy of Lithuania, great Poland and Prussia, will one day become the share of the house of Brandenburg; and Austria will not forget her own interest in the scramble; her share will be Cracow and its dependencies." When we consider the date of this discourse, and the verification of the prediction, great credit is due to the perspicacity of that prince. For the Swedes were at that time the predominant power of the North, it being only thirteen years after the conclusion of the treaty of Westphalia. One is surprised that he made no mention of Sweden in his prospectus of the division of Poland: but it may be considered a proof, that he foresaw that Sweden could not long maintain a pre-eminence which was beyond her natural strength. Could he have seen Russia after the reign of Peter, he might have

carried his views still further. Let us not content ourselves by barely admiring the foresight of the prince; let us profit by it, and reflect on what Russia is now! Europe cannot take too many precautions against that power: if she neglects to concentrate her force, or consent to her own weakness out of deference to the princes of little states which divides and paralyse her, the day is not far distant, when the disputes about these petty sovereignties will afford Russia a pretext for interference, which, neither the whining deprecations of princes despairing in their cabinets, nor the blustering remonstrances of ambassadors, nor the ignis fatuus which has misled the children of Europe into a belief that an Autocrat of all the Russias is an innoxious animal, will be able to convert into an object of profit, or amusement. Let Austria consider the words of John Casimir, and recollect that the Bohemians and Gallicians speak a dialect of the Russian language, let both Prussia and Austria consider the position of the dutchy of Warsaw.

After this general view of the political aspect of Europe from the year 1648, when the treaty of Westphalia laid the foundation of the subsequent negociations and treaties which afterwards took place, down to the

peace of Utretcht; the reader cannot fail to remark a great degree of improvement in its international policy: and although he has observed wars breaking out frequently, and in every quarter; and that great wounds were inflicted on the countries which were the theatres of them; still that much longer intervals of peace and security were enjoyed in turn by each of its kingdoms. These blessings resulted naturally out of the strength and stability acquired. In proportion as countries extended their frontiers, and formed great states: the territories of the weak were generally the theatres of war: the low countries, although under the Austrians, yet divided by intermediate powers; and the lesser states of Germany and Italy, divided into so many "impotencies," if the term can be allowed, each in their turn were visited by its calamities.

During this epoch, Prussia became a powerful monarchy; France had rounded her empire, and took a form which insured her security: Spain, shut out by the Pyrenees and the ocean, enjoyed for the most part internal security, her situation being far better than when a knot of independent sovereigns were struggling for superiority, and forming a separate system of balance within the peninsula The success of Austria in reducing Hungary to

a closer connection with the rest of her hereditary dominions, made that house the bulwark of the civilized world on that side. Poland has been the bane of Europe from the weakness and unsteadiness of her government: she was the original cause of her own degradation and misfortunes; and she has been the great fabricator of the preponderance of Russia; whose empire greatly exceeding the other states of Europe in extent, and increasing daily in population, already threatens the independence of all nations.

If this view of the subject be just; if the formation of great states by the absorption of little ones; and if the concentration of supreme power be acknowledged to have produced the improvement we have noticed, let us hope that the same improvements will yet farther be extended to those portions of Europe, which by their broken and disjointed state, have still the burden of a government to support, without the benefit of strength and security, or even the means of defence in the moment of danger.

When we consider the means by which each state acquired its possessions during the same epoch, we have no greater satisfaction, in a moral point of view, than we had in perusing the annals of more distant times; all seem to owe them to violence and usurpation, ex-

cepting when a right of succession intervenes; and even then it was no more than a succession to that, which had been usurped by predecessors.

In proposing therefore a plan for the better equilibrium of Europe, any reference to justice would appear like a confession of ignorance, or a total inattention to history. If delicacy towards particular families is to be preferred to the security and happiness of the world at large, and to be held up as a principle too sacred even to be questioned; there must be an end to all hopes of amelioration: the same causes must continue to produce similar effects; the face of the earth must resemble that of the ocean; nations, like billows on its ever moving surface, must continually rise and fall; and the progress which mankind have made in improving their international condition, must remain liable to be repelled by political tempests, from all quarters and in all directions.

From the peace of Utrecht, we must conduct our reader through various details to the peace of 1783 in the west of Europe; to the division of Poland in its opposite extremity; and to the state of affairs over its whole surface during the French revolution. The dark as well as the fair side of this picture, we shall endeavour to exhibit with a view of illustrating

the subject before us: if it can be proved that the principal part of the wars of Europe during this period have resulted from the defects of its political distribution, and that the good which has befallen it has resulted from those causes which we have before pointed out; the reader may be prepared to consider without prejudice those speculative ameliorations in the system which it is the principal object of this work to propose.

FOURTH EPOCH.

From the Peace of Utrecht 1713, *to the present time.*

THE wars occasioned by the ambition of Louis the 14th were facilitated and supported chiefly by the weak and divided state of Germany: those ensuing from the military ardour of the Swedes were indebted to the same disorders in Poland. These wars were succeeded by an interval of peace, ever on the point of being interrupted; and at last totally broken, notwithstanding the efforts made to remove every cause of disturbance.

In these negociations Great Britain took a principal part; the consideration she had acquired by the glory of her arms in the war of the succession of Spain, and the advantages she had gained both in Europe and America, gave her an influence which she had never before enjoyed. It has been evident from that time, that the permanent peace of Europe is essential to her prosperity: and the peace of Europe will be durable only in proportion to the perfection of its political balance.

The principal events during this epoch will require some detail; as we come nearer to our own times every incident becomes more interesting, and the defects in the system of nations will strike us more sensibly. The reader will observe that the chief cause of the wars which for the first sixty years of the eighteenth century desolated Europe, were disputes for successions: the contest for Spain between the houses of Austria and Bourbon, was no sooner at an end than another took place for the crown of Poland; then followed another for the succession of Austria; the claims on Silesia, founded on hereditary right, were then set up by the king of Prussia; and almost immediately followed a dispute for the succession of Bavaria. By this means the whole world was kept in a continued ferment for the personal interests of princes, but without the least reference to the interests of mankind. The reader will also remark, that in the course of these contests the smaller states have generally been the victims, Germany and Italy being ever the theatre of war.

It is evident, that were there no little impotent states touching on extensive empires, the great powers, brought into contact, would find more difficulties in executing their ambitious projects; and consequently be less disposed to enter-

tain any: another remark will also be obvious, that were it possible to introduce a new system into the matrimonial alliances of princes and sovereign houses, by the maintenance of which all disputes concerning successions would be put at rest, the greatest benefit would result to mankind. Further, were it possible, once for all, to draw certain great lines of demarcation, to divide the continent of Europe into portions, though not all equal yet bearing a certain proportion to each other; and to fix these separate portions irrevocably, so that no disputes should be permitted, and no two should be under one head; many causes of wars within Europe would be obviated. To such a plan I am aware great difficulties present themselves; but even that which appears impossible to-day, may be only difficult to-morrow; and by degrees, that which is difficult may become easy.

If any one whom these opinions may not suit should think he can answer us by alleging the justice due to individuals, he will permit us to require that he should first shew how any individual, whosoever, can in the name of justice claim a personal right out of the limit by which nature, reason, and universal consent appear to have circumscribed every personal right,—the universal good? What title shall any prince

assert to any thing in the name of justice, which in the same name, and with tenfold right, his fellow creatures may not assert to the peace, tranquillity, and happiness of the community? We should not believe an adversary to be serious who should pretend to controvert this position: and he who requires in his turn, before he will assent to it, that we shall define the terms "universal good" and "community," would be justly referred to the common sense of mankind, in which his own would be included; but we will furnish him with a declaration, equivalent in this place to the definition required; namely, that personal rights are subordinate to public rights in every sense: and that whenever these cannot consist together without damage, the public are justly entitled to the preference. Whatever, in the sense of natural right, belongs to a prince's condition, belongs also to that of a people: whatever, in any other sense, belongs to the condition of a prince which does not also belong to the condition of a people, is very properly considered and is therefore called right, for the benefit of the people; but it cannot continue to be right, however it may be called, when it operates to their prejudice. We do not perceive any reason grounded on justice, why a prince, whose patrimony obstructs a great improvement in the condition of Europe, should be

treated with more reserve than a private person, the identity of whose property cannot be preserved without the manifest deterioration, or the ruin of a great public interest: his consent to change the nature of it, is not necessary; his farm is divided, for the sake of a road or a canal, his manufactory is demolished, or transferred, to the prejudice of his connections in trade, perhaps of his family and fortune, to make room for a street, or a bridge to be erected for the general good of his fellow-citizens or countrymen: his claims are valued; and he is obliged to submit. Indemnifications may be given by similar rules in both cases; and justice may be satisfied in both, though each should have made a sacrifice to the public, as each was in duty bound to do as soon as the public good required it. We have ourselves, most wisely, excluded a whole line of princes from the succession to our throne; surely not in consequence of defective birth-right; but just for this very reason, that their possession of the crown of England could not consist with the public good.

These opinions do not arise from democratic prepossessions, or reasonings drawn from the natural equality of man: we know well that republics are in fact the domination of the few in the name of the many; and that a Pericles,

or a Cleon, holds but a precarious influence: that no government can be firm, at least if its extent of territory be considerable, which is not ruled by an hereditary head: that the freedom of the people does not so much result from the form of government, as from the fundamental maxims on which the system of distributive justice reposes. But if a state have not strength within itself to resist the shocks it is liable to receive from without, it must fall; or, at most, it will exist by sufferance. How often have we seen these small states overrun and annihilated? Justice has often exclaimed, and has often been silenced, when pretended necessity has been admitted as an excuse for wanton violence: why should the undoubted necessity of a case be less peremptory, when justice herself is ready to arm the hand that would ratify the public appeal in favour of the public good? If congresses are called, and the mutual jealousies of great powers induce them to permit those states to be again set up, this is no proof of the justice or wisdom of the arrangement: it only leaves to the great a facility of again breaking the peace of the world at the expence of the little, and the business of war and negociation becomes only that of alternately pulling down, and setting up, impotent states.

Let the reader carry these reflexions with

him on entering into the detail about to be given of the affairs of Europe during this epoch, and he will then be prepared to judge of the reasonings which shall, with deference, be submitted to him; conscious of no intention to dogmatise, we shall offer merely speculative propositions; the obscure individual who through the medium of the press promulgates to his fellow-citizens merely speculative ideas, ought not to consider either the adoption or rejection of his reasonings in any way personal to himself: he must also be fortified against the scurrility and abuse which may be vented against him by those who perhaps are only angry that the reflections he has made had never occurred to themselves; he must only smile when he finds a reviewer, embarrassed with arguments he is unable to attack in front, recur to the poor expedient of stringing together a number of sentences not connected in the text, to make the writer talk nonsense which his critical acumen may confute, and mislead both himself and his readers.

Erroneous principles will always spread rapidly; the more absurd they are, the more eagerly they will be devoured by the majority, which must always be the vulgar. Truth always must combat prejudice when it first presents itself: if the difficulties give way by degrees, it is a

strong proof of its presence; if, on the contrary, neither the few nor the many adopt a particular opinion which is hazarded, or convincing arguments are logically put together, in order to refute it, then there is little danger that the good sense of the learned, or the simplicity of the vulgar will be imposed upon.

The peace of Utrecht,* which had been the work of almost all the powers of Europe, might be supposed to have laid a solid basis of future tranquillity; it was however found impossible to bring the emperor, and the king of Spain, to any agreement, although they were the two crowned heads principally interested. Charles the 6th had not yet acknowledged Philip the 5th as king of Spain; and Philip would not agree te renounce his claims to those parts of the low countries, which had been left to the Spanish monarchy by Charles the 5th, but which, by the treaty of Utrecht, were adjudged to the house of Austria, to whom they had originally belonged, in consequence of the marriage into the house of Burgundy. Thus a long war, and the united labours of almost all the cabinets of Europe, were on the point of being rendered fruitless, and a fresh exertion of force was necessary to make them effectual.

* Koch. Traties, vol. 2.

Philip the 5th was guided by the advice of his minister, the famous Cardinal Alberoni, whose extensive genius and great views, were however not tempered by moderation and prudence: he had succeeded in re-establishing the finances and the navy of Spain, by which means the kingdom recovered its energy for a moment. Flushed with this success, he formed the plan of setting aside the treaty of Utrecht, and of reviving the claims of his master to the throne of France. The duke of Orleans, who was regent of that kingdom during the minority of Louis the 15th, was to be removed from the helm, and the guardianship of the young king to be intrusted to the king of Spain, to whom the low countries were to be restored. In order to disconcert this plan, the duke of Orleans sought the alliance of Great Britain, who of all the powers, was principally interested in maintaining the treaty: Holland was invited to a participation of this confederacy: and the tripple alliance was signed at the Hague, Jan. 4th, 1717, only four years after the peace of Utrecht, in order to enforce its execution!

Alberoni was by no means discouraged by this alliance, he fitted out a fleet and army to Sardinia; the Spanish force landed on the 22d Aug. 1717, and took possession of the island. Thus the emperor lost Sardinia, which from the

nature of his power and situation, he was as well qualified to protect as the elector of Bavaria, or the great mogul. The same armament in the following year attacked Sicily, in order to drive out the duke of Savoy; and about the same time the British government, who regarded the treaty of Utrecht as its own work, concerted with France a project of accommodation between the emperor, the king of Spain, and the duke of Savoy, for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

The emperor agreed to the proposal; but the king of Spain, and the duke of Savoy, disapproved it: and Great Britain, being determined by force of arms to support her own plans, negociated the famous treaty known by the appellation of the Quadruple Alliance. The object of the alliance was, by fair means or by force, to oblige the king of Spain, and the duke of Savoy, to agree to the conditions of peace proposed by France and England, and acceded to by Austria; of which the following were the principal articles:

The king of Spain should restore Sardinia to the emperor.

The emperor should renounce solemnly all claim on those parts of the Spanish monarchy ceded to Philip the 5th, by the treaty of Utrecht; and should acknowledge him as the

legitimate king of Spain. Philip the 5th was to renounce his claims to the provinces of Italy, and the low countries, as adjudged to the emperor by the treaty of Utrecht.

As the succession to the grand dutchy of Tuscany was on the point of becoming vacant, as well as those of Parma and Placentia, the former by the extinction of the Medici family, the two latter by that of the house of Farnese, it was determined that these dutchies should be held as male fiefs of the empire, and that the emperor should give the reversion of them, in default of male heirs, to Don Carlos, eldest son of Philip the 5th by his second wife, Elizabeth Farnese, daughter of the duke of Parma, on condition however that they should not be held by a prince who was at the same time king of Spain: that the port of Leghorn should be declared free, and in order to insure the succession of the said dutchies to the infant Don Carlos, a garrison of 6000 Swiss should be placed in the principal places, namely, Leghorn, Porto Farrajo, Parma, and Placentia, which should be paid by the contracting and mediating powers.

Philip the 5th was to renounce all right to the succession of Sicily established by the peace of Utrecht; and his right should be transferred to Sardinia.

These were the conditions of accommodation proposed to the emperor, and the king of Spain: the following were offered to the emperor, and the duke of Savoy.

The duke of Savoy shall cede Sicily to the emperor, renouncing his right to that kingdom, the cession of Sicily to Savoy having been an article of the treaty of Utrecht. The emperor shall cede Sardinia, in the same state in which he shall have received it from the king of Spain, with all the honors of royalty to the duke of Savoy, who shall insure the reversion of that island to the crown of Spain, in default of heirs male in the house of Savoy. The emperor shall confirm to the duke of Savoy all the concessions made in Italy, at the treaty of Turin in 1703, he shall also confirm to the house of Savoy all right to inherit the crown of Spain in case of the extinction of the male descendents of Philip the fifth; with the condition however, that the territories of the house of Savoy, and the kingdom of Sardinia, shall go to a younger branch of that house, and never be united with the Spanish monarchy.

These articles are followed by an alliance between France, England, and the house of Austria, by which the treaties of Utrecht and Baden are confirmed: the contracting powers guarantee to each other their respective pos-

sessions; they assure to France its succession as settled by the treaty of Utrecht; and that of England conformably to the laws of the kingdom: finally, these powers agree to assist each other mutually in case of attack: and a space of three months was given to Spain, and Savoy, to accede to the treaty; after which, in case of failure, the contracting parties were to declare war against them.

The duke of Savoy submitted very reluctantly to this treaty which he signed on the 10th November 1718.

The king of Spain was less docile, the Cardinal Alberoni represented to him the project of the quadruple alliances, as derogatory to his dignity; he refused his consent, and war commenced.

The British fleet under admiral Byng, on the 11th August 1718, attacked the Spanish fleet on the coast of Sicily, and defeated it; the Spaniards lost twenty-three ships, 5300 men, and 728 pieces of cannon: in the year 1719, the duke of Berwick entered Navarre, took Fontarabia, subdued the whole province of Guisposcoa, and afterwards attacked Catalonia; the British at the same time made a descent on Gallicia, and took Vigo.

These decided measures shook the firmness of the king of Spain, and he signed the quad-

ruple alliance on the 26th January 1720; Cardinal Alberoni was dismissed from his office, and the Spaniards evacuated Sicily. The treaty of quadruple alliance was then confirmed by the ratification of all the contracting parties, which was done at the Hague, on the 20th February 1720. These treaties of triple and quadruple alliance, were necessary to patch up the treaty of Utrecht: but even then, the root of the evil was by no means removed; the contest between Austria and Spain, was indeed abated, but the rest of Europe was left just as subject to fresh disputes as it had ever been; the house of Savoy was still left to guard a port beyond its strength, and to balance powers beyond its weight; the states of Italy were just as open as before, to become subjects of contention; the pretentions of the house of Austria to be the liege lords of Italy, still shewed that the old farce, acted at Rome by the emperor Charlemagne and the Pope in the eighth century, was still considered as a sufficient title to mangle Italy into morcels, and to treat that nation as being, by right, the vassals of the Germans. What was the consequence of all these military enterprises and diplomatic finesse? The ministers of England flattered themselves that the fabric would stand, but in less than two years, they were

forced to undertake a new war, to prolong this famous peace! We shall see in the sequel that from the signature at the Hague, in the year 1720, the whole interval, untill 1731, was filled up with contentious negociations, which were concluded only seven years before a new cause of dispute, the throne of Poland, at once replunged all nations into the horrors of war.*

When the king of Spain had acceded to the quadruple alliance, and his forces had evacuated Sicily and Sardinia; it appeared that nothing was wanting to the general tranquility: in fact, war was at an end, but peace was not established; there still remained many points to be settled, between the emperor, the king of Spain, and the duke of Savoy, for which it was necessary to call a congress.

In the year 1720, a congress was appointed at Cambray; but the dispositions of the different courts, the antipathy which subsisted between those of Vienna and Madrid, and the views of the mediating powers themselves, who desired to terminate the most important points first, delayed its opening till the year 1722.

We cannot mention such frivolous excuses for retarding the settlement of these affairs, without at the same time blushing for the

* Koch abregèe des Traties.

weakness, which has allowed them to be repeated, and which continues to allow them to be possible.

The emperor could not bring himself to renounce his claims to the crown of Spain; and what was still more absurd, to lay down the empty title of *Catholic Majesty*, to which he seemed particularly attached: this childish pertinacity so little susceptible of excuse, admitted at least of disguise; and for this purpose he raised difficulties on the article of mutual renunciations, and required that Philip's renunciation of the Low Countries should be confirmed by the Cortes. Philip in his turn required that of the emperor to be sanctioned by the diet of the empire. To remove these difficulties, an act of guarantee was signed at Paris in favour of the emperor and the king of Spain, which was intended to supply any defect of formalities which might be discovered in the renun ciation of either party; and the renunciations were exchanged and ratified at London.

The next difficulty was on the part of the mediating powers, whose commercial jealousy induced them to require the abolition of the East India Company of Ostend; but the principal one which retarded the opening of the congress, arose from the investitures of Italy, which had been adjudged to the infant Don Carlos by the treaty

of quadruple alliance. All parties seemed to agree in one point, namely, that Italy had no right to an individual existence; no right to an individual, an exclusively national, interest; no right to maintain independence; and therefore no right to unite her parts for the purpose of asserting it! The greatest powers have for ages wasted their best blood and treasure in endless contests for those envied regions; but it was not then, any more than at present, a lesson to them; nor is it yet possible to convince or persuade the disposers of dominions, that the political freedom, the internal tranquillity, and the power of Europe, depend as much on the unity of certain parts as on the harmony of the whole system; that these parts, so united, must have each its proper head; that nations cut into pieces, and governed successively by strangers, can never be united in fidelity to their governors; but will always be ready to shake off obedience, whenever fortune favours them with the opportunity of escaping vengeance.

The emperor repented of the promises he had made, and sought a thousand pretexts to recede from his engagements. The minister who directed the affairs of Italy for the emperor, pointed out to him the danger which his Neapolitan and Milanese dominions would encounter,

if an infant of Spain should hold the grand dutchy of Tuscany, together with Parma and Placentia: the dispatch of the patent of investitures met with several obstacles by the opposition of the then reigning duke of Parma, the pope, and the grand duke Gaston de Medicis; and many other circumstances favoured the equivocations of the imperial court. The duke of Parma demanded that during his life-time the emperor should not exercise in the dutchies of Parma and Placentia any right of direct dominion; a provision which had been already made by the quadruple alliance. The pope loudly protested against that clause of the treaty which declared these dutchies to be fiefs of the empire; he cried out against the injustice of depriving the church of the right of superiority over fiefs which it had enjoyed so long without contestation; and which, he might have added, were founded on imposture. Nothing further need be said by way of comment upon this protest, but that the time was approaching, when the bayonet would determine the right to dominion in spite of the frauds which had so long divided and enslaved mankind.

The grand duke of Tuscany maintained that as his dominions held of God alone, he could not allow them to become a fief of the empire, nor acknowledge don Carlos as his heir to the

prejudice of his sister the electrice palatine. Tuscany had been a part of the kingdom of Lombardy unjustly destroyed by papal jealousy, (to go no further back) and it had then become a part of the kingdom of Italy; Matilda, who died in the beginning of the twelfth century, had left it to the church: the republics of Italy then arose, and the Medici family became by their abilities, their riches, and their crimes, the sovereigns of Tuscany. All this was what John Gaston called divine right: the right of the Italian nation to an independant government was of course not divine, and held no place in these divine negociations. Italy was left, and will continue for a long time to be, the land of human misery.

During the year 1722 the ministers of different courts had assembled at Cambray, and the duke of Orleans, who had just betrothed two of his daughters to the sons of the king of Spain, and wished to oblige that prince, persuaded the emperor to induce the diet to expedite the patent of investiture required by the quadruple alliance; but the form of this patent, and the conditions therein stipulated, displeased the court of Madrid, who rejected it. This occasioned new delays, and it was not until the commencement of the year 1724, that the patent was made out accord-

ing to the pleasure of the king of Spain. France and England were then required to guarantee the same, on account of the protests of the pope and the grand duke of Tuscany. Consider the character of these negociations, and it will appear that the main principles which ought to guide the cabinets of great empires, were totally disregarded! All the history of past times was forgotten, though the evils generated by those absurd arrangements were still staring every one in the face: it might easily have been seen that, in order to give a splendid maintenance to a younger son of the house of Spain, the noble country of Italy would be kept, divided and weak, for the theatre of ensuing wars. At this day the Spaniards have not a foot of land in Italy: the interval between the event now before us and the present time is only ninety-two years. We shall see what has happened to it during this period; and then let us ask ourselves, whether its state is one jot amended since the fifteenth century, and whether new wars, and similar disasters, do not await it at the present time?

This negociation being terminated to the satisfaction of the king of Spain, the conferences of Cambray were opened in April 1724, at which the kings of France and England were acknowledged as mediators; and the powers interested

brought forward their several pretensions. The king of Spain required that the emperor should renounce his title as king of Spain, and grand master of the order of the golden fleece; that he should give up the archives and treasury of that order; that the affair of the garrisons in Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, for the security of the succession of the infant don Carlos, should be regulated; that the demands of the incumbent duke of Parma should be examined and decided by the congress; that commissioners should be appointed to regulate the limits of the dutchy of Parma towards the Milanese on the banks of the Po; that the states of Mantua and Mirandola, of Montferrat and Sabionetta, and other smaller fiefs, should be restored to those who had possessed them heretofore; and finally that Italy should be placed on its old footing.

The emperor, on his part, insisted upon retaining his titles of king of Spain and grand master of the golden fleece, although he required the king of Spain to renounce his Austrian titles; he pretended that he was sole master of the golden fleece, that order having been founded by the ancient dukes of Burgundy, of whom the emperor was the heir and successor; that the pretensions of the duke of Parma and other princes of Italy not being of a nature to

be discussed in congress, as they were not connected with the objects of the quadruple alliance, might be settled by the aulic council, or by the diet of Ratisbonne; and that all the contracting parties should guarantee the pragmatic sanction. The maritime powers, England and Holland, loudly demanded the suppression of the East India company of Ostend.

These opposite pretensions occasioned many differences among the plenipotentiaries. Those of the mediating powers declared the demands of the duke of Parma admissible, and even founded on the quadruple alliance; but the emperor was so disgusted, that he forbid his ministers to treat at all on the subject of the duke of Parma.

All these difficulties convinced the cabinet of Spain that nothing could be done with the emperor at Cambray; and weary of the delays caused by the partiality of the mediators to the emperor, they thought fit to send the baron Ripperda to Vienna in October 1724 to endeavour to come to some understanding, without the intervention of the congress. About the same time the infanta of Spain, who from the age of three years had been betrothed to Louis the 15th, and brought up at the court of France as the future queen of that country, was sent back to her fa-

ther: this produced a misunderstanding between the two courts, on the very eve of a treaty of which France had been the mediatrix. Philip the 5th recalled his minister from Cambray, and the congress was broken up: he even recalled his ambassador at Paris, and forbade his ministers in all foreign courts to have any communication with those of France: he then ordered Ripperda to hasten the conclusion of terms with the emperor, and a separate treaty between the emperor and Spain was signed at Vienna 30th of April 1726.

When we reflect on the nature of these differences, and consider how little reference the demands, on either side, had to the national interests of Austria or Spain, being only personal to the sovereigns, we may be excused for repeating, that such causes of dispute are in themselves sufficient evidence of the defective state of the international policy of Europe. There are too many real causes of discord between states! If those which are inherent in the very nature of things cannot be removed, they might perhaps be reduced; but it would be at least expedient to prevent the unnecessary accession of others.

The treaty of Vienna, which ensued in the year 1726, confirmed all the articles of the qua-

druple alliance: it contained the renunciation of Philip to the Low Countries and to the states of Italy; that of the emperor to Spain and South America; and the eventual investiture of the dutchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, to don Carlos.

The king of Spain agreed to leave to the emperor all he held in Italy, and renounced his claim to the succession of Sicily, but reserved the same right on Sardinia; each party agreed to preserve the titles they had assumed during their own lives: but that after their deaths, their successors should only assume the titles of the provinces of which each should be in possession.

The emperor guaranteed the succession of Spain according to the treaty of Utrecht. Philip did the same on his part to the Austrian pragmatic sanction: this last step gained the court of Vienna.

This peace was followed by another between Spain, the emperor, and the empire, signed at Vienna the 7th of June 1725; it is nothing more than a confirmation of the foregoing.

These treaties in fact contained nothing which could offend France or England; they were founded on that of Utrecht and the quadruple alliance. Philip the 5th renounced all the ad-

vantages he might have hoped to obtain through the mediating powers: he sacrificed to his resentment the cause of the vassals and princes of Italy which he had pleaded at the congress of Cambray; and abandoned the interests even of the duke of Parma, which he had before pretended to be inseparable from those of don Carlos: the affair of the golden fleece remain undecided, and so it has since remained.

Nothing here could offend France or England. A treaty of alliance between these two courts was soon after made, which was kept secret. It determined the mutual aid the contracting powers were to give to each other in case of attack; the emperor declared therein that, the king of Spain being resolved to insist upon the execution of the promises of England to restore Minorca and Gibraltar, he would not oppose the demand, but use his good offices to promote it. In return the king of Spain granted to ships under the imperial flag a free entry into his ports, with all the advantages of the most favoured nations: this article regarded the Ostend company, and was fully explained in a subsequent treaty of commerce concluded between them on the 1st of May.

These treaties put an end to the misunderstanding which had subsisted between Spain and

Austria for twenty-five years, and caused a strict connection between them, which excited the jealousy of France and England. The duke of Bourbon, who then governed France and had been the cause of sending back the infanta, was apprehensive of the resentment of the king of Spain; and he formed an alliance with England and Prussia in order to balance the league formed at Vienna. This alliance was concluded the 3d of September 1725, and is known by the name of the alliance of Hanover. The contracting parties guaranteed each other in the possession of their respective territories, and fixed the quota that should be mutually afforded in case of attack.

The Dutch acceded to the alliance of Hanover, after a fruitless negociation to induce the emperor to abolish the Ostend company. They signed on the 9th of August 1726. In the following year the Danes and Swedes followed their example. France and England promised them great subsidies, and renewed the guarantee of the dutchy of Sleswic in favor of Denmark against Russia, which was then inclined to support the pretensions of the duke of Holstein Gottorp. During these efforts which England and France were making to increase the number of their allies, the court of Vienna was not idle; it succeeded in drawing the em-

press Catherine the 1st, who acceded to the treaties of Vienna and also became a guarantee on the 26th of August 1726. The emperor even found means to seduce the king of Prussia from the alliance of Hanover; and the greater part of the catholic states of Germany joined the emperor; so that nearly all Europe was divided into two confederacies, and in the beginning of the year 1727 every thing seemed to portend a general war.

The unguarded expressions which fell from Ripperda, who was then at the head of the Spanish government, had given to the court of London a suspicion that there existed some secret engagement among the allies of Austria to force the British to give up Gibraltar, and to cause a revolution in England by the restoration of the house of Stuart. The king of England complained loudly of this in his speech to parliament. These apprehensions and mutual reproaches were followed by preparations for war on all sides; and the ambassadors and ministers were recalled. Great Britain sent powerful fleets to America, the Mediterranean, and Baltic; and the Spaniards, desirous of reaping the profit of their new alliances, laid siege to Gibraltar.

At this juncture the empress Catherine died,

and the face of the north was changed; the emperor could not now reckon on the aid of Russia; and of course he shewed no inclination to second the views of Spain; and in fact neither France nor England were inclined to war.

The British government, instead of declaring war against Spain, contented itself with granting letters of marque against the Spaniards; and the cardinal de Fleury, who had succeeded to the duke of Bourbon in the ministry, thought fit, instead of making a diversion on the side of the Pyrenees according to the agreement, to inspire by persuasion pacific sentiments into the Spanish government.

In these circumstances the pope offered his mediation; his nuncios negociated at once in Vienna, Madrid, and Paris, at which last place it was determined to come to an armistice for seven years; the Ostend company was to be suspended during that time; and, four months after the signature of this treaty, a general congress was to be held at Aix la Chapelle. This was called the preliminaries of Paris, and signed 31st May 1727: the congress, fixed for Aix la Chapelle, was for the convenience of the cardinal Fleury, transferred to Soissons on the 14th June 1728.

The ministers of almost all the powers of

Europe assembled at this congress, where it was expected that the negociations for a permanent peace would be more successful than they had been at Cambray; the principal difficulties which had made the latter fail having been overcome by the peace of Vienna, and nothing now remaining but to satisfy the court of Spain on the subject of the dutchies of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany, in conformity with the treaty of the quadruple alliance.

The cabinet of Vienna could now no longer oppose the establishment of a Spanish prince in Italy; nor the suppression of the Ostend company, which had been suspended in the preliminaries: whatever opposition was now made by that court to the introduction of Spanish forces into Italy, it was only meant to raise the value of these concessions, in order to bring the other power to guarantee the pragmatic sanction.

The cardinal de Fleury, whose character was that of a pacific minister, yet considered the house of Austria as the rival of France; he therefore opposed the pretensions of the emperor, and resisted with all his might the pragmatic sanction, which in fact was to be the basis of any treaty to be concluded at Soissons; the cardinal's conduct was in this respect at variance with his principles. The object of the

pragmatic sanction was to settle the Austrian succession, and so to preserve the unity of the Austrian empire; and of course give stability to the affairs of Europe: the policy of the cardinal went directly to interrupt the succession and to provoke war. The consequence, had he succeeded, would have been general confusion until some new arrangement could have been made, which from the very nature of things could not possibly have improved the balance of Europe. Ministers are too apt to confine their views to the present or apparent advantage of the states they govern, and to neglect prospective good; which is the consequence of not mixing with the consideration of the interests of their own country, a due regard to the welfare and peace of their neighbours.

The obstinacy of the cardinal and the reserve of Spain caused the negociations of Soissons to languish, as it prevented Austria from concurring in points which the court of Spain had most at heart. The cardinal, in order to remedy a mischief of his own creating, endeavoured to separate Spain from Austria by representing in the worst point of view the refusal to admit the infant into Italy: he flattered himself by this means to make Austria cede in the affair of the dutchies without the guarantee

of the pragmatic sanction; and did not foresee that this very guarantee would best secure the infant in the possession he wished him to acquire. Cardinal Fleury was however reckoned a great statesman, although he shewed himself in this business to be no more than a wrong-headed old priest.

The court of England, which might have easily perceived that the undisputed succession of the house of Austria was essential to the peace of Europe, allowed itself to be led by the cardinal; and though the guarantee of the pragmatic sanction was a most solemn engagement on the part of England, nevertheless a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive was signed at Seville between England and Spain on the 9th November 1729, the object of which was to force don Carlos into the three dutchies, without the condition abovementioned which Austria had so much at heart: so that the British cabinet undertook to assist the French minister in undoing its own work. The emperor was of course highly offended at the treaty of Seville, as it disappointed his best hopes; and he felt keenly the injustice of obliging him to prevent his subjects from exercising their commerce, in order to favour other nations; knowing however, that neither England nor France were in earnest about the war,

he broke off all relations with Spain, recalled his embassador from Madrid, and sent a strong force into the Milanese, to resist the introduction of Spanish forces. The duke of Parma dying in January, 1731, the emperor took possession of his states.

The British government now felt that they had been deceived by the cardinal; and opened a secret negociation with Vienna; and in concert with the United Provinces, offered to obtain a guarantee of the pragmatic sanction, provided the emperor would agree to admit Spanish troops into Italy, and to abolish the Ostend company. This the emperor agreed to, and on the 16th of March, 1731, a new alliance was formed between Austria, Britain, and Holland, and the affair of the dutchies and Tuscany, was agreed to. Great Britain, and Holland, engaged to guarantee the pragmatic sanction; the states of the empire approved this treaty; and thus, at last, ended the contentions which had been occasioned by the disputed succession of Spain, and which had lasted thirty years.

When we look back on the whole chain of these events, and consider that the peace of the Pyrenees, concluded in the year 1659, was expected to put an end to the trouble, which existed between France and Spain ever since

the treaty of Vervins concluded in the year 1598; we may admit, that long usage has made us familiar with wretched arrangements; but we must also acknowledge, that such arrangements were not calculated to meet any of the public purposes for which it was pretended that they were designed. A connection by marriage of the house of Austria with the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, and the marriage of Louis the 14th with the infanta, at the peace of the Pyrenees, occasioned the spilling of oceans of human blood. Whatever may be the good that has ever resulted from the mixtures of royal houses, it has born no proportion with the evils which accompanied or followed them: some instances have occurred in which these unions have moulded two contiguous states into one, and thus simplified the system; but where the dominions of two families are distant, it is not easy to conceive what public benefit, at least, can arise out of their alliance. By the first of these marriages, the liberties of Europe were nearly overthrown; by the second, a series of wars disturbed the world for thirty years. These are the fatal effects of claims to thrones, in right of females.

We shall now see how great a nuisance an elective kingdom may become, and the fate which justly awaits it.

Scarcely two years elapsed since the last treaty of Vienna, of the year 1731, by which the affairs of Spain and Austria had been adjusted, before a new cause of disturbance arose, which occasioned a general war: in treating the principal events of which to its conclusion at the treaty of Vienna in 1738, not only the evil effects of disputed thrones will clearly be seen, but we shall be again reminded of the mischievous existence of little impotent states; which, while they facilitate the enterprises of powerful princes, are for ever the victims of wars, in which their own interests are in no wise implicated; and which might be incorporated with the great empires, once for all, very much to their own advantage and for the general advantage of Europe.

Augustus the 2d, king of Poland, and elector of Saxony, dying on the 1st Feb. 1733, Louis the 15th wished to restore his father-in-law, Stanislaus Lescinsky, to the throne; who had been before elected in 1704, by the influence of Charles the 12th of Sweden. The Polish nobility entered into the plan of Louis, from respect for the qualities of Stanislaus; and, the day of election being arrived, the primate, with the majority of the nobility, decided in his favor. He was proclaimed on the 12th Sept. 1733, by the primate. A faction

however, which had been bought by the elector of Saxony, son of the late king, quitted the field of election and took post in a small village, called Prague, on the banks of the Vistula; and, sustained by a Russian army which invaded Poland, proclaimed Augustus the 3d on the 5th of October following.

The emperor Charles the 6th decided in favor of Augustus, who had gained the court of Vienna by acceding to the pragmatic sanction, and marched an army to the borders of Poland. In vain the court of France represented that the measures which the emperor was now pursuing, would oblige the king to have recourse to arms; Stanislaus, by the junction of the Russians and Austrians, was obliged to leave Warsaw and to retire to Dantzic where he was besieged by the Russians and obliged to fly from thence in June 1734. On the 10th Oct. 1733, Louis had declared war against Austria, and was joined in an offensive and defensive alliance by the kings of Spain and Sardinia.

The allied army attacked the Austrians on three points; in Germany, in Lombardy, and in the kingdom of Naples. The French seized on Lorraine, passed the Rhine, and took the fort of Kehl; while another army entered Italy, took Pavia, and obliged the citadel of Milan to capitulate. Although the French army in pass-

ing the Rhine, declared they had no hostile intentions against the empire, the Germanic body, for this time, joined their chief.

The emperor endeavoured to interest England and Holland, in the quarrel; but no former treaties were now sufficient to make either of them give him any assistance. The Dutch promised the king of France to stand neuter, provided the Austrian low countries were not invaded, and that, so far the barrier treaty should not be violated; this being approved of, the neutrality was signed at the Hague on the 24th Nov. 1733.

The emperor, abandoned by Great Britain and Holland, and unable to resist so many attacks, suffered various reverses; and this was all he gained by interfering in the affairs of Poland.

In the year 1734, the duke of Berwick, who commanded on the Rhine, detached the count of Belleisle, who took possession of Treves and Trarbach, while he himself besieged Philipsburg, where he was killed. Mareschal Asfeld succeeded to the command, and obliged the city to surrender soon after. Italy became the principal seat of war: and Lombardy was completely conquered by the reduction of Novara and Tortona.

However great the misfortunes of the em-

peror were in Upper Italy, his affairs went still worse in the kingdom of Naples. The infant Don Carlos invaded it on the 29th March, with a Spanish army, under the command of the duke of Montemar, and took the capital. The imperialists were intrenched at Bitonto in Apulia, whence they were forced by the Spaniards; and that victory decided the conquest of the kingdom. Don Carlos then passed into Sicily, and took possession of it in a short time; he was crowned king of the Two Sicilies at Palermo on the 3d July 1735. All this, we must not forget, happened because there were two competitors for the crown of Poland!

The emperor Charles the 6th, after having, by a needless interference in the affairs of Poland, endeavoured to assist Russia in forcing a German on the throne, was now reduced by severe reverses to sue for peace. A prince who had been labouring for so many years to settle the succession to his own throne, ought rather to have set his face against any scheme to disturb the quiet succession of a kingdom bordering on his own frontier: by a contrary conduct, he was himself setting the example of the violation of that which he ought to have endeavoured to make all the world consider as most sacred!

Great Britain and Holland offered their me-

diation; and the several powers, in Jan. 1735, offered various projects of peace, which were all rejected. France, who knew how sincerely the emperor must desire peace, opened a secret negociation with him, which ended in peace, a peace as we shall see, as liable to interruption as any which had preceded or has followed it. Surely this repeated experience of the insufficiency of treaties, demonstrates that there is some radical defect in the public right of Europe: improved, as it has been, since the treaty of Westphalia, it is still imperfect: and that which has been found susceptible of improvement in one age, may surely be improved in another.

The emperor embraced this proposal of secret negociation, the more willingly as he felt averse to the mediation of Holland and England, whom he considered as having abandoned him, contrary to their engagements. The preliminaries signed the 3d of Oct. 1735, between France and Austria, having been approved by Russia and the king of Poland, Spain acceded on the 1st May, and the king of Sardinia on the 16th August: the king of Spain indeed entered into this agreement with reluctance, because his claims on the dutchies of Parma, and Placentia, and Tuscany, had been overruled, in consequence of the acquisition of the Two Sicilies, by Don Carlos; an

acquisition which might have satisfied the king of Spain, but the king's resentment shews how far blind avidity will carry princes, whose politics are not conducted on reasonable principles. The king of Sardinia was also out of humour, because he had not gained a greater portion of Lombardy; but he, too, did not covet more for the sake of strengthening his position, which ought to have been his only consideration, but in order to assuage his avarice. Such was the miserable and bounded view, that princes and their ministers took of public affairs. No notion was entertained of trying to set, in a clear light, the real causes of the eternal vacillation of their own power, but each was seeking to snap up a slice of territory here and there, without reflecting on the consequences or on the means of preserving it when once obtained; and, least of all, did they endeavour to do any good to the country when they possessed it: let any one look at Sicily and Sardinia; the beggary, the ignorance, dirt, misery of these countries; and ask their sovereigns, if it were not better to remain in a private station, than to lord it over human nature so degraded!

Immediately after signing the preliminaries, a cessation of hostilities took place: much negociation was, however, necessary before peace

could be definitively settled, which was at length signed on the 8th Nov. 1738, between France and Austria. The king of Sardinia did not accede till 3d Feb. 1739: and the courts of Madrid and Naples, on the 21st Aug. of the same year.

By this treaty France gained Lorraine, with the exception of the county of Falkenstein, reserved to the duke of Lorraine, husband to Maria Teresa. Stanislaus renounced his right to the throne of Poland; by which means the right of election was transferred from the dict, to the Russian army. In exchange for Lorraine, the grand dutchy of Tuscany was adjudged to Francis, exduke of Lorraine; and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies guarranteed to Don Carlos and his heirs.

The dutchy of Milan was restored to the emperor, with Mantua. The dutchies of Parma and Placentia, were also added; but on condition that he should do justice to the house of Guastalla, in lieu of its claims on the dutchy of Mantua.

The king of France guaranteed the pragmatic sanction. Such was the result of this war; which placed Italy nearly in the position it occupied when the revolutionary war overturned every thing. The want of a strong power, or in other words, of unity, in Italy,

gave to France the riches and resources of that country, and was in fact one of the great causes of its success. The weakness of Germany had the same effect in another quarter, and gave to France the same advantage. When we come to the treaty of Vienna of 1815, we then shall be able to judge, if the great statesmen of Europe knew how to appreciate these leading truths.

The war for the succession of Poland being terminated by the peace of 1738, and all the powers of Europe having guaranteed the pragmatic sanction, one might have supposed that no new dispute could, for a very long time arise, to disturb the general repose; but Charles the 6th dying on the 20th October, 1740, only two years afterwards, the succession of Austria caused a general war. Let us mark down the circumstances, and examine them with attention; we may, perhaps, be able to point out the great defects existing in the public right of Europe. But if those defects are not to be remedied, because the princes of Europe do not chuse either to be quiet themselves, or to suffer their neighbours to be quiet, the world as it is, is very well suited to their purpose, for it abounds with seeds of discord, and wars may be perpetuated *ad infinitum*. Charles the 6th published, as far back as the year 1713, a

regulation known under the name of the Pragmatic Sanction, by which, in case of the failure of the male line of his posterity, his daughters should succeed in preference to those of his elder brother Joseph the 1st, and the succession of his daughters should follow the order of primogeniture, and they should inherit, undivided, the whole Austrian monarchy.

He took the greatest pains to have this regulation approved by the states of all his hereditary dominions, as also by the daughters of Joseph his late brother and predecessor, and by their husbands the electors of Saxony and Bavaria; he also obtained the guarantee of the same from all Europe. Spain gave her guarantee in the year 1725: the empress of Russia and the king of Prussia in the year 1726: the king of Great Britain, and the states of Holland, by the second treaty of Vienna in the year 1731: the empire by a result of the diet in the year 1732: the king of Denmark by a separate treaty signed with Russia and Austria in the year 1732: and France acceded at the last treaty of Vienna in the year 1738.

All these guarantees were however insufficient, because the emperor omitted the most essential precaution, which was to place his finances, and his army, on a respectable footing; the state of

exhaustion in which he left the former encouraged several pretenders to start up, and to dispute the succession of Maria Teresa his daughter and heiress.

The principal claimants were first the elector of Bavaria, descendant of Anne of Austria daughter of the emperor Ferdinand the 1st: he pretended that the claim of the first female should be preferred to that of the second, adducing the contract of marriage of that princess with Albert the first of Bavaria, and the testament of Ferdinand the 1st: he insisted that, in virtue of these two acts, the succession of the house of Austria was assured to Anne and her descendants in failure of the male issue of the archdukes her brothers.

Such a plea might be brought before a tribunal in the case of two private individuals, and a question might be entertained concerning the right of a personal inheritance; but where the public right of a state is concerned, the possibility of such a dispute for the succession to a throne should not be admitted. The justice or injustice of the claim of birthright ought not to be put in competition with the peace and repose of empires. In France the Salic law has most wisely provided against this inconveniency: for it is enough for nations to be engaged in wars of ambition or self-

defence, without being embroiled about successions. In the last century similar disputes occasioned the greater part of the disturbances which took place; and if the causes of them can be removed, so that no stranger in right of a female, and indeed no stranger at all, shall or possibly can claim the succession; how great a source of public evil will be dried up!

The second claimant of the Austrian succession was the elector of Saxony, king of Poland, whom Charles had helped to mount the throne in return for his guarantee of the pragmatic sanction; and who claimed the whole Austrian monarchy in right of his wife, who was eldest daughter of Joseph the 1st. If he had such a right, his guarantee of the pragmatic sanction was a barefaced fraud unworthy of a prince; and to be king of Poland he had waved it. The present queen of Wirtemberg might as well pretend to succeed, to the prejudice of the princess of Coburg, in default of the male issue of George the 3d, if the succession of our sovereign was not secure under better auspices than the guarantee of strangers. After such a breach of faith on the part of Saxony, its present king might be told that the dismemberment which his states have lately suffered, was no more than what his predecessors had attempted against others; and that he deserves no more

commiseration than any one who has lost half his fortune at play. The struggle among princes to overwhelm each other is, in fact, on our present system, like the efforts of gamblers at a card table; at which fair play is professed, advantages are taken, and losers, as the proverb says, have leave to rail—but nobody is obliged to pity them. The manifestos addressed to the public by princes, are no more than a part of the game intended to raise a popular cry, and it is the vulgar alone who are the dupes.

The king of Spain next came forward with a claim to the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, founded upon the convention between Philip the 9th and the archduke Ferdinand of Gratz; Philip had consented by this agreement to cede to the archduke, his cousin, the right which he pretended to have on Hungary and Bohemia from his mother Anne daughter of Maximilian the 2d: and had stipulated that his claim should be valid in case of the extinction of the male descendants of that archduke. On such pleas as these it was pretended that two great kingdoms should be ruled by a Spanish viceroy! But the court of Spain, in fact, had no other end in view than to extort a consideration for giving it up, and to get a settlement for another infant of Spain in Italy, at the expence of Austria, this prince having

espoused a daughter of Louis the 15th. If princes, and their advisers, will persist in exciting wars for such considerations as these, it will be unprofitable labour to recommend to their favor, any scheme of amendment in the distribution or relation of Europe, by which its liability to be disturbed would be diminished. Nations must continue to be driven about as live stock, and remain stupid and brutified, till public opinion shall have effectually impressed upon sovereigns, the necessity of manifesting in their political transactions, that they entertain, and act in obedience to, as high a sense of their duty to consult the real interests of the public, as they are wont to entertain, and expect to be entertained, of the duties of loyalty, respect, and obedience from the public to them.

The king of Sardinia next, renewed his pretensions to the dutchy of Milan, founded on the marriage contract of his paternal grandfather, the duke Charles Emmanuel, of Savoy, with the infanta Catharine, daughter of Philip the 2d. king of Spain. The absurdity of this pretension is evident; the war of the succession having disposed of those countries by the treaty of Utrecht, which had terminated the dispute; and the claim to inherit to the prejudice of a living female, in right of a great-grandmother, might be overturned by some

other prince who might claim from even remoter ancestors.

Lastly, the king of Prussia* renewed his claims on several dutchies of Silesia, although, as we have seen, he guaranteed the pragmatic sanction; but these dutchies had been taken from the house of Brandenburg in the thirty years war.

The court of France thought this a proper opportunity to humble the house of Austria, its ancient rival, and the pacific policy of the cardinal de Fleury was overruled by the mareschal de Belleisle, and his brother, who were at the head of the war party in the cabinet.

The elector of Bavaria allied himself with France, on the 18th of May 1741, and the king of Poland, as elector of Saxony, joined this alliance, together with the kings of Prussia and Sardinia, the elector Palatine, and the elector of Cologne. The crown of Germany was offered to the elector of Bavaria; and in order to prevent the Russians from assisting the queen of Hungary, the French, as head of this confederation, projected a treaty for the dismemberment of the Austrian dominions:*

* See the claim of the king of Prussia in his own works, and in Coxe's History of the House of Austria.

* Mr. Gentz, in his fragments on the balance of power, chapter 2d, speaking of the partition system, says, "it was not

Bohemia, and upper Austria, were intended for the elector of Bavaria; the Margraviate of Moravia, and upper Silesia, for the elector of Saxony: the remainder of Silesia, to the king of Prussia; Austrian Lombardy, for the king of Spain: Maria Teresa was to be allowed to keep Hungary, and the low countries, with lower Austria, and the dutchies of Carinthia and Carniola. For the happiness of Europe, this project was not realized in any part, except one, that of giving Silesia to the king of Prussia, which in fact, improved the balance of Germany. To leave to the queen of Hungary the low countries, in such an event, was

known, it was not counted upon, it was scarcely even dreaded, when in the year 1772, the partition of Poland took place." This inaccuracy is the more astonishing, as the project for the partition of the Austrian empire was, as we see, projected in the year 1741: the same kind of scheme, if Sully is to be depended upon, (book 30) was projected by Henry the 4th of France, against Austria: it is surprising he should forget such remarkable circumstances, which confute the whole reasoning of that chapter.

The Abbe du Pradt, has fallen into the same mistake, in his twenty-fourth chapter, on the congress of Vienna, I transscribe his own words:

" Le partage de la Pologne avoit donné le premier example de ces attaques a l'existence des nations, attaques à-peu-près inconnue en Europe depuis la chûte de L'empire Romain et les grandes invasions des barbares. Les changemens ont été presque toujours les résultats de marriages, de successions ou d'accord

worthy of men, who had no notion of political geography; or who had very mischievous designs in view; it seems as if all had been concerted to awaken the Turks from their apathy, and to invite them into Germany. Had this plan been realized, the equipoise of Europe would have been still worse, and more unsteady; but had the Bavarian emperor, succeeded to all Austria, including even Hungary, and abandoned the Italian provinces, and had there been any notion of what du Pradt calls, an European system; certainly the union of Bavaria with Austria, and a strong intermediate empire in Italy on the southern confines of Germany and France, would have displayed some wisdom.

pacifiques." But he forgot that these specific agreements were the effect of violence and war, when the weakest yield always, to the strongest: if no such scheme was brought to perfection like that of Poland, was not the dismemberment of the territory of Henry the Lion, in the reign of Frederic the 1st, a partition? Was not the territory acquired by France, at the treaty of Westphalia, a partition of the Germanic body? Were not the spoils of the counts of Flanders, the dukes of Burgundy, and Lorraine, partitions? Were not the usurpations of the princes of Germany on the empire of Charlemagne, partitions of the kingdom into separate portions? That of Poland of late days, is an invention as old as the Trojan horse, and if it had never been counted upon, as Mr. Gentz tells us, nor understood, how came it that Casimir, king of Poland, should have spoken so clearly in the year 1661.

Such were the motives, and ends, of the war against Maria Teresa; and when we consider the mischief which might have resulted from this coalition, without the least chance of any permanent good, in case of success; we cannot but rejoice at its abortive issue.

It is not necessary to expose the casuistry of the French government, in their answer to the complaints of the queen; a French and Bavarian army, with the elector of Bavaria at its head, took possession of upper Austria; and instead of marching to Vienna, entered Bohemia, where they were joined by the Saxons, and took Prague; in which town the elector was crowned, king of Bohemia. Let us again ask by what right princes complain of violence committed against them by others, or of becoming, in their turns, victims of successful enterprizes against them, while they continue to invade the territories of their neighbours without scruple and without mercy.

Let it however be granted that they are injured: we still persist in our proposition. If the maintenance of the sovereign rights of a prince greatly obstructs the common good, and welfare of nations; if the sacrifice of them is necessary to support a system of evidently beneficial relations among the remaining powers of Europe; if the horrors of almost perpetual

war can be thereby mitigated or diminished, and such balances of power can be erected and preserved, as will be barriers against ambition, and securities against pernicious confederations of, separately, impotent states; and if pride, prejudice, or any base passion should stifle the sentiment of public good in the breast of a reigning prince, so that the desired object can only be relalized by violence: let the injustice be as great as our adversaries would persuade us to think it; let one be said to have a right to complain of another, though all have, in their turns, committed the same crimes in prejudice of the public good which we would excuse them for committing in its favor: yet, if injustice be ever venial, can it ever possess such overwhelming claims to universal pardon, as when it can present testimonials of universal approbation, grounded in the experience of universal good!

The king of Prussia has himself given us a detail of his successes, and to his works we refer the reader for the particulars. The elector of Bavaria was elected emperor, and crowned at Frankfort on the 24th of January 1742, under the title of Charles the 7th.

With the supplies of money obtained from Great Britain and Holland, the queen of Hungary was enabled to make head against so many

enemies: she marched an army against the emperor into Bavaria, which she conquered, and Austria and Bohemia were evacuated.

The queen however sought, by the mediation of Great Britain, to detach Prussia, by ceding to the king the greatest part of Silesia, the negociation succeeded; and the elector of Saxony was included in the peace, on condition of his renouncing his connection with France: like all feeble princes, he now changed sides, after having done no other good than to allure a French army into Germany, which overthrew the balance by reducing the house of Austria to a second rate power, without supplying the deficiency any where else. This was the peace of Breslau and Berlin, concluded 28th of July 1741, and ratified at Vienna, December 20th 1743.

The king of Sardinia now followed the example; he saw that Spain had the same views on Lombardy with himself, and he considered the Austrians to be less troublesome neighbours than the Spaniards: thus he was obliged to retrace his steps, after having allowed himself to be the tool of France, without perceiving his mistake till it was too late to recover it. It is clear, at this day, that if Spain had obtained Lombardy, it could not have kept its ground; after all which has since passed in Italy, it is

wonderful, that the absurdity of repeating the experiment, of erecting such transitory ephemeral dominations, has not yet struck the cabinets of Europe. Thus arose the treaty of Turin, and the result was that the French, being abandoned, were by degrees driven back; and the Spaniards were foiled in their attempt upon Lombardy. George the 2d. at the same time broke his neutrality, and marched to the assistance of the queen.

The court of Austria, in order to keep the king of Sardinia steady to his new plan of politics, thought proper to bribe him by some concessions: by the treaty of Worms in the year 1743, the Vigevanesco and part of the dutchy of Pavia, between Turin and the Po, were ceded to him; also the town of Placentia, with that part of its territory situate within that of Pavia and the part of Anghiera which is in the Milanese, his right on the town and marquisate of Finale were allowed, and the territory was given to him, to procure him in that quarter a communication with the sea. This last article of course offended Genoa, which was in actual possession of Finale. The king of Sardinia renounced his claims on the Milanese, which his successors may again revive, if a new system of public right be not adopted. France, from being simply an auxi-

liary of Bavaria, now became a principal, by declaring war against Austria: she attacked the Austrian Netherlands, took Menin Furnes, Ypres, Knocque; and prepared an expedition at Dunkirk against Great Britain, in order to re-establish the pretender.

Another French army invaded Italy, and attacked the king of Sardinia; it defeated the Piedmontese, and laid siege to Coni: the resistance of the besieged however, and the inundations of the rivers, obliged it to retreat beyond the Alps. The next year the Austrians entered Alsace; the king of France marched to oppose them; and the war was carried on with vigour. And now the king of Prussia violated the peace of Breslau and Berlin, and by a fresh invasion of the Austrian states, obliged prince Charles of Lorraine to fly to the protection of Bohemia.

The king of Prussia, in breaking the peace of Breslau and Berlin, had two objects in view; namely, that of protecting the emperor, whom the queen of Hungary was determined to force to an abdication of the imperial crown; and that of ensuring the conquest of Silesia, which that princess seemed willing to reconquer. These considerations induced him to ally himself anew with France, to oppose the confederation which the queen of Hungary, and the kings of Poland, Great Britain, and Russia, had

made; and by this agreement, which was signed at Versailles, he was to make a powerful diversion on the side of Bohemia, in order to force the Austrians to evacuate Alsace: it was also agreed that one French army should pursue them, and another push into Westphalia.

In order to colour his rupture with the queen, the king of Prussia concluded with the emperor Charles the 7th. a treaty of union (as it was called) which was signed at Frankfort 22 May, 1744: by which, the allied sovereigns agreed to employ their means to oblige the court of Vienna to acknowledge the emperor, and to restore him to his hereditary dominions. In pursuance of this treaty, the king recommenced hostilities by invading Bohemia, in August, 1744: his army entered in three columns; one passed through Saxony, the second by Lusatia, and the third through Silesia, by Brunaw: all these directed their march to Prague, which the king took possession of on the 16th of September, after a siege of six days: the Austrians, however, being joined by the Saxons in consequence of their late alliance, became superior in force, so that the king was obliged to evacuate Prague in November, and to retreat into Silesia.

In the mean time the French had repassed

the Rhine under Marechal Cogny, and laid siege to Fribourg in Brisgaw, about the end of September. The king of France joined the army after his recovery. The town and citadel fell into the hands of the French in November. The Prussian general Seckendorf, supported by a body of French troops, re-entered Bavaria, and the emperor Charles the 7th returned to Munich.

An unforeseen event now changed the face of affairs in the beginning of the year 1745; it was the death of the emperor, which took place on the 20th of Jan. and put an end to the union of Frankfort. Maximilian Joseph his son, and successor, less ambitious than his late father, was inclined to make peace, and make sure of what he actually possessed, the Austrians having at this juncture defeated the Bavarians, and obliged them to retreat beyond Munich. This success, added to the defeat of a French corps under Segur, decided him to think seriously of peace. The treaty was signed at Fuessen, in the diocese of Augsburg. The elector renounced his alliance with France, and was restored to his dominions: he gave up all pretensions in contestation with Austria, and signed afresh, the pragmatic sanction: and he acknowledged the validity of the electoral vote

of Bohemia, and promised to give his own, in favor of Francis, the husband of Maria Teresa, 22 April, 1745.

Before the treaty of Fuessen was concluded, a quadruple alliance was signed at Warsaw by Great Britain, Austria, the king of Poland as elector of Saxony, and the states of Holland, for the re-establishment of peace in Europe. Now, is any one prepared to deny, that all these disorders proceeded from the following causes: the chaotic Germanic system; the disproportion, and superfluous number of independent states; and the intermarriages and claims of succession in right of females? The same system still exists in its full force, and must, in future, produce similar effects. The treaty of 1815 has not adverted to these evils; and of course the stability of that treaty is just as much to be depended on as those, which we have already reviewed. The want of philosophy, in all this, is the more surprising in an age, when every thing is open to investigation: and surely, no subject can be more interesting than one, on which the peace and prosperity of mankind at large depends. The professors of mechanics of all kinds, endeavour to improve the work of their hands on scientific principles: the great statesmen of Europe, like the Irish pea-

sants, can only answer, "Our fathers did so before us, and we neither wish to change, nor do we speculate on any improvement!"

In virtue of the quadruple alliance, the king of Poland, as elector of Saxony, engaged to march into Bohemia with 30,000 men, for the defence of that kingdom: the king of Great Britain promised to pay 100,000*l.* per annum, and Holland 50,000*l.* for this army. Another article of this alliance stipulated, that if the elector of Saxony should be attacked, the allies would defend him with their whole power. Russia, and the republic of Poland, were invited to join this confederacy.

The king of Prussia, now abandoned by his allies and ill supported by France, stood on the defensive: on the opening of the campaign of the year 1745, he intrenched himself in Silesia, where he waited for the attack of the combined forces of Austria and Saxony. In this position, prince Charles of Lorraine, who commanded the Austrians, penetrated into Silesia, and advanced into the plains of Hohenfrieden; the king of Prussia suddenly attacked and defeated him, and the Austrians returned into Bohemia: the Prussians pursued; but the former took so strong a position, that they durst not attack them, and were finally obliged again to retreat into Silesia: being again pursued in their retreat by the Austrians, the Prussians again defeated

them, although with very unequal numbers, near Sorr.

In the interim, the French again entered Germany, and the Austrians were obliged to fall back; but reinforcements joining them, the French were in their turn obliged to retrograde: this last event, produced the election of Francis the 1st. to the imperial throne, but not without an useless protestation, on the part of Prussia, and the Palatinates.

The king of Prussia then fell upon Saxony, whose elector had been one of the instigators of this absurd war, with a view of sharing the spoils of Austria; he had, as we have seen, become its ally. In both respects he was unfortunate; and so will it ever be when little turbulent princes enter into the quarrels of more potent neighbours: but the king had opened a new negociation with the court of London, for peace with Austria; and the kings of Britain and Prussia, signed a convention at Hanover for that purpose: but the queen, who always hoped to recover Silesia, having disdainfully rejected the proposal, the king was determined to bring her to terms by force:* he determined to invade Saxony, and marched to Dresden: the elector fled to Prague; and Leipsic and Meisen, fell into the hands of the Prussians.

* See Coxe's History of Austria.

Prince Charles marched to the relief of Dresden, but the Saxons were already beaten, so that he was again obliged to retreat: Dresden capitulated on the 17th December, and all Saxony was laid under contribution; so much for this little miserable state. Maria Teresa was then obliged to accede to the convention of Hanover, in order to save the Elector of Saxony from utter ruin, and to prevent the addition of Saxony to the conquests of Prussia.

On the 25th of December 1745, peace was signed at Dresden between Austria, Prussia, and Saxony, under the mediation of Great Britain: by this treaty every thing was restored to Saxony; and the electress, who was daughter to the emperor Joseph the 1st. renounced all the right which the pragmatic sanction could give her, in Silesia. The peace of Dresden restored tranquillity to Germany, but the war continued in the low countries, where success attended the French arms, which afterwards were turned against Holland, in order to accelerate a peace which France had no occasion to violate.

In Italy, the French and Spaniards were not so successful; the peace with Prussia having enabled the Austrians to send succours thither.

The defeats which the French fleets suffered

from Great Britain, reduced their maritime power so low, that it remained with only one line of battle-ship fit for sea.

At this crisis, the empress of Russia sent an army to the assistance of the Austrians, under the command of prince Repnin; they marched through Poland, Moravia, and Bohemia, to the Rhine; and this movement accelerated the peace, which all parties seemed now ardently to desire.

Thus ended this war, which after having cost so much to all parties, did not answer the end for which it had been commenced; except the king of Prussia, all the enemies of Maria Teresa were disappointed: Silesia was secured to Prussia; the king of Sardinia after all, lost Finale, though he got those portions of Lombardy which had been ceded to him by the treaty of Worms; the duke of Modena, and the Genoese, were restored to their possessions; only to be deprived of them again, every time an irruption of either French or Austrians should be made into Italy. The definitive treaty was signed at Aix la Chapelle on the 18th November 1748.*

The peace of Aix la Chapelle kept Europe

* The particulars of these events may be seen, by referring to Koch, Abregèe des traties de paix, from which the chief part of this narrative is taken.

quiet for little more than seven years: but such was the unsteady nature of the balance, that the smallest movement was enough to overturn it, and renew the horrors of war.

The rivality existing between Great Britain, and France, for maritime superiority, and colonial empire, could not be settled, without embroiling the continent in their disputes: this seems a proof that a proper equipoise was not yet established; for these disputes might have been decided on the ocean, or in the countries which were the objects of them, if such a balance had existed.

Great Britain considered it necessary, in order to become mistress of the ocean, to cut out work for France upon the Continent. France thought it good policy, in order to bring Great Britain to terms, to seize the electorate of Hanover, and so force the king to make those sacrifices which she required. Men of reflection will decide, according to their own views of the subject, whether a king of the British isles gains or loses, by having dominions on the continent of Europe: if it be advantageous, it is to be regretted that he has not a greater extent of contiguous territory, that his German weight in its concerns might be felt as well as his British influence be regarded. If it be detri-

mental, the possession of Hanover is a milstone about the neck of England. Be it as it may, this new war, which broke out in the year 1756, lasted seven years; and whatever misfortunes happened to Great Britain in its commencement, she was crowned with success in the end: when the whole continent had been devastated, and the Russians again called in to terminate the dispute, everything was nearly restored to its former position; but the king of Prussia remained undisputed master of all Silesia.

In the year 1761, the family compact was made between France and Spain, by which the two kingdoms have been ever since united in a common league whenever a war broke out between Great Britain, and either of them. Thus stood affairs at the peace signed at Hubertsbourg on the 13th February 1763, and at Paris on the 10th February of the same year. We may pass over the American war which happened about that time; for the contest for the independence of America, which ever way it had been decided, would not have affected the Balance of Power in Europe. Great Britain, notwithstanding the loss of her colonies, still maintained her consequence in Europe; and had she preserved them, it scarcely seems

probable she would have played a greater part, than she has done since the accession of King George the Third.

The state of Europe from the peace of Hubertsburgh, to the year 1777, was more calm and prosperous than perhaps it had been since the days of Augustus Cæsar; the whole extent of it seemed to be one confederation: the term, foreigner, was scarcely bestowed on any but an Asiatic; individuals of all nations were intermingled with a liberality and freedom unknown before: sovereigns treated their subjects with decent familiarity: men of letters were encouraged and respected: knowledge extended itself by rapid strides; and the genius and spirit of the age, assumed a totally new aspect. In the midst of this political calm, the evil inherent in the public right of Europe, again broke forth: Bavaria, which had been nearly ruined by the ambitious views of the Elector, was now doomed in its turn to be the object of contestation; and the principal pretender was that very power against which it had directed its own ambitious views.

The younger branch of the house of Wittelsbach becoming extinct by the death of Maximilian Joseph, who died on the 30th December 1777; the disputes which took place for the succession, again troubled Europe, and occa-

sioned a war which, happily, lasted only seventeen months, as it was terminated by the treaty of Teschen on the 13th May, 1779.

Before this event, all Europe conceived that the succession of Bavaria would raise no difficulty,* as the right of the elector palatine, or elder branch of the family, to the whole succession, seemed incontestable. His claims were founded, 1st. on the common feudal right, which called the elector palatine to the inheritance, as the nearest collateral and feudal heir of the late elector, and as being comprised in the first investiture; their common ancestors having conjointly held the two states before the treaty of partition,† in the year 1329, which in fact established the two branches of the palatinate, and that of Bavaria: 2dly. the golden bulle,‡ which had introduced into the electoral houses the order of lineal succession, and the law of indivisibility; which assured the succession to the palatine, in default of the Bavarian branch: 3dly. On the agreement of mutual succession to the surviving branch, made by both parties, on the division in 1329; and renewed by the compacts made in the years 1524, 1724, 1766,

* See Epoch 2d. page 168.

† Here is another treaty of partition, which has escaped Mr. Gentz, and the Abbé du Pradt.

‡ See Pütters, art. Golden Bulle.

1771, 1774; and confirmed by the capitulations of the emperors by the compact of 1774. The elector palatine had been admitted by the elector of Bavaria, to the possession of all the territories comprehended in the compacts made at former successions.

And lastly, on the treaty of Westphalia, art. 4, sect. 9 and 10: which not only assures to the palatine branch, the reversion of the ancient electoral dignity, and of the high palatineate; but also, confirms all his rights, as well as that of the succession of Bavaria.

This is still another proof of the defective state of the public right of nations; all these treaties, all these claims so perfectly certified, were not sufficient to insure the succession without dispute and without the interference of foreigners. Ill regulated finances, and an inadequate military force, had brought the same misfortune on the Austrian empire: the small extent of Bavaria, its want of sufficient inherent strength, now produced the same effect; and if the attempts of other powers, to unite it to their own dominions, have failed, that failure has been the effect of the jealousy of neighbouring states, more than of any means possessed by Bavaria to maintain its own independence. It must also be observed, that the termination of the disputes both for the Ba-

varian and the Austrian successions, afforded no security for the future, in case of the recurrence of a similar opportunity to revive them. Two conclusions may be fairly drawn from these remarks; first, that no treaties are sufficiently strong to support the independence of a state, which has not at the same time extent and resources sufficient to maintain that independence without them: and secondly, that no right of succession will ever be free from contestation, until the reigning houses of Europe lay aside the practice of intermarrying; mortifying as this may be to the high family pride of princes, it is a truth, according to our view of the subject, too weighty to be neglected.

However legitimate, and incontestable, these claims appeared, several pretenders, to considerable portions of the succession came forward: the chief of whom were the empress queen Maria Teresa, the electress dowager of Saxony, and the duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin. The emperor, as emperor, claimed the fiefs of the empire, which had been separately granted to the Bavarian branch by former emperors, after the separation of the two branches in the year 1329: but it was urged, that the palatine branch was not included.

The empress queen, as queen of Bohemia, pretended to reunite to that crown the fiefs of

the upper palatine, which held of the crown of Bohemia, and which had now become vacant by the extinction of the male line of Bavaria: the same princess, as arch dutchess of Austria, laid claim to all the countries and districts of the upper and lower palatinate, which had formerly been held by the line of the Shaubingen, electors of Bavaria, and which became extinct, in the fifteenth century, in the person of the duke John, who died on the 6th Jan. 1425; a claim founded on an investiture of the emperor Sigismond, 10th March, 1726, to duke Albert of Austria, his son-in-law: and finally, she laid claim to the lordship of Mindelheim, situated in the circle of Swabia, in right of a reversion granted by the emperor Matthias, to the house of Austria, and confirmed by succeeding emperors.

The dowager electress of Saxony, as sister to the late duke of Bavaria, claimed all the allodial possessions:

1. Many lands and lordships, which were, purely, allodial.

2. The improvements made in the fiefs.

3. Right to succeed to all the moveable property.

4. The actual debt, and particularly the thirteen millions of florins, with which the upper palatinate was burdened. In order to under-

stand the nature of this transaction, and how this debt was contracted, it is necessary to introduce the following account:

The expences incurred by the duke Maximilian of Bavaria, for re-conquering upper Austria; and Bohemia, for the emperor Ferdinand the 2d in the thirty years war, were estimated at the time at 13,000000 of florins: for this debt, the emperor mortgaged to the duke of Bavaria, upper Austria; but, by an agreement made on the 26th February, 1628, he resumed that province, and sold him, for the same sum, the upper palatinate, and the county of Cham, which he had forcibly taken from the elector palatine, his enemy; and this sale was so conditioned, that if the male line of the house of Bavaria should become extinct, and the upper palatinate should escheat to the imperial crown, or fall to the collaterals of the palatine branch; then the allodial heirs of the last elector should have a right, not only to claim the thirteen millions of florins as the price of the purchase, but also a consideration for the improvements; and that he should keep possession of the upper Palatinate, until the demands should be liquidated. The fourth article of the treaty of Westphalia, section 9, while it stipulates in favor of the elector Palatine, the reversion of

the upper Palatinate, and the county of Cham; in case of the extinction of the male line of the Bavarian branch, reserves expressly to the allodial heirs of the last elector, the property and benefices, which by right belongs to them in the country. The electress dowager of Saxony, in quality of allodial heiress of the last elector of Bavaria, now considered herself authorised, in virtue of that clause of the treaty of Westphalia, to demand the thirteen millions of florins, as an allodial debt of the upper Palatinate.

Here we see, a confusion of ideas of sovereignty with notions of private property: the origin of this may be traced to the pretension to a right in the emperor to sell or mortgage the sovereignty of the Palatinate. Either the emperor was sovereign of Germany, or he was not: if he was not, the sale, at least, was not valid; if he was, it would still he a question, whether he had a right to sell his right; and this would lead us back to the origin of the power of Pharamond, and Clovis. In the whole of this transaction however, the Palatinate is considered as a fief, with certain regalia annexed to it; all nationality is banished; and military despotism seems to be at the bottom; but certainly, no idea of political order can be grounded on such principles: the people of the

Palatinate seem no more to have been considered, than the herds which grazed in its fields! a public right founded on such a basis, is a real parent of jacobinism; and if it is not exploded, jacobinical principles, will increase and multiply as fast as liberal notions of government, and general knowledge, can make room for their developement. Security and protection, in return for veneration and obedience, compose the basis of sovereignty: monarchy, founded on feudal tenure, is obsolete, and acting upon feudal principles, is too corrupt for our times: and if this is the secret of the right of the petty German princes, the sooner they sink into the rank of private individuals the better.

Immediately after the death of the elector of Bavaria, and even before these various pretensions were brought forward, an Austrian army invaded Bavaria, and the upper Palatinate; and took possession, in the name of the emperor, and empress queen of all the countries and districts which those sovereigns claimed: the elector Palatine, intimidated by the court of Vienna, acknowledged, by a convention signed at Vienna on the 3d January, 1778, and ratified at Munich on the 14th, the legitimacy of all the pretensions of Austria: but the duke of Deux-ponts, whose consent was indispen-

sable, because he was heir presumptive to the Palatinate, refused to sign; encouraged by the king of Prussia, who sent the count Gortz to him, he covered his rights by a declaration he made at the diet, on the 16th March following: he was supported by the king of Prussia, who declared the Austrian pretensions to be without foundation, and incompatible with the security, the liberties, and the constitution of the empire.

Here is again another instance of the bad effects produced by the existence of impotent states. Jealousy of Austria, no doubt, prompted the king of Prussia to act as he did; and his conduct was considered as a master-piece of policy: but what was the consequence? he neither strengthened his own monarchy, nor that of Austria; the little miserable states of Germany continued to exist; the French revolution occurred; Germany was conquered because it was divided; and Prussia itself was for some time annihilated*: a series of the most extraordinary events overturned the French power; and the congress of Vienna has now re-established the old system of division, with all its defects, (one might say) to prepare things for the next conqueror who may appear; and

* From the battle of Jena to the downfall of Napoleon.

who will profit by this mistaken policy, to establish an empire perhaps more solid than that of Buonaparte. The king of Prussia having espoused the cause of the elector Palatine,* every thing portended a severe and long contest; but the aversion of Maria Teresa to war at her advanced age, rendered the campaign almost bloodless: The palatine branch, in whose favor all these movements had been made, remained a quiet spectator of the contest: Bavaria, for which the war had been undertaken, was not violated by the march of any hostile army; and the elector, who had even declined the assistance of Prussia, reaped the whole benefit.

Three treaties were signed at Teschen in 1779, which, together, form one: first, a treaty between the empress queen, and the king of Prussia; secondly, a convention between the empress queen and the elector, which regulates the succession of Bavaria, including the claim of the duke of Deuxponts; thirdly, a convention between the empress queen and the elector of Saxony, relative to the allodial succession which the electress had claimed.

By the treaty between the empress queen, and the elector palatine, the former renounces all her claims on Bavaria, by which means a

* See Coxe's Hist. of the House of Austria, chap. xliii.

small state was left between France and Austria, which facilitated the enterprises of Buonaparte at a subsequent period, on the capital of the German empire. The present king of Bavaria is a porter of Germany, as efficient as the king of Sardinia is a porter of Italy; and neither of them have strength sufficient to keep the door shut which is intrusted to their care.

The house of Austria having failed in its pretensions on Bavaria, the emperor Joseph the 2d. endeavoured to obtain by negociation, what he had failed to acquire by force. His plan, according to our view, was a very good one; he would have exchanged the low countries for Bavaria, and thus strengthened himself on the Upper Rhine, and got rid of the barrier treaty; which burdened him with the defence of a country almost out of his reach. He got the concurrence of Russia to this project, and the consent of the elector palatine; but as this did not suit the views of the little insignificant duke of Deuxponts, the king of Prussia again interfered, and overturned the whole scheme: he opposed this commutation on the score of the danger to the equilibrium of Germany: he might also have adduced the treaties of Utrecht, and the barrier which expressly forbad that any other, but the house of Austria, should hold the Netherlands. The king of Prussia carried his

point, and the equilibrium of Germany was preserved; consequently, Austria and Hungary were invaded by Buonaparte, and Prussia was conquered; and these consequencess would have been permanent, had it not been for the indiscretion of Buonaparte, and the frosts of Russia!

In consequence of these transactions, a confederacy was signed at Berlin, on the 25th of July, 1785, by the king of Prussia, and the princes of Saxony and Brunswick Lunenburg; this agreement renewed the ties existing, and is purely defensive; it had for its object the preservation of the Germanic system, and of the possessions of all its members: these rights have since been violated by the treaty of Vienna, 1815; and while great precautions have been taken to shut the door of Germany on the side of France, a back door has been opened to admit all the hords of Siberia, through Germany, into the heart of Europe! The wisdom of these arrangements is inconceivable!

Having traced lightly the great events which transpired from the treaty of Utrecht to the year 1779, it is now necessary to recur to the affairs of the northern powers; to shew the course of events during the same space of time, from the early part of the eighteenth century to the final division of Poland in our days.

By the peace of Nystad, where we left the affairs of Sweden in the foregoing epoch, the the principal articles of which were the same with the treaty of Oliva, the independence of Poland was guaranteed; and the very next article confirms a German on the throne.

By the sixth article, it was agreed that Poland and Sweden should unite to check the preponderance of Russia: subsequent events have proved how well this plan was concerted.

We now come to a remarkable historical fact, which requires a more minute attention, namely the war which was terminated by the peace of Abo, on the 18th of August, 1743.

The treaties of Stockholm and Nystad, seemed to have established the peace of the north on a solid foundation. Denmark has enjoyed its effects, without interruption, until the year, 1814, if we except the British attack on Copenhagen in the year 1807. Sweden however thought proper to take up arms against Russia, at the very moment when the great powers of Europe were engaged in the contest for the succession of Austria.*

In order to comprehend the motives of this war, it is necessary to consider the position in which the affairs of Sweden then stood. The

* Koch. Peace of Abo, vol. iii.

government had been aristocratic since the revolution of 1720, which took place after the death of Charles the 12th: at that period the crown was deprived of many of its prerogatives; the kings were merely presidents of the council which governed the country. The history of these events is too well known to require a detail here, and this work is intended for such readers as have previously turned their attention to the study of history.

In this order of things, (as it always happens in countries where there are too many to assist in its councils) two factions divided the state; the chief of the one was count Horn; of the other, the count Gyllenborg; the former, whose policy was pacific, endeavoured to keep up a good intelligence with Russia and Great Britain: the latter, excited by the French cabinet, breathed nothing but war. The mass of the nation, and, above all, the young nobility, was devoted to the war faction; and this party, seconded by the influence of count St. Severin, the French minister, succeeded in getting into office. The count Horn, and his party, resigned the helm to count Gyllenborg, and his associates.

Animated by a desire for war, the Swedes thought the moment now arrived when Russia was to be humbled, and the lost provinces were

to be recovered: advantage was to be taken of the war which had broken out between Turkey and Russia: they made a treaty of subsidy with France, and a defensive alliance was proposed to be made with Turkey against Russia.

Hostilities would have immediately commenced, if the Turks, on whose assistance the Swedes had reckoned, had not made a peace with Russia at Belgrade. Russia too, was threatened with intestine troubles on the death of the empress Anne, and on the accession of the young Ivan, in the year 1740; the princess Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the great, intrigued for her own elevation to the throne, and was encouraged by the court of France, whose object it was to keep Russia employed in the North in order to prevent her from giving any assistance to Maria Teresa in the war of the succession. These considerations induced Gyllenborg and his party to declare war, which was effected in an extraordinary diet, convoked at Stockholm, on the 4th of August, 1741: in the manifesto published on the occasion, Russia was reproached with some infractions of the last treaty, the exclusion of the princess Elizabeth, and the duke of Holstein Gottorp, from the throne of Russia, and the assasination of General Sinclair, the Swedish minister at the Porte.

Sweden did not take a single step which prudence ought to have dictated in declaring war against so formidable an enemy as Russia.* She had but few troops in Finland, which was, of course, to be the theatre of war: and, as there were no magazines, the few troops she had there could not be kept together for want of subsistence. The count of Lowenhaupt, who was to command the Swedish army, was no wise distinguished for military talents; his only merit was that of being devoted to the war party: a hope was indeed cherished, that the Turks would renew the war against Russia; and great advantages were expected to result from the alliance with France.

The first campaign produced the defeat of a Swedish corps of 5000 men, and the loss of Wilmanstrand.

The revolution which took place at Petersburg, in the end of the year 1741, and which dethroned Ivan, and placed Elizabeth on the throne; seemed at first to portend peace, and the empress herself was not averse to it; a suspension of arms was agreed on, and a negociation opened between the two cabinets.

The Swedish ministry, actuated by the same principles of policy which had first im-

* Koch.

pelled them to the war, flattered themselves that by the diversion they had made in Finland they had contributed to place the empress on the throne, and they thought proper in consequence to rise in their pretensions: they demanded the restitution of all Finland, part of Carelia, and the town of Wiborg; but Elizabeth, resolved to cede nothing of what her father had conquered, replied by offering them indemnification in money; which being rejected the war recommenced. The campaign of 1742 was still more adverse to the Swedes: their general proved so unskilful, that though his army equalled the Russians in numbers he was obliged to retreat before them; and abandoning every post, one after another, he retired to Helsingfors, on the Swedish side of the Kimene.

The Russians, who pursued, occupied the road to Abo; and the Swedes were cut off from all communication by land with their own dominions; the sea remained open to them some time afterwards, but the Russian fleet appearing, the Swedish navy, being unable to cope with the enemy, retreated, so that the army was blockaded by sea and land.

Lowanhaupt being recalled, a general Bousquet took the command, and shortly after concluded a shameful capitulation: ten Finlandish regiments were disbanded; the Swedish corps

alone were allowed to return home; and all Finland was ceded to Russia.

This unsuccessful campaign awakened the Swedes from their dream of glory, and opened their eyes to the imbecility of their rulers.

The diet now assembled to deliberate on the present state of affairs; and the measure of naming as heir presumptive to the throne a prince who might be agreeable to Elizabeth, was considered as the surest step towards an accommodation; with these motives, the states offered the succession of Sweden to the duke Charles Peter Ulric of Holstein Gottorp, nephew of Elizabeth. This piece of servility however was of no service, for that princess named the duke of Holstein heir to the Russian sceptre; and in consequence of her declaration he publicly embraced the Greek ritual.

Disappointed in this project, the Swedes next threw their eyes on Denmark, and proposed the crown prince; by which means the two crowns would have been reunited. The empress, who of course was actuated by Russian politics, looked on such an union as an obstacle to the aggrandisement of her empire, it being a principle of her government to encroach to the westward; she determined therefore to relax in her pretensions, to prevent that union. She offered to restore a great part of her conquests on condition that the Swedes

would name Frederic, of Holstein Gottorp, bishop of Lubec, which they agreed to.

This election took place on the 4th of July, 1743, in spite of the opposition of the Dalecarlians and others, who were for the prince of Denmark, and it promoted the conclusion of the peace at Abo in Finland.

Thus the Russians, by placing whom they pleased on the thrones of Poland and Sweden, and by holding back in all wars till all parties were nearly weary, by degrees became arbiters in all the affairs of Europe, which they have made subservient to the extension of their own empire.

By the treaty of Abo, Russia retained Finland as far as Fredericsham; and the footing she preserved in it has, at last, procured her the whole of that province.

The union of the three kingdoms of the north was at the same time prevented; and by the election of a prince of Holstein Gottorp, the house of Russia may one day lay claim to the throne of Sweden.

This event is not far distant; it does not however seem to have struck the negociators at Vienna in 1815, who ought, instead of acquiescing in the choice of Bernadotte, to have insured the succession of Denmark; a policy which would have furnished some of the principal means of improving the balance of Europe, and of stop-

ping in that quarter the further progress and aggrandisement of the colossal empire of Russia.

Mr. Coxe begins the fortieth chapter of his History of the House of Austria by a reflection on the melancholy task of describing the dismemberment of Poland: it appears to us to be one of the most useful lessons of its kind to be drawn from history. With whatever pain we may contemplate the subjection of a brave and high-spirited people to a foreign despot, we may reflect, much to our advantage, upon the natural operation of their vicious system of government upon every order of the state; its tendency to corrupt the execution of the administrative and judicial power; its unavoidable pliability to circumstances which at one time favoured the designs of an aspiring chief; at another, the arrogant pretensions of a haughty nobility; and at all, the ultimate object of both, the oppression of the people. We may reflect upon the effects of a never-ceasing conflict of interests, all equally at variance with that of the commonwealth, and follow them through the vicissitudes of tyranny and treason; intrigues, opposition, and rebellion; of public admonitions from surrounding nations, and domestic improvidence; of wilful blindness, and perhaps wilful perversity: till pride without power, and prowess without prudence, matured at length the bitter fruits of anarchy, the slavery of the people, and the subjugation

of the country. Whoever considers the form of Polish polity will acknowledge that the debility of that kingdom originated in the defects of its constitution, and was continued till its dissolution, without any fortunate attempt on the part of its government or of the people to fortify and improve its condition. Its dissolution was long foreseen, and we think ought not to be regretted*. Nobody would ever have suggested the idea of a balance of power, if experience had shewn that states might depend on the virtue and forbearance of their neighbours for their independence; if, therefore, the necessity of a balance be admitted, aggression and injustice must be admitted to have a positive existence also: then why not consider aggression and injustice as essential parts of the machinery of human affairs? We agree that this is lamentable, but to deplore or to declaim against it will not remedy the evil. All the obloquy thrown on Russia, Prussia, and Austria, may be very well founded, but it has not induced any one of them to renounce the fruits of its injustice; the mischief

* By a concurrence of extraordinary events, arising from the mutual jealousy of the European powers, Turkey remains like an ivy-mantled ruin tottering to its fall: but it is not in the nature of things that in its present state of inferiority to its neighbours it can long occupy the ground it stands on; the rapid progress of human affairs must, in spite of all treaties, crumble this ruin, and the space must be occupied by an edifice of more modern structure.

is now done, and it is without remedy. If a similar opportunity were to occur in any other quarter, every neighbour would be as ready to fall on as those we have mentioned, and all the moralizing of the best men would not prevent it: it is from sound principles of policy and their resolute application, that the only effectual prevention can be expected to proceed *.

The astonishing confusion and anarchy of Poland excited, of course, the cupidity of the neighbouring monarchs, who now thought fit to turn it to their advantage. It is pretty clear, however, that the first mover of the plan of partition was Frederic king of Prussia. It is not necessary to detail the means he used to get it adopted by the other courts. A dispute respecting those who were not of the predominant religion first occasioned foreign influence. When the project of dismemberment was finally agreed on, cordons of troops were drawn along the frontiers to prevent the pretended or expected incursions of the Poles, and also to guard against the plague, which it was said had found its way into the countries bordering on the Turkish frontier. In these operations the Prussian and Austrian troops had raised contributions on the Polish territory. The Prussian line extended from Crossen to the opposite side of the Vistula, and covered all Prussia proper: the king

* See Coxe's House of Austria, chap. 40.

designing to defend a province which communicated with his German territories *.

The occupation of several districts of Poland by the Austrians, in the year 1771, had suggested to Frederic the idea of a plan of partition, which he considered as the only means of avoiding a general war which was on the point of breaking out. The court of Vienna now pretended to lay down the law to Russia, to prevent her from transferring the theatre of war beyond the Danube; and even to force her to restore to the Turks Wallachia and Moldavia, in order to maintain, according to her view, the balance of Europe! hoping, at the same time, to induce the Porte to cede to itself all those provinces which she had been forced to give up at the treaty of Belgrade.

War having begun between Austria and Russia, the king of Prussia thought he could well avoid taking a part, in virtue of the treaties existing between the empress of Russia and himself. His plan for preventing war, and conciliating the interests of the different powers, was to invite them to join together in the dismemberment of Poland. He conceived that Russia would be so amply repaid by what she would gain in Poland, that the empress would no longer refuse to restore the Turkish provinces: he also saw that by this

* Koch, vol. 3.

means alone the chief obstacle to the peace with Turkey would be obviated; that Austria would also reap advantages in this partition of more importance than any thing to be hoped from the Turkish alliance.

Had Poland been in the full force and vigour of political health, such reflections could not have occurred to the Prussian monarch; for, being able to act from her own internal impulse, she would have presented an aspect which would have commanded more respect: but Poland seemed to cherish a government incompatible with the very intention of human society. It was not Prussia who inspired the Poles to rush into anarchy; but it was the business not only of Prussia, but of every other neighbour, to profit by that anarchy, if it could be made innocently serviceable to their respective empires. The king of Prussia, considering the position of his own territories in the vicinity of Russia and Austria, and the disproportion of them to those of his neighbours, was naturally led into the course which he adopted as indispensible to his interests; and he has given very good political reasons for his conduct himself, which the reader may see by consulting his posthumous works, vol. v. p. 58, Berlin edition. The king therefore communicated his project of partition to the empress of Russia, who was disposed to enter into his views; she saw therein an ex-

pedient to relieve herself from her embarrassing situation with the court of Vienna; and was flattered with the idea of being able to extend her empire without danger, and of indemnifying the king of Prussia for the subsidies she had received from that power: for the present, however, she confined herself to declaring, that before she took a decided part the king should sound the inclinations of Austria.

Prince Kaunitz was at that time too full of his project of alliance with the Porte, and the advantages he hoped to reap from it for Austria, to relish the proposal of his Prussian majesty; he looked on it as fraught with insurmountable difficulties, and feared besides, that the alliance with France, which was in fact his own work, would suffer from it: he therefore declared to that prince, that the court of Vienna, so far from adopting the proposal, which could only tend to embroil the affairs of Europe, was ready to evacuate the district which it had occupied in Poland, provided the other powers would do the same*.

This answer from the Austrian minister did not disconcert the king of Prussia; he foresaw that the court of Vienna would change its sentiments as soon as Russia and Prussia were agreed, and that Austria would prefer a share in the partition

* See Favier Polit. des Cabinets.

to the danger of a war with two such formidable enemies.

With a view to take advantage of this circumstance he renewed his negociation with St. Petersburg. Various events concurred to second his views: the motions of the army of Hungary; the difficulties which Austria, in quality of mediatrix, objected to a peace with the Porte; the imperious tone in which it explained itself on the articles of that peace, which it affected to consider as inadmissible; and a report of a treaty of subsidy which Austria was said to be negociating at Constantinople; all these events made the empress of Russia apprehend that a rupture with Austria would be inevitable. Sensible, therefore, that she would stand in need of the assistance of Prussia, she no longer hesitated to enter into negociations with the king about the means of effectuating the partition, which were opened immediately. They were both long and difficult; they occupied the two cabinets from June, 1771, until the month of February, 1772.

On the one hand, Prussia complained of the extent to which the Russians pretended to carry their new acquisition, and the Russians were displeased that, in this division, the towns of Dantzic and Thorn should be comprised in the share destined to fall to Prussia, as the king requested. A long dispute on the subject of Dantzic took place, whose freedom had been guaranteed by Russia,

and was at the same time secretly supported by Great Britain. Russia required that Prussia should assist with all her force in case of an attack from Austria; while Russia proposed to send no reciprocal assistance to Prussia before peace with the Porte was signed. The attention of the king of Prussia was chiefly directed to engage Russia to agree to the restitution of Wallachia and Moldavia, without which there were no means of avoiding a general war, nor of bringing the court of Vienna to take part in the partition of Poland.

The Russians having at last given up this principal point, the king of Prussia made no further difficulty to promise the empress the unconditional assistance she requested: he saw clearly that the restitution of the conquests between the Dniester and the Danube would confirm Austria in the pacific disposition which he thought he might safely attribute to that power. The king of Prussia also gave up his pretensions to Dantzic, wisely judging that the master of the Vistula and of the port of Dantzic would not fail, sooner or later, to be also master of the city; he, therefore, did not think it worth while to delay a negociation of such importance, for an advantage which was in fact only deferred.

A secret convention was signed at Petersburg between Russia and Prussia on the 17th February, 1772, by which the respective limits of the shares

were settled, and of which each guaranteed to the others the possession: it was also agreed to invite Maria Teresa to take a part; the king of Prussia promised to send twenty thousand men into Poland, to assist Russia in case the war became general; and to declare himself openly against the Austrians if the first assistance should not be sufficient.

This agreement between the cabinets of Berlin and Petersburg brought on a fresh discussion with Austria, whom it was necessary to persuade to accede; and Prince Kaunitz was reduced to the alternative of choosing between the partition of Poland, or a war with Russia and Prussia: much as he was convinced that the partition of Poland was to be preferred, the fear he felt of disturbing the good understanding with France kept him for some time in suspense.

The remounting of the Prussian cavalry, which was executed with the greatest rapidity, shewed to the court of Vienna the decided resolution of the king, and that there were no means of preventing the partition of Poland without, at the same time, declaring war with the two powers; a measure at that time by no means suitable to Austria, as she had not a single ally on whom she could depend. Austria was therefore obliged to concur in the partition, in order to maintain a kind of balance between herself and the two co-partitioning powers.

In agreeing to this step, Prince Kaunitz required the signature of an act, by which it was agreed to observe a perfect equality in the partition; this point having been agreed on, a negociation was opened to settle the proper means of equalizing it.

It was necessary at first to moderate the excessive pretensions of the court of Vienna, which had a little before shewn so many scruples of conscience, and now carried its views to an extent of country amounting to the third part of all Poland; and it was with the greatest difficulty that the others succeeded to make the Austrians renounce their claim to the palatinates of Lublin, Chelm, and Belez, which they had chalked out for themselves. This being settled, it was resolved to lose no time in signing the triple convention for the division, which was concluded at Petersburg by the ministers of the three courts on the 25th July, old style, or the 5th August, new style, 1772. It is expressed in the preamble of this treaty, that "the spirit of faction, of trouble, and intestine discord, by which Poland had been agitated for some years, and which increased every day, gave just apprehensions of the pending dissolution of the state, leading directly to disturb the relations and harmony of the neighbouring monarchies: that the powers bordering on Poland having claims on that country as ancient as they were legitimate,

for which they never yet could obtain any indemnification, and which they now were in danger of irretrievably losing; they owed it to themselves to put these rights on a proper footing, and at the same time to take measures for the re-establishment of tranquillity and good order in the kingdom, and for insuring to Poland a political existence agreeable to the interest of its neighbours. The treaty proceeds to regulate the limits of those districts which were to fall to the share of the respective contracting parties; they mutually guarantee the new acquisitions, and engage to act in concert, in order to make a definitive agreement with Poland on these heads, and also all that may refer to the re-establishment of good order and peace in the interior. The empress of Russia wishing to hasten her peace with Turkey, and to engage the empress queen and the king of Prussia to concur by their good offices, agreed neither to insist on the possession nor even the independence of Wallachia and Moldavia. The first of September, old style, was therefore fixed on for taking possession of the places and districts designated, and the parties agreed to keep the treaty secret until that period.

In conformity with this last disposition of the treaty, the declaration and letters patent of the three courts were presented at Warsaw in the month of September, 1772; at the same time the

armies of the three powers took possession of the provinces of Poland whose dismemberment had been agreed on, and justificatory pieces were published respecting the claims of the three powers to the countries they seized.

Conferences were opened at Warsaw in a diet assembled for that purpose; a confederation was formed under the auspices of the three courts, to which the king and nobles were forced to accede: the diet named a committee, drawn from the senate and equestrian order, to whom they entrusted the care of transacting matters with the plenipotentiaries of the partitioning powers concerning the articles of the treaties, by which the provinces now taken possession of should formally be ceded by the republic. These were signed at Warsaw on the 18th September, 1773, and afterwards ratified by the diet.

Many articles to the advantage of the respective powers and their subjects were referred to an ulterior scrutiny; there were also some relating to the constitution of Poland, and some to those persons professing various forms of worship, which required great delicacy; but these having no relation to the object of the present work may be passed over.

The king and the republic of Poland ceded by this arrangement to Austria, in virtue of letters patent dated 11th September, 1772, all the right

bank of the Vistula, from the borders of Silesia to beyond Sendomir, and the conflux of the Sar; thence drawing a straight line to Francopol, Zamosc, Rubieszow, as far as the Bug; and following the old frontier of Red Russia beyond that river, which is at the same time that of Volhynia and Podolia, to the neighbourhood of Zbarag; thence in a straight line to the Dniester, along the river Podgorge to its confluence with the Dniester, and thence the old frontier between Pocutia and Moldavia.

The territory ceded to Austria by this article contains thirteen cities of the province of Zips, which Sigismond king of Hungary had mortgaged to Poland in the year 1412; nearly half the palatinate of Red Russia, the greater portion of the province of Belez, Pocutia, and part of Podolia. The towns of the country of Zips were incorporated anew with Hungary, from which they had been from that time dismembered: the remaining part of the country was erected into a province, and comprised under the name of Gallicia and Ludomeria. These states were estimated to contain 1300 imperial square leagues, and a population of 2,700,000 souls; and a particular advantage accrued to Austria from the salt-mines of Wieliska, of Bochnia, and Sambor, which furnish all Poland. The treaty with Russia contained a cession, first of the remainder of Polish Livonia, as well as that part of the palatinate of

Polozk situated behind the Dwina, and the palatinate of Witepsk; so that the Dwina should become the frontier of the two states near to the provincial limit which separates the two palatinates, to that point where the three palatinates of Witepsk, Polozk, and Minsk, join each other. From that point the limits of the two states were prolonged in a straight line near the source of the river Drujec, in the vicinity of a place called Ordowa, and thence, in following the last river to its confluence with the Dnieper, from which point the Dnieper became the frontier of the two states, keeping to Kiew and its district, its limits on that side of the river.

By this treaty Russia obtained, besides Polish Livonia, the greater part of the palatinate of Witepsk, the principal part of that of Polozk, all the palatinate of Misislow, and the two extremities of that of Minsk: all these countries and districts form at this day the government of Polozk and Mohilow; their extent is greater than that of the Austrian share, but the population did not exceed 1,800,000 souls.

Prussia obtained all Pomerelia, except the town of Dantzic, and the district of Great Poland on the Prussian side of the river Netze, pursuing this river from the frontiers of the New Marche to the Vistula, near Fordor and Solitz; so that the Netze formed the Prussian frontier, and belonged

exclusively to Prussia; and besides this, all Polish Prussia, the palatinate of Marienburg, the town of Elbing, comprehending the bishopric of Varmia and the palatinate of Culm, except the town of Thorn, which, with its territory, remained to Poland.

The part of Poland which was not at this time dismembered, was in itself too feeble long to ward off the second blow which obliterated the Poles from the list of nations at a later period.

The interval between the first and second dismemberment was employed by Russia in aggrandising itself. The war which broke out in the year 1787, not only confirmed the former acquisition of the Crimea and the navigation of the Black Sea, but by the check which the Swedes received, the lines of circumvallation have been completed which Russia has for a century past being drawing round Europe.

In the month of May, 1791, the Poles, thinking to take advantage of the war between Russia and the Porte, assembled a diet; the best men among them felt the inconveniences of the new system of government, and were determined, if possible, to obviate them. A new constitution was formed, in which the crown was rendered hereditary, and the *liberum veto* was abolished. This system, though defective, was a great improvement, and the partitioning powers took the

alarm; they insisted on the re-establishment of the old system, which had furnished them with the pretext to divide Poland, and thus defended the very order of things on which, for their own security, they had pretended to ground their aggressions. The Poles unprepared for war, the nobles jealous of arming the peasants, were overwhelmed by their enemies, and Poland finally divided*.

These are the great events which have changed the face of Europe down to the revolutionary war; the partition of Poland was the last on ancient principles. It has been the fashion to deplore the miserable end of Poland; and yet it cannot be denied that the nobility, jealous of their own privileges, so oppressed their country that the ground may be said to have slipped from under their feet. If the leading men in any nation choose for their own ill-judged interests to destroy their means of defence, they must not complain if they are finally deprived of a power which they had not the discretion to use.

In the fate of Poland the national pride alone has suffered: the nobility lost their lawless independence; but the peasantry, even in the Russian portion, were governed by milder laws than under their own nobles, who certainly are not to be pitied for being deprived of the means of any

* See Annual Register from 1791 to 1795.

longer exciting trouble and confusion in their native land.

We propose to close this epoch with the partition of Poland. The French revolution is so well known, its events are so recent in the memory of men, that any detail would be needless; we shall therefore endeavour in the next concluding chapter to reason from the whole of this picture, in order to shew the defects in the European system; and although the remedies we have to propose be not easy to execute, still we conceive it must be felt that unless something of the kind be adopted, no amelioration in the public right of Europe can be expected.

CONCLUSION.

The reader, who has had the patience to peruse the foregoing pages with attention, will have nearly anticipated the object of the remainder. We have endeavoured to shew the grounds on which we consider the international system of Europe as defective. The whole complicated machine has grown through many ages into its present deformity, from, originally, fortuitous combinations, and concurrences of various circumstances, in various manners, without any perceptible influence from the foresight, or prudence, or political genius of the statesmen who have successively managed it; and if ever it should become the sincere wish of the most powerful members of the confederation of Europe to remedy these defects and deformities, it is evident they must strike boldly at the root of them, and abolish those political maxims which still display their barbarous origin, and continue to reproduce their original effects.

We have seen what intricate claims have been brought forward to prove that every portion of the whole continent belongs to any body but the actual possessor: we have seen the

mixture of military possession with legal acts; countries at one time conquered by force of arms, at another mortgaged for money, at another settled on younger children, and separated from the political body of the states; wills, settlements, letters patent, all combining to increase the intricacy and confusion, and to create incompatible and jarring interests; that disputes without end have arisen, and large masses of mankind have been prevented from taking such political forms as would have best suited their local situation and their relative interests; at other times we have seen great aggregations of territory, for they could scarcely be considered as states, passing, by the extinction of a reigning family, under the dominion of sovereigns of other realms, and forming with them motley combinations, which sometimes, indeed, produced a salutary effect by consolidating contiguous tracts, and giving them the strength and security of one national body; but at others, overturned established relations, shook existing balances of power, and caused wars by which the whole continent was desolated.

If we consider the present state of the great community of this quarter of the globe, we cannot disguise from ourselves that similar causes of dispute are just as likely to operate in these times as it is certain that they have operated in the past; that every day may produce similar or equally

obnoxious conjunctures and changes, and that in such contests, similar or equal danger exists; that some primary power may start forward, and either overwhelm the rest, or ruin them, by new, long, and exhausting wars. The example of France, in these last times, is sufficient to admonish us, and as its evidence is recent and irresistible, we may hope that it will not be disregarded: a view of the map of Europe as it stood during the meridian of Bonaparte's power, will shew that his success was founded, first, on the total subversion of Italy; secondly, on the formation of his confederation of the Rhine; and thirdly, from the knot of little feeble states which, from their want of union, had been unable to resist him, and therefore became his allies, or more properly his vassals *. The treaty of Vienna has, however, restored these without any essential improvement: the confederation of the Rhine is dissolved, but its materials are preserved; and Italy has changed its patrons without improving its

* Les Cananéens furent détruits; parce que c'étoient de petites monarchies, qui ne s'étoient pas confédérées, et qui ne se defendirent pas en commun. C'est que la nature des petites monarchies n'est pas la confédération. La république fédérative d'Allemagne est composée de villes libres et de petits états soumis à des princes. L'expérience fait voir qu'elle est plus imparfaite que celle de Hollande et de Suisse.

Montesquieu esprit des loix, Livre ix. cap. 2.

fortunes. If in the present moment there is no danger of Italy being invaded by a French army, it is because that peninsula is entirely under the Austrian power; for of whatever nature may be the relations of Vienna with Naples, it is pretty evident that the former will exercise the chief influence; whether this influence will be stable, and how far it will strengthen the Austrian empire, or give security to Italy, may be conjectured, if not determined, by looking into the history of past times. The right to the crown of Naples, if we examine the title deeds of that kingdom, is perhaps more disputable than any in Europe; for let us recollect that the popes, who used to think that every thing they saw was their own, in order to deprive the descendants of the Swabian emperors, on whom it had devolved in right of a female, chose to give it to Charles of Anjou: in the same equitable spirit they afterwards promoted the massacre of the French, in order to give the same investiture to the kings of Aragon. By this family it centered in Ferdinand and Isabella, and became a part of the Spanish monarchy: the house of Austria, in the person of Charles the Fifth, who succeeded to the crown of Spain through another female, became master of Naples; and when the Spanish branch of that house became extinct, and the treaty of Utrecht placed a French prince on the throne of

Spain, the kingdom of Naples remained with Austria till the dispute for the succession of Poland, after the death of Augustus the Second. In that war, as we have seen, Naples was conquered by Don Carlos, who transmitted it to his younger son, the present king.

Don Carlos had the same right to the kingdom of Naples as Murat; both held it by right of conquest: yet we say that the treaty of Vienna restored the legitimate sovereign. What is the meaning of the term *legitimate sovereign?* If conquest gives the right, Murat was conqueror as well as Don Carlos; if Murat had no right by conquest, neither had Don Carlos any right by conquest. The last conquerors were the Austrians, who drove Murat away: does the present king hold his power in right of a donation from the emperor? Is he the vassal of the emperor? When these questions are answered, we must, after all, acknowledge the right of conquest, or have none at all!

Whoever holds his crown by right of conquest, cannot pretend to deny the same right to one who, being stronger than himself, chooses to drive him out. The house of Austria once possessed Naples, which it lost by interfering in Polish affairs: should the throne of that kingdom become vacant, will it revert to a younger branch of the Spanish house of Bourbon, or will it go to the emperor, in

right of his first wife? Queens have reigned in Naples, and may reign again: but the least fallible answer to this question is, that it will belong to him who has the sharpest sword.

In Sweden, when the death of the present king, who was duke of Sudermania, takes place, a dispute for the succession seems not improbable. There may be four competitors: the young king, who was dethroned; Bernadotte; the king of Denmark; and the emperor of Russia. Is it likely that Russia will neither advance her own claim, in right of Christian Augustus, great uncle of Peter III. (the duke of Holstein Gottorp Christian Albert, who died in the year 1694, being the founder of the royal families both of Sweden and Russia), nor interfere at all in such an event? We have seen Russia in the war which preceded the treaty of Abo, oppose the renewal of the union of the three kingdoms of the north with all her might; is it probable she will allow that union to be accomplished if it should be again attempted, while she has the means to prevent it?

The elector of Hanover has obtained the title of king; he has got a little province or two added to his miserable and dreary sands; he has added nothing essential to his own power. If ever the house of Brandenburg should share the fate of Poland, by being forced to yield eastern and western Prussia to the Russians, which the latter may

seize for the least misbehaviour, another little prince would be crowded into the country west of the Elbe, which would become the weakest part of Europe, and of course the most open to the intervention of strangers. Among the evil effects, in general politics, of the division of a country among small princes, this is remarkable, that there is never any one ready to defend it; on the approach of a powerful enemy they all fly like crows and vultures from a carcass as soon as the sportsman appears, and return not until he has left the field.

The Germanic body has been seen in all the epochs we have run through, to have been too feeble to prevent strangers from interfering in its affairs; and is it not matter of wonder, that history should speak with so little effect to those who have superintended public affairs, and are still occupied in continual negociations in great congresses, for the professed purpose of pacifying the disturbances and securing the tranquillity of nations? Is it possible that they should not have felt the inconveniences of the feudal sovereignty of the emperors over the other princes of Germany, particularly in preventing united action? But since Bonaparte's wars have dissolved these connections, which had so evidently been proved to be the causes of incessant evil, we ought no longer to pretend that it is impracticable to abolish other de-

fects which as evidently obstruct the improvement of our international system.

These feudalities parcelled out states on no rational plan of equipoise: accident, caprice, the chances of war, the fortune of families, all concurred to throw together this chaos. The natural result has been an alternation of contentions and conventions without end; and as those were commenced, these were concluded without consulting the national interest. From the frontiers of Holland to the banks of the Elbe, at this day, cities and districts are parcelled out like private estates on a great scale; a national feeling among the inhabitants is either unknown or stifled; each portion is weak in itself, and its present distribution must be liable to eternal change and eternal contestation: it can be of no use to itself; it can afford no efficient support to others: but like a collection of rook's nests, which a gust of wind dislocates, these little principalities are liable to be overrun and plundered in every political squall. Were there no such clusters of small independencies in Germany and Italy, there would be no commodious theatre for war: powerful princes would be obliged to attack the territories of powerful princes, and the simple construction of the European system would not only be better understood, but fewer clashing interests would exist, to produce the motley arrangements which

are exhibited in every treaty. The solid and compact states of Europe would be less liable to be shaken on every sudden emergency; fewer causes of disorder would arise; and whatever differences might occur, it would be so difficult to gain any decisive advantage by hostilities, that negociation would come more quickly, as well as more seriously, to the relief of nations.

It is on these grounds, and for others which may yet appear, that we cannot consider the treaty of Vienna to have more stability than that of Utrecht, or any subsequent treaty. It is not very likely that the remedies we have to submit to consideration will be easily adopted; but it may be allowed us to suppose, that things will go on in the same manner until in the general congresses for the peace of Europe some attention is paid to the causes which so often disturb it. The opportunity which now presents itself to Russia to interfere in the affairs of Germany, already illustrates, and will probably confirm, our reasoning upon this subject. The new confederation of Germany, notwithstanding the abolition of the feudal investitures and the feigned supremacy of the Emperor, has all the defects of the old at the time of the treaty of Westphalia, with the addition of some others. The body of Amphictyons who sit at Frankfort, has no power to enforce its own decrees; the emperor, who has only four votes,

may set all the rest at defiance; foreign interference is, therefore, a consequence as natural as ever. If France is concerned, the theatre of war must be Italy and the upper Rhine; if Russia, it will be Saxony and Silesia; and Prussia must either be the instrument or the victim of Russian ambition.

When a space is occupied by a number of princes, whose dominions are intersected and confounded together, no union of action can possibly take place sufficiently firm to resist the attacks of a great uniform body. Holland, Oldenburg, Cologne, Treves, Mentz, Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, Saxony, Brunswick, Osnaburg, &c. formed into one great state with Guelderland, would probably have been able to have stopped the French armies, when supported by Austria and Britain; divided, they could do nothing but submit.

To posterity it must appear unaccountable, that no sooner had Europe escaped from the danger which threatened it, and the false principles of its balance were manifested by facts, than the ministers of the principal powers met again in congress, and the result of their negociations produced a treaty, in which not one of the causes of the evils, still fresh in the minds of all men, is adverted to, or provided against for the future. Let any one who is unwilling to assent to this statement look at the map of Europe as

it is settled by the last treaty; let him weigh well what has been submitted to his consideration only in the fourth epoch; let him apply all this to the present map, and then ask himself what hope there is that the treaty of Vienna will be one jot more permanent than the foregoing? It is true that Poland will elect no more kings in its tumultuous assemblies; but the emperor of Russia is king of almost all Poland, and the king of Poland, now hereditary, has the resources of all Russia in both continents at his command. This great extent of country is behind the western world in luxury and riches; but it has men and arms; and the latter have always been, and will always be, the means of acquiring the former.

The interest of the more civilized world is to defend and preserve the advantages it enjoys; to do this, its only means are to increase its collective strength, and to watch every motion of Russia, in order to prevent her future encroachment. The portion of Poland acquired by that power at the last treaty, at the expense of Austria and Prussia, places the latter totally at her mercy: eastern Prussia and Silesia, separated by the duchy of Warsaw, annihilates the frontier of that kingdom. In the north, Finland, as far as the gulf of Bothnia, has submitted to the master of Poland. Prussia and Austria have by the result been great losers by the destruction of Polish independence.

Four primary powers exist in the present day: Russia, Austria, France, and Britain.

Prussia and Scandinavia in the north, Spain and Turkey in the south, are only secondary powers.

The smaller states in Europe are only so many additional wheels, which render the action of the whole machine more uncertain, complicated, and unsteady.

The treaty of Vienna was, exclusively, the work of the four primaries; and the whole of it is, neither more or less, than a compromise among them, in order that each might obtain the particular objects of its own avarice or ambition, but without any consideration of the disputes which might arise from it. Had this not been the case, would not some minister have expressed, what all must have felt, that the neighbourhood of small states must be ever a field for the cabals of the turbulent or ambitious? Would no one have dared to say that princes who cannot depend on their own strength for security, must ever cast about for support elsewhere? and make a thousand contortions, like rope-dancers, in order to prevent or break their fall!

Europe must ever be the victim of its own internal disorders, if certain powers do not agree in the determination to extricate her. Austria, Prussia, France, and England, must, for this end, be-

come once more united. These sovereigns must lay aside their mutual jealousy, and concur in making a geographical and political partition of Europe; and reciprocally, in good faith, abandon all past and future claims on such parts as shall be allotted to each in this new arrangement. A firm and compact state should be formed consisting of Holland and the Netherlands, including the countries from Dunkirk along the French frontier as far as Landau or Philipsburg upon the Rhine: proceeding from thence in a direct line across Germany through Wurtzburg to Bamberg: from thence, between Coburg and Culmbach, following the chain of the Bohemian mountains to Teschen; and from thence pursuing the left bank of the Elbe to the sea.

Let the emperor take the rest of Germany on the south of this limit to the Rhine at Basle; from Basle eastward, including Tyrol, Carinthia, Carniola, Croatia, Sclavonia, following the left bank of the Save to its confluence with the Danube at Belgrade: from thence following the right bank of the Danube to the Euxine sea. Give him Wallachia and Moldavia, the latter of which, with the Carpathian mountains, would complete his frontier.

Give to Prussia all from the right bank of the Elbe eastward to the south-eastern extremity of Gallicia inclusively: and from thence northward,

including the duchies of Warsaw, so as to make Prussia the palatine of Europe against the Scythians.

Constitute the whole peninsula of Italy into one kingdom, and place on its throne either the house of Savoy or of Naples; and let Sicily and Sardinia become the portion of the other.

Give the remaining part of the province of Savoy which has not been made the canton of Geneva to France, together with the country of Nice.

The reader may be startled at the proposal of giving so large a portion of Germany to Austria, and yet could the project be realized, it would then be scarcely strong enough to resist the pressure of Russia. It must also be remembered, that in this demarcation the Austrian states would have scarcely any sea coast, and the resources of an inland country in point of riches are much inferior to the maritime: it is on these grounds that I have considered those countries which have a long line of sea coast, as being stronger, in proportion to their extent, than the former. Maritime powers can act in every quarter of the globe; inland states can only reach their neighbours; their extent and resources therefore are less to be feared.

One of the great objections to be made to the union of Italy into one body politic is the question, how the pope is to be disposed of? As he is

considered by all catholic states as supreme head of the church, though he should be deprived of all temporal power he must still be placed somewhere: he must therefore be established within the dominions of some prince or other whose subject he would become; but the other catholic states would then be governed in spiritual affairs by a personage in the dependance perhaps of a rival, perhaps of an enemy. It is for this reason that all catholic governments have been obliged to recur to the old expedient of making the pope a temporal prince. But in this point of view, provided the pontiff can reside in a territory governed by himself, and independent of any sovereign, extent of possession is by no means an essential consideration; it is enough that he stand between contending parties on neutral ground, and that he be kept there by their joint concurrence. If that be admitted, Majorca, Ivica, and Minorca might be his portion, and these islands would become henceforward the sacred land of Europe. The Grecian states considered Delos in the same point of view, and the central spot of their religion. Christian Europe could not do better than to dedicate the Balearic isles to so holy a purpose.

Unite Denmark with Sweden and Norway, and call it, if you please, the kingdom of Scandinavia; the rest of Europe may remain as it now stands for the present. It would be vain to attempt

to disguise the real origin of those many disastrous wars for disputed successions, with examples of which all histories, except the Turkish, abound. The intermarriage of royal houses is the fertile source of most of these evils; and as no modifications of this inconvenient custom can be proposed without leaving entire the main objection to it, we propose that the sovereign houses should come to an agreement, and bind themselves in the most formal manner to prevent all such intermarriages for the future. Insulate as much as possible every state, and let each house provide heirs to the crown in a way the least liable to create discord.

The Turkish plan of procuring Georgian and Circassian women is perhaps the best calculated, though not conformable to the manners or religion of Europe: it is however to be remarked, that this usage has been one of the great preservers of the Ottoman empire. Could the sultans have married European princesses, wars by this time would have occurred for the succession to that throne, like that of every one in Europe; and there is little doubt but that half the princes of Germany would have laid claims to the right of becoming Mahomedans in order to reign at Constantinople. Grotesque as the reflection may appear, the truth is evident; and this is perhaps one of the rare instances of the superiority of Turkish

legislation to our own: claims set up by cousins, nieces, and grand-daughters, never occur in its history.

The princes of Europe might perhaps hit on some plan to perpetuate their race without buying female slaves, and at the same time avoid signing, with every marriage contract, the death-warrant of thousands of their fellow-creatures. We reproach the sultans for strangling three or four of their brothers to secure to themselves the throne; they may reproach us for the carnage we so humanely occasion by foreign alliances.

We have already taken notice of the advantages of the Salic law in France. Its validity was once disputed at the extinction of the Capetian dynasty, when Edward the Third of England claimed the crown in right of his mother Isabella, sister of Charles the Fourth; and a transitory possession of it was enjoyed by Henry the Fifth and his son; but it ended in the expulsion of the English from France. Since that time the Salic law has kept the throne out of the reach of contention, down to the dissolution of the monarchy at the revolution.

It is wonderful that the beneficial effects of this institution should not have been more adverted to, and that not one kingdom should have ever entertained the project of adopting it. Had it been established before the end of the seventeenth

century, three wars for succession might have been avoided; it might perhaps have added to the difficulties opposed to the pragmatic sanction, but the dynasty of Hapsburg being extinct, and females married abroad excluded, Charles of Lorraine might have succeeded, as the founders of dynasties have done in France.

Could the Salic law, with certain provisions for such circumstances, become the fundamental law of every state, it would probably, together with some regulations growing out of the proposed partition, be found to be a more trust-worthy security than any other for the future repose of the continent, and one of the firmest bonds of union in that general treaty which we propose, and which we think is necessary to prevent that repose from being continually interrupted.

In support of these reflections, let us suppose for a moment that the family now reigning on the British throne were to become extinct: the house of Savoy would lay their claim as descendants from the daughter of James the First, the kings of Denmark as descendants of the sister of George the Third.

In the former case, what would be the incompetent interests of Hanover, Great Britain, and the Italian dominions of the house of Savoy, now brought under one head? Savoy is sometimes allied to France from fear of Austria, sometimes

vice versâ; the king of England would then become the porter of the Alps, and the resources of Great Britain would be called on to support this uncertain power. France and Austria, in the event just mentioned, would unite to partition the territories of the king of England in Savoy and Piedmont; the result of which would be fresh wars in Lombardy between those two powers for the dominion of Italy. Should the Danish princes mount the throne of Great Britain, what accession of power would this give to ourselves? should not we be implicated in all the quarrels of the north, and would not Denmark become an eye-sore to Russia, to Sweden, to Prussia? would not Hanover be again attempted? would not these disputes open a theatre for Russian ambition?

It is clear from what has been said, that until Europe is composed of states competent by their own strength to support themselves, and till foreign princes are excluded by irrevocable laws, and prevented by adequate means, from disturbing the settled successions to crowns, no improvement in the public system can be durable; and, perhaps, but little, if any, will be found practicable upon any other terms. When we consider the origin of the investitures granted by plundering barbarians, we need not hesitate about the lawfulness of settling the society of a civilized world on a more reasonable basis. The primary powers of

Europe are, even without Russia, sufficiently strong to do what they please, if they would be unanimous in the determination to do what they ought.

Could they be made to feel that by agreeing with each other they would individually reap more advantage than by tearing each other to pieces, they might then agree to divide the whole continent among them once for all, and fix those great boundaries of their states, within which each should separately possess in unity of power all the possible means of independent existence and government; all the possible means of national defence and security; all the possible means of domestic prosperity and improvement; and, which is of more importance, the means of maintaining external respect by the dignity of their public counsels and conduct; the means of vindicating their national rights by the unanimous impulse of their national spirit; in short, the means of preserving altogether inviolable the country and constitution which may be the portion and the characteristic of each. No cause of dispute could arise for successions, for each reigning house would be independent of and unconnected with the rest. Civil discord, if unhappily it should be excited, would either evaporate in idle or innoxious squabbles, which the arm of executive power would easily compose; or, at worst, swell into revolutionary

commotions which the neighbouring powers would be able to repress; for we should not then see any one so hardy or so rash as to hazard, by uniting with demagogues, the integrity of a wise, substantial, and beneficent system, in the pursuit of any visionary personal interests, which there would be no possibility of ultimately realising: and if any differences of a commercial nature should arise, they would be decided by arms on the sea, or settled at home by negociation.

* To endeavour to abolish war entirely and to restore the golden age, has already been allowed to be a chimera; but to diminish the number of causes which produce it, is the object which has been professed in every treaty between nations: the consideration therefore of the means best calculated to promote that object is one of acknowledged importance, and is really one of vital interest. It would be a great point gained if the nations of Europe could be diverted from employing their arms against each other, even though they should carry elsewhere the evils incident on war. The extension of civilization would compensate for many. The theatres of war would be Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and the northern coast of Africa; and instead of laying waste the interior of Europe, armies would become colonies, and refine-

* See the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit in Goldsmith's account of the cabinet of Bonaparte.

ment and light would expand over the whole earth *.

The coast of Africa, from the streights of Gibraltar to the Pelusian mouth of the Nile, was at one time a civilized part of the world. Let civilized nations before they again quarrel among themselves, and fight for every inch of each other's territory to so little purpose, reflect, that within the precincts even of their own continent a semi-barbarous race of Turcoman Tartars have for three centuries polluted the soil, which originally was the cradle of science and art; the stupid des-

* In the present state of general distress I cannot help making the following observations:—

A long series of warfare having not only impoverished the inhabitants of the continent so as to disable them from buying our manufactures, but also having accustomed them to have recourse to their own industry for those objects which they formerly bought of England, a great want of employment has been felt by all orders of workmen. The governments also have begun to prohibit the produce of British industry, so that it does not seem probable that employment will be soon found for numbers of people in this country thus thrown out of work. Great Britain therefore is loaded with a population without means of support; it is in the situation of those ancient states of Greece whose population was too much increased. Can we find a better remedy than to have recourse to colonies? would not the planting them on the north-west coast of Africa be a policy worth consideration? A commerce with the interior of that continent might be the consequence of such an attempt, should it prove successful.

potism of their government desolates the country they inhabit; fanaticism and ignorance urge them to refuse all rational precautions against a contagious disease which sweeps numbers of themselves from existence, and constantly threatens all nations with the same scourge; for three centuries the needless discord of nations has preserved this disgraceful neighbourhood.

Look at the tract extending from the right bank of the Danube to the southern extremity of Greece, and the islands of those seas; would not these regions afford establishments sufficient to indemnify those greater princes who may suffer from our scheme of partition? Look at the northern coasts of Africa which we have just noticed; would not those immense tracts be sufficient to reward the enterprises of any nation whose spirit, population, or resources, should urge them to colonise? When we consider the rapid progress with which the Americans have extended colonies and settlements over the face of a new and immense continent, and when we see Europe circumscribed within its narrow limits, and overflowing with people, we cannot help wondering at the narrow views of its rulers, who confine themselves to the pitiful policy of trying to over-reach each other.

Were the sovereigns of Austria, Great Britain, France, and Prussia, to concur sincerely in such a

plan of policy as we recommend, qualified and corrected by a more minute research into the subject, it is hardly to be supposed that even Russia, with her myriads of Cossacs, could oppose any very serious obstacles to its accomplishment.

It is true some princes would be deprived of their dominions; the greater, such as Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, Darmstadt, &c. might be indemnified in the countries we have just now enumerated. The lesser princes of Germany would probably descend to the rank of magnates of the different monarchies: they would, no doubt, lose their supremacy; with the *jus de non appellando;* the right to coin, now and then, a few thousand pounds worth of bad money; and that of commanding an army of twelve or fourteen soldiers: but they might enjoy their territorial revenues with greater happiness, as they would not have a ridiculous and shabby grandeur to support.

Henry the Fourth of France is understood to have had a plan in view for the tranquillity of the world, but it laboured under many inconveniences. In the first place it required the consent of too many princes to carry it into execution, and a great military enterprize was to be achieved before it could be realized: nothing less than that the house of Austria should be deprived of every thing without the peninsula of Spain; and Europe was

to be divided into too many heterogeneous states to preserve long a state of peace.

The distribution was as follows; six great hereditary monarchies, viz. Spain, France, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy: five elective monarchies, viz. the Empire, the Papacy, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia: four republics, viz. Venice, Ducal Italy, Switzerland, and Holland.

All the states were to be kept in concert by an Amphictyonic assembly, who were to decide on all differences. The means however of enforcing these decisions were not provided, for they had no executive power; and if that had been provided, these Amphictyons, collectively, would have been in a condition to coerce the very sovereigns from whom their power was delegated! The reader may read with attention the thirtieth book of Sully's Memoirs to make himself complete master of this project; and after having impressed on his mind the contents of this little work he will perceive the impracticability of Henry's plan, or, at least, the little probability of its producing the desired effect.

One reflection, however, is of consequence to us. That Henry should have occupied himself with that subject; that he should have been able to draw queen Elizabeth, and so many others, into a co-operation in his plans; and this at a time when so many advantages which we possess were

wanting to him, is no doubt very encouraging; for if in those days the governments of Europe felt the inconveniences resulting from the instability and other defects of the existing system, so strongly as to concur in measures of partition in order to amend it, although the attempt was abortive; if so many were brought so easily into one great design, complicated as it then was, surely it ought not now to be thought so difficult to unite in one common view for the same common object five of the most powerful monarchs on earth, and so accomplish that grand and final partition upon more simple principles, and under auspices which promise its safe execution.

Here we may be interrupted by those who would make objections on the score of justice. In the first place, let them observe the justice with which the reigning families originally acquired their dominions. Let them next consider whether stopping the unnecessary effusion of human blood, by adopting sounder principles of international government, be not justice in a higher and nobler sense to mankind at large? *Salus populi snprema lex esto,* is an axiom which they must first confute before they can plead in favour of the right of princes who have not the means of fulfilling their part of the contract with the people whom they govern, namely, that of giving a valid protection in return for allegiance. But a yet stronger argu-

ment may be brought in favour of our slashing system as it may be called; our adversaries may be asked when they appeal to the moral code, in the narrow scale in which they would confine us, how they came in the last peace of Vienna, 1815, to allow Russia to seize on the duchy of Warsaw and half of Gallicia? why did they deprive Saxony of one half of its territory? why were the ecclesiastical electorates of Mentz, Cologne, and Treves, given, in an arbitrary manner, to the king of Prussia and the duke of Hesse-Darmstadt? why was the independence of the republic of Genoa and Venice sacrificed to the king of Sardinia and the emperor? why was Norway given to the king of Sweden? why was Pomerania given to the king of Prussia? If all these changes could be made merely to accommodate different princes without regard to pleas of justice, and which is worse, without insuring the stability of Europe, our adversaries may be repelled without any further trouble.

The justice and the morality which they preach has about as much to do with the question as rhetoric, chemistry, or architecture. We deny that the principle of justice governs the deliberations of general congresses. When, therefore, the inconveniences of any particular order or distribution of territory are either universally felt or are proved to the satisfaction of men of sound judg-

ment and experience, justice is not with them the reason for withholding the remedy, though justice, in its sublimest sense, would be imperative upon them to apply it without any other consideration but the paramount necessity of the public good. We do not undervalue the minutest offices of any kind of justice; but we assert that the public is to be served first, and that minor interests must give way. To offer to the reader more arguments on this subject would be to suppose he were not able to adduce them himself, and would look like proving a truism.

Princes are ever calling out on the patriotism and public spirit of their subjects, but if love of the sovereign and of the country is admitted to be the duty and the virtue of subjects, is it less the virtue or duty of princes to watch over and to cherish the public interests of their empire, which can never be exclusive of the care of the public interests of their neighbours? Public interests have universal relations, and a good father of his people should be the general patron of mankind.

The kings of England once ruled over Normandy, Poitou, Brittany, &c. &c. on the same footing that our kings hold the kingdom of Hanover; that is, these were sovereignties belonging to the king, but separate from the body of his English empire. So long as the weakness of the French monarchy lasted, in consequence of the

division of that kingdom into great fiefs, those provinces obeyed the English monarch; the simplifying principle having concentrated the power of the French monarchy, they returned to the allegiance of France. Hanover will have the same fate if Russia does not, before Germany be condensed into one body, overturn the present system of Europe; for if Germany should be so consolidated, Hanover will be reabsorbed.

The picture drawn by the abbé du Pradt of the Russian empire, is the most interesting part of the work which he has lately published, entitled, "*the Congress of Vienna.*" It contains many great truths, but it seems to have been written too hastily, and instead of appealing to the reason, to be rather designed as an address to the passions of men. The style of Rousseau seems to have corrupted the taste of many French writers who affect to be very profound, and to "*saisir un apperçu,*" as they term it. But they seem to forget, that in matters of politics, though reason is never excluded, history is the source of clear and distinct knowledge. Strip his work of the declamation it contains, and the two volumes would dwindle to a very small book, neither as comprehensive nor as profound as the subject requires.

We cannot however omit doing justice to the abbé's accurate view of the Russian empire. A barbarous people, he observes, commanded by

T. Miller, Printer, Noble Street, Cheapside.

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